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A great deal of philosophy of perception literature has been concerned with determining the 
fundamental philosophical account of perception. The overwhelming majority of 
contemporary work in this area has advocated for either a relational view of perception 
(broadly known as relationalism) or a representational view of perception (broadly known as 
representationalism). Each of these views is argued by its proponents to constitute the 
fundamental philosophical account of perception. These arguments are often framed in a 
manner suggesting that relationalism and representationalism are incompatible with one 
another on the grounds that if one theory explains all that we would like a philosophical 
theory of perception to explain, then the other theory is at best screened off as explanatorily 
redundant. This is known as a screening off argument, and has been utilised by both sides 
of the relationalism versus representationalism debate. The aim of this thesis is to 
demonstrate that both the utilisation of this argument in the philosophy of perception, as well 
as the explanatory methodology underpinning this utilisation, are misguided. This is 
accomplished by proposing instead that a methodology called explanatory pluralism, which 
holds that the best explanation of a given phenomenon is determined by what it is about that 
phenomenon one wishes to understand, should be applied to the debate in question. Once 
this plausible methodology is applied, I argue, instances that appeared to settle the 
relationalism versus representationalism debate decisively in favour of one view or the other 
instead become instances that shape the contours of a view according to which relationalism 
and representationalism are in fact compatible. I identify and argue for such instances, using 
them to support the conclusion that relationalism and representationalism are 
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The aim of this thesis is to address and resolve a debate at the heart of the 
philosophy of perception. By perception, I mean the conscious experience of 
our environment that is informed by sensory modalities such as seeing, 
hearing, smelling and so on. The philosophy of perception seeks to 
understand this aspect of conscious experience and provide overarching 
philosophical theories about it. It is with regard to these theories that the 
debate I will be concerned with occurs. 
Two theories have enjoyed discussion and success throughout the majority 
of contemporary philosophy of perception literature: according to the first, 
perception is a matter of one standing in a particular relation to the objects 
in the world that one perceives; according to the second, it is a matter of 
representing one’s environment as being a particular way (what all of this 
means and amounts to will become clearer in due course). Call the former 
relationalism and the latter representationalism. Between them, the two have 
divided the majority of philosophers working in this area, as each claims to 
provide the most fundamental philosophical account of perceptual 
experience. 
I claim that this either/or split is misguided, in that neither offers the most 
fundamental philosophical account of perception simpliciter. By applying an 
alternative methodology to the relationalism versus representationalism 
debate, I will argue that the merits offered by each view can be 
accommodated without precluding those of the other. This will be achieved 
by conceiving of each theory as offering explanations of perceptual 
experience and conceiving of explanations as offering answers to particular 
questions dictated by what it is one wishes to understand. This conception 
allows for a pluralist stance to be taken towards explanation, which (very 
roughly) holds that different sorts of explanation may be more effective than 
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others at explaining different things. By plugging certain explanations 
offered by relationalism and representationalism into this framework, it is 
possible to construct a pluralistic account that resolves this debate and – I 
will argue – accommodates much of the insightful work in the literature, as 
well as diagnosing the erroneous nature of the initial debate. 
I devote the first two chapters of the thesis to providing a thoroughgoing 
analysis of representationalism and relationalism. Chapter 1 will focus on 
representationalism: what it holds, arguments in its favour, and internal 
debates among its proponents as to the nature of representational content. 
Chapter 2 provides a similar exegesis of relationalism’s workings and 
arguments in its favour, with a particular focus on various ways 
relationalists have attempted to account for so-called problem cases posed 
by illusory and hallucinatory experiences. Chapter 3 provides a commentary 
on explanatory pluralism – the methodology I shall be applying to the 
relationalism versus representationalism debate – assessing reasons for its 
motivation in extraneous disciplines with the purpose of providing an 
argument for its motivation in the philosophy of perception. Chapter 4 
evaluates side-by-side the explanations offered by relationalism and 
representationalism of various aspects of perceptual experience, with a view 
to identifying certain questions to which we seek answers that can only be 
answered by one theory or the other, but not both. With these cases in hand, 
Chapter 5 elucidates the nature and means of constructing complimentary 
explanations, arguing that relationalism and representationalism offer 
explanations that can fall within this framework, and concluding that this 
picture accommodates the merits of both views whilst negating the need to 
endorse at most one of the theories. Finally, Chapter 6 discusses the 
ramifications of this line of argument for the philosophy of perception, 
considering and addressing potential objections, and closes with some 
remarks on avenues for future work in this area. The remainder of this 
introductory chapter is devoted to providing historical context for theories 
of perception throughout the literature, and introducing the relationalism 
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versus representationalism debate with which the remainder of the thesis is 
concerned. 
 
0.1: Setting the debate in context 
It is no accident that much has been made in philosophy of efforts to 
understand the mental aspects to our existence. Of the array of mysteries 
and ‘big questions’ that the discipline addresses, it is the philosophy of mind 
that centrally treats us, or at least our mental workings, as the mystery to be 
solved – as what is to be understood. Of course, within this broad enterprise 
of understanding how the mind works, there are various separable aspects 
of the mind and its workings into which our investigative enterprises might 
be categorised. Of these, one that has enjoyed a great deal of attention over 
the years has been the philosophy of perception. Even cursory consideration 
of the role of perceptual experiences renders this readily understandable: it 
is true that not all aspects of our mental lives, as it were, are concerned with 
providing us with information about the external, mind-independent world 
and its workings. It is also true to say that a great deal of our conscious 
experience is dedicated to providing us with this information – it is broadly 
through our perceptual faculties that we enjoy success in this area. 
Broadly, we might speak of the mind-independent world as the collection of 
(predominantly) physical objects and states of affairs that obtain between 
them irrespective of whether any subject is around to experience or act upon 
them. In other words, things which are mind-independent are such that were 
a subject to simply cease to exist – without any further consequences – this 
would not impact the object’s existence. That is, the object would not also 
cease to exist. This might be contrasted with the property of being mind-
dependent, whereby things that are correctly predicated with this term are 
such that, were a given subject to cease to exist, they would too – in other 
words: they depend on the mind of that subject for their very existence. 
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On the face of it, that the mind-dependent is a domain over which the mind 
enjoys control seems obvious: metaphysically speaking, it is at least 
controversial to suggest that anything mind-dependent exists on the same 
plane as anything mind-independent. For example, the love one feels for 
another, whatever else may be said about it, is not as physically robust as the 
wedding ring worn as an expression of that love. The former would (in 
centrally important respects) perish with the demise of both parties as a 
matter of necessity, whilst the latter would not. This is not to say, however, 
that the mind-independent and mind-dependent are wholly isolated from 
one another. Indeed, as the external world is thought of as being mind-
independent, any information that we have about it (which might be 
manipulated by us mentally to our own various ends) is such that it requires 
some connection – one that bridges the gap between the mind-independent, 
external, physical plane and the mind-dependent, internal mental workings 
of our minds. 
Perception seems a natural candidate for such a connection between the 
internal and external: a connection which allows us to capture information 
about the mind-independent world around us; information which we can 
then (plan to) act upon, manipulate, and so on. For one thing, then, it seems 
as though perception allows us to greatly enhance our epistemic states. 
Cohering with approaches to popular philosophical themes, perception qua 
source of knowledge is certainly a process that we have been eager to 
understand. Indeed, after knowledge attained via reason and intellect alone, 
it appears other knowledge we possess is in some way delivered to us via 
our perceptual faculties, be this by means of vision, olfaction, or any of the 
other sense modalities.  
The philosophical interest in perception is not exclusively an epistemological 
one. Whilst there are epistemologically-minded people who concern 
themselves principally with what it is to know something about one’s 
environment as a result of perceptual experience – or with precisely how this 
works – it is also true that people are occupied with the phenomenology of 
our perceptual experiences, i.e. with ‘what it is like’ to have them. These are 
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merely two out of several focal areas that are presently being investigated 
and theorised about in an active fashion, but which have been so for a great 
number of years. 
Faced with this physical process that apparently allows us to gather 
information about the physical states of affairs and happenings in the mind-
independent world, and have this information available to us mentally when 
planning our actions, it is only natural that we might wish to understand 
exactly how the process works. Throughout the years this was attempted 
primarily by attending to the question of exactly what it was that we were 
most directly perceiving. In other words, in seeking to understand 
perceptual experience, philosophers of perception turned first and foremost 
to address the question of what constitutes the object of perception in our 
perceptual experiences. We can see motivations for this on two fronts. In the 
first instance, we have it that perception appears to be the key source of 
much of our knowledge pertaining to the external world, yet we know also 
from experience that perceptual experience can be misleading. How such a 
fallible source of information might also be simultaneously the central 
foundation of such knowledge is a question of critical importance to the 
discipline; these are the broad concerns that motivate the so-called ‘problem 
of perception’, on which I shall say more below.1  
On the other hand, contemplation of a more metaphysical sort leads us quite 
naturally to several considerations. Firstly, veridical perception – where 
reality and our perception of it match – seems poised to give us knowledge 
only on the basis that our perceptions and the mind-independent objects 
that they are perceptions of are linked in an appropriate manner. Yet it 
seems clear that they cannot be one and the same thing. Take, for instance, 
my perception of the mountain I am looking at – this cannot be identical to 
the mountain itself: the mountain itself will persist if I suddenly drop out of 
existence, whereas my perception of it would perish with me. Additionally, 
one of the properties of the mountain itself is the vast amount of space it 
                                                          
1 Matthen (2015: 5) 
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occupies, yet my perception seems to take place within me – something that 
cannot possibly be achieved by the mountain itself, as it occupies much 
more space than I do! 
It seems, then, that the question regarding the direct object of veridical 
perceptions is more complicated than it may first appear. Several 
alternatives have been suggested as candidates and, though not the primary 
focus of this thesis, they merit a brief mention for reasons of historical 
context. Answers which are now for the most part rejected have appealed to 
a number of things: one example being sense-data – non-physical objects 
residing outside the subject, our awareness of which fundamentally accounts 
for perception – which are relied upon in sense-datum theory. This view is 
the main articulation of indirect realism, which holds that we are aware of 
mind-independent objects only indirectly, via being directly aware of an 
intermediary, such as sense-data.2 Anti-realist views, such as Berkeley’s 
idealism, according to which we are not directly perceiving mind-
independent objects at all, and our perception extends only to mind-
dependent objects, have also been advanced.3 Theories such as the more 
mentally focused adverbial view, according to which perception is a state of 
mind adverbially modified in some way (e.g. my seeing the tomato sauce in 
front of me is to be semantically described as my ‘visually sensing redly’) 
have also been proposed.4 For various reasons, these views have been 
predominantly cast aside as untenable by those engaged in the philosophy 
of perception literature.5 They do, however, serve to exhibit the number and 
variety of responses to the demand for understanding with respect to our 
perceptual experiences. 
 
                                                          
2 See Russell (2001) for the traditional view, and Robinson (1994) for a contemporary version. 
3 See Berkeley (2012a, 2012b, 2012c). 
4 Initially Chisholm (1957), though Kriegel (2007) offers a contemporary adverbialist spin on representation of 
non-existent entities. 
5 For reasons of space, I am unable to undergo a full-dress discussion here as to why these theories fell out of 
favour, however Brewer (2011) and Crane & French (2015) provide good discussion of this. 
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0.2: Representationalism and relationalism: introducing the debate 
If the aforementioned theories are all-but-universally discarded, then what 
has replaced them? The answer to this is largely composed of two distinct 
theories of perception: representationalism and relationalism. Though a 
much more detailed account of each view will be provided in the chapters to 
follow, for now it suffices to provide the following tenets: 
REP:  Perception most fundamentally consists in a subject representing the 
mind-independent world as being a certain way. 
REL:  Perception most fundamentally consists in a relation between the subject 
of the experience, and the mind-independent object(s) they are perceiving, 
which obtains within a particular set of circumstances. 
Despite this admittedly basic articulation, it is still correct to say that the 
philosophy of perception has been a two-horse race between 
representationalism and relationalism for the last several decades. Though 
this is not to say anything about how the philosophy of perception should 
have been for any length of time at all – as we shall see, I take the two-horse 
race mentality to be completely mistaken. I shall provide a summary of why I 
think this before the chapter concludes, and providing more comprehensive 
treatment of the issue is the overall task of this thesis, and so shall be 
something I attempt in the chapters that follow. For now, it will be prudent 
to offer some account as to why this state of affairs has obtained, 
irrespective of whether it ought to have or not. 
There are multiple ways to accomplish this. For one, we can consider the 
chronology of the theories in question, in particular what they were put 
forward to replace. Representationalism was put forward as a response to 
the other theories discussed above: sense-datum theory, adverbialism and 
idealism, for instance. The thought was that one could get around the 
dubious metaphysics they employ, by positing that each experience has 
associated with it some content (as experience is intentional, therefore about 
something, and what it is about is this content), and this content is grasped 
by the subject by means of representation. A subject thus representing their 
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environment to be a certain way is – according to representationalism – what 
perception most fundamentally consists in.6 Conversely, relationalism was 
advanced to provide contemporary accommodation for the early modern 
intuition that the direct objects of perception just are the objects that they 
appear to be: i.e. we perceive objects in an unmediated manner.  
For all its purported benefits, it was still thought by some that 
representationalism fell wide of the mark in its efforts to give the most 
fundamental characterisation of veridical perception (by which I mean 
normal, successful perception and not illusion or hallucination). In 
particular, it has been suggested that veridical perception most 
fundamentally involves a direct connection with the mind-independent 
objects we perceive, rather than representing them as being a particular way. 
Relationalism attempts to accommodate this suggestion, holding that there 
is a relation R of direct acquaintance that obtains between a subject S, a 
mind-independent object o, from a standpoint c (where c is taken to 
encompass the lighting conditions, angle of viewing, and other such things), 
and however R is cashed out is what perception most fundamentally consists 
in.7 Note that relationalism does not preclude the occurrence of experience 
involving representation, any more than representationalism precludes the 
subject being directly acquainted with mind-independent objects – what each 
denies is that the other is correct about how best to fundamentally 
characterise perceptual experience.  
The immediate problem here, as the emphasis in the previous paragraph 
highlights, is that we have two distinct accounts of perceptual experience, 
each of which claim that their position constitutes the most fundamental 
account of perception. By straightforward consideration of what the words 
mean, we can appreciate that there can be at most one theory of perception 
that is the most fundamental. From here, the fact that most of the literature 
                                                          
6 Logue (2014: 224); not all theories of perception that fall under the banner ‘representational’ adhere to all of 
these commitments, but for the purposes of this introductory chapter, this is a sufficient characterisation. 
More elaboration on the intricacies and nuances of representationalism is provided in the following chapter. 
7 Again, this is very concise. A much more complete exposition of the various ways relationalism has been 
cashed out is provided in Chapter 2. 
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surrounding these two sorts of view have treated the two as incompatible, 
has itself been taken as evidence that the two theories are incompatible. 
According to almost all discussion on the matter, the choice between 
representationalism and relationalism, and – due to the falling out of favour 
of other sorts of theory of perception – the choice of one’s theory of 
perception at all, was seemingly a one-or-the-other situation. It is this precise 
point that I submit is misguided. In making this claim, I join a growing list of 
contemporary philosophers of perception who arrive at the same conclusion, 
though it is fair to say that the path taken to get there varies substantially 
depending on whose work one reads.  
In her (2011) for instance, Susanna Schellenberg defends what can be 
referred to as a reconciliatory theory of perception. According to her view, it 
is simply false, even on the assumption that the only plausibly correct 
theories to be had about perception are relationalism and 
representationalism, that it must be one or the other that is the correct view, 
as opposed to both. This is then fleshed out by way of contending that 
representational content and the perceptual relation of direct acquaintance 
are “mutually dependent” in providing a fundamental philosophical account 
of perception.8  On her view, this is because having an experience with 
representational content involves the employment of concepts, the 
possession of which in turn requires that the subject bear the sort of 
relation to mind-independent objects that the relationalist contends is 
fundamental to perceptual experience – a relation of direct acquaintance that 
can pick out the mind-independent objects or property instances that the 
concept is of.9 
The view I shall be advancing, in contrast, agrees with the core notion that it 
is just false that we cannot incorporate both relational and representational 
views into our overarching theory of perception. In fleshing out what this 
amounts to, my view comes closer to Heather Logue’s, as set out in her 
(2014), and stresses that which of representationalism or relationalism we 
                                                          
8 Schellenberg (2011: 732) 
9 Ibid. (732 – 733) 
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should be appealing to in order to best afford us an understanding of 
perception depends on what it is we are trying to explain.  
Motivating the immediately preceding statement, and showing how this 
allows us to on some level accept both relationalism and representationalism 
are the central tasks of this thesis, and as such require a great deal more 
exposition and argument before they may be completed. I return to that task 
in subsequent chapters. In what remains of this one, I shall set out the type 
of argument which it is thought has led several to think that there is no 
middle-ground to be had between relationalism and representationalism, 
before sketching a rough overview of my response to it, and offering some 
concluding remarks on what the ramifications of this are, how the proposed 
view sits with its alternatives, and outlining in more detail what is to follow 
in subsequent chapters. 
 
0.3: ‘Screening off’ objections 
So why, then, has it been taken to be the case that representationalism and 
relationalism are incompatible with one another? As far as I can determine, 
those who assented to a position of incompatibility have been guided by 
reasoning that emulates that of the argument immediately below. 
The Screening Off Argument: 
1) Suppose (for the sake of reductio) that perceptual experiences are 
representational (in the sense that representationalism says they are). 
2) Relationalism is not explanatorily redundant with respect to what we want 
our philosophical theory of perception to explain (a commitment of 
relationalism). 
3) The fact that perceptual experiences are representational is sufficient to 
explain what we want our philosophical theory of perception to explain. 
4) If perceptual experiences are representational, then relationalism is screened 
off as explanatorily redundant with respect to what we want our 
philosophical theory of perception to explain (from 3). 
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5) Relationalism is screened off as explanatorily redundant with respect to 
what we want our philosophical theory of perception to explain (from 1 and 
4). 
6) Contradiction (2 and 5); perceptual experiences are not representational.10 
 
The above is an instance of a ‘screening off’ objection. There are two 
things to immediately note about it. The first is that there is an 
analogous argument that comes down on the side of perceptual 
experiences not being relational:  
1) Suppose (for the sake of reductio) that perceptual experiences are relational 
(in the sense that relationalism says they are). 
2) Representationalism is not explanatorily redundant with respect to what we 
want our philosophical theory of perception to explain (a commitment of 
representationalism). 
3) The fact that perceptual experiences are relational is sufficient to explain 
what we want our philosophical theory of perception to explain. 
4) If perceptual experiences are relational, then representationalism is screened 
off as explanatorily redundant with respect to what we want our 
philosophical theory of perception to explain (from 3). 
5) Representationalism is screened off as explanatorily redundant with respect 
to what we want our philosophical theory of perception to explain (from 1 
and 4). 
6) Contradiction (2 and 5); perceptual experiences are not relational. 
 
Both arguments presented above are screening off objections which, 
more generally, hold if there are two theories attempting to explain the 
same thing, and one of them explains all that there is to be explained 
about this, then the other becomes ‘screened off’ as explanatorily 
redundant even if it can provide an explanation to that thing as well. In 
                                                          
10 This is an adaptation of what Logue (2014) refers to as a ‘close cousin’ to the second part of Martin’s 
argument against positive accounts of hallucination (more on this in Chapter 2). I have adjusted Logue’s 
reconstruction such that ‘what we want our philosophical theory of veridical perception to explain’ has taken 
the place of the experience’s ‘epistemological, behavioural and phenomenal features’. The reason for this is 
that I wish to remain neutral on whether or not there is any aspect of veridical experience of which we should 
want our philosophical theory to provide an explanation that is not exhausted by the initial phrasing of 
epistemological, behavioural and phenomenal features. 
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the first argument presented above, it is concluded that perceptual 
experience is not representational by deriving a contradiction from the 
assumption that it is. Simply accepting alongside this assumption that 
relationalism is not explanatorily redundant, and that 
representationalism can explain everything we want a philosophical 
theory of perception to explain. The other version operates in exactly 
the same manner, with representationalism and relationalism swapped 
around, therefore reaching the conclusion that perceptual experience is 
not relational. Taken together, these arguments seem to suggest that 
one cannot accept both theories: i.e. they are incompatible. 
The second thing to note is that each of the conversing formats of this 
argument seem to be equally valid. Consequently, since these two 
arguments would directly contradict one another, then if they are both 
valid, it must be the case that at least one of them is unsound. I submit 
that it is in fact both of these arguments that are unsound, and 
additionally contend that it is premise 3 of each argument that this lack 
of soundness has as its point of origin. 
So I take it to be mistaken both that (i) the fact that perceptual 
experiences are representational is sufficient to explain everything that 
we want our philosophical theory of veridical perception to explain, and 
(ii) the fact that perceptual experiences are relational is sufficient to 
explain everything that we want our philosophical theory of veridical 
perception to explain. That is to say: I take the endorsement of the 
Screening Off Argument by relationalism or representationalism to be 
in error. 
As later chapters will show, I also take there to have been a further 
error made on the basis of this first one. In a nutshell, this amounts to 
the notion that relationalists and representationalists have on multiple 
occasions taken the apparent inability of the opposing view to provide 
an explanation of some aspect of veridical perception that their view 
can explain as a decisive argument in support of their own view. In a 
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snappier form: proponents of screening off objections are screening off 
more than they ought to be. I will spell out in much more detail why I 
take this to be the case in due course, but in summary form the idea is 
that once a reconciliatory view of perception is on the table, then cases 
where only one of relationalism or representationalism can offer an 
explanation of an aspect of perception that we want explained should 
not be treated as entailing the refutation of the allegedly opposing 
theory.  
Instead, such cases should be treated as delineating the specific 
commitments of that reconciliatory view that draws on each individual 
theory, depending on what it is about our perceptual experiences we 
wish to understand, and how well each theory respectively explains this 
phenomenon. Additionally, this type of reconciliatory view 
accommodates persuasive arguments made in the literature by 
relationalists and representationalists that their respective views are 
correct. Reinterpreting the dialectic in this way makes sense of why 
relationalism and representationalism have been viewed as 
incompatible, whilst resolving the debate. The persuasive arguments in 
favour of one view or the other, when subjected to the error of 
screening off as explanatorily redundant more of the opposing view 
than is warranted, effectively predicts the ‘one or the other’ mentality 







The theory that has dominated discussion in contemporary philosophy of 
perception is what I will be calling representationalism11. As shall be clear by 
the end of this chapter, providing a specific account of what exactly this 
theory amounts to is exceptionally difficult. The literature covering, in the 
broadest sense, content views of perception is massive and this in turn has 
led to the generation of a great many similar yet distinct views for which it is 
challenging to provide an accurate taxonomy. In order to understand what is 
to follow in subsequent chapters, it is worth explaining the various paths 
that so-called content views have taken within the philosophy of perception, 
since without doing this it is not easy to see precisely how the various views 
work or are to be distinguished from one another. For the exegetical 
purposes of this chapter, I shall use ‘content view’ as an umbrella term for 
views of perceptual experience that involve content in some way. Not all of 
these content views are articulations of representationalism, yet in 
discussing them, I hope the commitments of representationalism will 
become clear. The structure of this chapter is as follows: I will first set the 
advancement of content views in context; then, I shall provide an exegesis of 
what, in the broadest of senses, the core claims of content views are, and will 
draw distinctions between types of content view to arrive at a sharp 
definition of representationalism. Then, I provide over several sections a 
more thoroughgoing classificatory schema of positions that philosophers of 
perception have taken on issues surrounding the nature of representation 
and representational content. The final section discusses how 
representationalism deals with the so-called ‘bad cases’ of perception – 
illusion and hallucination – in an appealing manner. 
                                                          
11 Block (1990) opts for the term ‘representationism’, which distinguishes the view in question from what I will 
call herein ‘strong intentionalism’ – the view that the phenomenal character of an experience not only 
supervenes on its representational content but is identical to it. I opt for the distinction I do because I imagine 
it easier for the reader to immediately discern what is meant, e.g., by the claim that ‘strong intentionalism is a 
form of representationalism’ than the claim that ‘representationalism is a form of representationism’. 
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1.1: Historical context 
Historically, philosophical theories of perception have tended towards 
answering questions regarding what exactly it is that we most directly 
perceive in the course of our veridical perceptual experiences.12 Pre-
theoretically, it may seem obvious that the answer to this question is, to 
borrow some phrasing from Brewer, the mind-independent, physical objects 
that we all know and love.13 This permits us to say that we have knowledge 
of our immediate environment when we successfully perceive it, because we 
have direct awareness of it, of the sort we would lack were we hallucinating. 
This rudimentary view is known as direct realism. There are several issues 
with this sort of view, most prominently arguments based on non-veridical 
experiences – illusion and hallucination. The first of these runs as follows: 
 
 
The Argument from Illusion: 
P1) In an illusory experience, it seems to one that something has a quality, F, 
which the ordinary object supposedly being perceived does not actually have. 
P2) When it seems to one that something has a quality, F, then there is 
something of which one is aware which does have this quality. 
C1) Since the ordinary object in question is, by hypothesis, not-F, then it follows 
that in cases of illusory experience, one is not aware of the object after all. 
P4) The same account of experience must apply to both veridical and illusory 
experiences. 
C2) Therefore, in cases of veridical experience, one is not aware of the object 
after all. 
P6) If one is perceptually aware of an ordinary object at all, it is in either a 
veridical or illusory experience. 
                                                          
12 Crane (1992: 2) 
13 Brewer (2011) 
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C3) Therefore, one is never perceptually aware of ordinary objects.14 
As stated here, the argument from illusion seeks to establish a negative 
conclusion that runs contrary to the spirit of direct realism as described 
above. We see also in premise 2 that there is nevertheless something 
apparent to the subject in cases of illusion. This premise has come to be 
known as the Phenomenal Principle, and states that if something seems to a 
subject to possess a sensible quality, then there is something of which the 
subject is aware that actually does possess that sensible quality.15 A natural 
question that follows is precisely what the nature of this thing is, if not 
physical and mind-independent (as held by direct realism). Bertrand Russell 
proposed an answer in the form of non-ordinary, non-physical, mind-
dependent objects called sense-data.16 The character of an illusory experience 
is thereby explained by the sensible qualities that these sense-data actually 
possess. A similar case can be made in light of hallucinatory experience, and 
runs as follows: 
The Argument from Hallucination: 
P1) When I hallucinate, I am not aware of any mind-independent, physical object. 
P2) When I hallucinate, I am nonetheless aware of something. 
C1) When I hallucinate, I must be aware of a mind-dependent, nonphysical mental 
object – a sense-datum. 
P3) Experiences that are phenomenally indistinguishable are of exactly the same 
type, qua mental state. 
P4) If two experiences are of exactly the same type, qua mental state, and one 
involves being aware of a mind-dependent, nonphysical object, then the other also 
does. 
P5) For every non-hallucinatory experience there is a phenomenally identical 
hallucinatory experience. 
                                                          
14 Crane & French (2015) 
15 Robinson (1994: 32) 
16 See Russell (2001) 
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C2) All perceptual experience, hallucinatory and non-hallucinatory, involves 
awareness of a mind-dependent, nonphysical object – a sense-datum.17 
Ultimately, Russellian sense-datum theory fell out of favour due to a number 
of objections raised against it. For one thing, the metaphysical status of a 
sense-datum is dubious; for another, implausible consequences of the 
Phenomenal Principle upon which these arguments rely are drawn out by 
Armstrong, who generates a phenomenal sorites paradox using the notion of 
colour samples. We are asked to consider three colour samples: C1, C2, and 
C3; these are such that (with respect to colour) C1 appears exactly similar to 
C2, C2 appears exactly similar to C3, but C3 does not appear exactly similar to 
C1. By the Phenomenal Principle, this entails the existence of corresponding 
sense-data S1, S2 and S3, which are such that (again, with respect to colour) S1 
is exactly similar to S2, S2 is exactly similar to S3, and S3 is not exactly similar 
to S1. Yet such an arrangement, it is argued, violates the alleged transitivity 
of exact similarity with respect to a given property, in this case colour. It is 
plausible to say that apparent colours need not be transitive – limitations in 
the human visual system make this quite likely – but the Phenomenal 
Principle entails that sensible properties of sense-data surely are just the 
sort of properties which exact similarities between ought to be transitive.18 
Despite the apparent failure of Russellian sense-datum theory, there are 
other avenues to pursue from this point: the direct acquaintance that 
Russellian views claim that we have with sense-data, for instance, may be 
argued to obtain between subjects and mind-independent objects without a 
sense-datum-like intermediary (as in contemporary relationalism). 
Alternatively, as will be the focus of the remainder of this chapter, we might 
focus on perceptual representations in order to articulate our philosophical 
theory of perception. 
 
                                                          
17 Macpherson (2013: 12 – 13). 
18 Armstrong (1993: 218 – 219) 
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1.2: Experiential content views 
Issues with other theories of perception led to the advancement of what may 
be labelled, in the broadest of terms, as content views. Outlining several 
options for the core commitments of such views is the primary task of this 
section; first, though, I shall say a little on why it might be thought that 
perception is representational, as this will stand us in good stead for what is 
to follow. 
In the first instance, it may seem prima facie obvious that experience is 
intentional, in the same way that beliefs, desires and the like are: experiences 
seem to be about things. Considering the case of a belief, it is clear that 
“there is a way the world could be which would make the belief true and a 
way the world could be which would make the belief false.”19 In other words: 
the belief has accuracy conditions – when the content of my belief is that 
there is a white lamp on my desk in front of and to the right of me, then the 
accuracy conditions for this belief are met if there actually is, in the world, a 
white lamp on my desk in front of and to the right of me. Some beliefs can 
be more coarse or finely grained than others, and it is possible that the 
accuracy conditions may become more stringent if my belief is of a finer 
grain (e.g. that the lamp is ceramic, or is of the sort used to treat Seasonal 
Affective Disorder), and these accuracy conditions will not be met if the 
world does not accurately reflect the content of these finer-grained beliefs, 
even if the original accuracy conditions on the more straightforward, coarse-
grained belief about the white lamp and its position would be.  
Some proponents of the content view apply something like the foregoing 
analysis of beliefs’ accuracy conditions to perceptual experience, generating 
a view according to which experiences are intentional, and thereby according 
to which “all visual perceptual experiences have contents.”20 The idea is that 
the contents of one’s experience constitute accuracy conditions for that very 
experience: if, as the case may be, I have an experience of a whiteboard on 
                                                          
19 Macpherson (2011: 2) 
20 Siegel (2010: 334) 
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the wall to my right, then (at least part of) the content of my experience is 
that there is a whiteboard on the wall to my right, and this experience will be 
accurate (or veridical) iff there exists in the world a whiteboard on the wall 
to my right. Otherwise, my experience is inaccurate, by way of being to some 
degree either illusory or hallucinatory.21 As Siegel points out, however, all 
that is established at this stage is that experiences possess accuracy 
conditions – nothing has been done to argue that these accuracy conditions 
are fit to serve as the content of experience. What the content theorist really 
wants, after all, is to uphold the claim that all perceptual experiences involve 
contents, not merely accuracy conditions.  
Identifying views that have upheld this claim and assessing arguments in 
their favour is the major task of the remainder of this section. It will first be 
prudent to introduce some terminology, and in so doing make clear key 
distinctions between what I am taking to be three core versions of content 
view.22 Logue distinguishes between three ‘flavours’ of view: Mild, Medium 
and Spicy. I shall now explain in turn the respective commitments of each of 
these.  
The Mild Content View consists in nothing more than an acceptance of the 
following two claims, which Logue contends form the bare minimum that 
one is committed to in holding that experience has content: for any 
perceptual experience E, 
(i) there is a proposition associated with E, and 
(ii) this proposition captures the way things perceptually appear to the 
subject in virtue of having E. 23 
Being a fairly weak claim, the Mild Content View is silent on a key point 
often endorsed by theorists who accept content views. Since the view holds 
merely that there is a proposition associated with E, one could endorse the 
                                                          
21 Macpherson (2011: 4) 
22 I stress again that some, but not all, of these content views are rightly called ‘representationalism’, as I am 
using the name. This will become clear below. 
23 Logue (2014: 222) 
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view without holding that experience is a propositional attitude. It can be 
denied on the Mild Content View, in other words, that the subject 
experiencing E perceptually represents the proposition associated with E.24 
Thus, the proposition is relevant to the theorist attempting to characterise 
the experience, but is not such that the subject of the experience bears any 
distinctively experiential psychological relation to it.25 To put it another way, 
the Mild Content View can be held even whilst denying that the experience 
has any experiential content.26 
With the Mild Content View introduced, the other two views can be defined 
with relative ease. Starting with the Medium Content View, this is simply the 
preceding claims (i) and (ii), together with the following claim: 
(iii) perceptual experience consists in the subject perceptually representing 
her environment as being a certain way.27 
In terms of differences between the Mild and Medium Content Views, what 
most obviously differs is that the former involved no commitment 
whatsoever to the subject perceptually representing their environment as 
being a particular way and is instead merely a commitment to an association 
between an experience and a propositional content.28  The Medium Content 
View, by the addition of claim (iii), is committed to holding that some 
experience E consists in the subject perceptually representing this 
propositional content, and thereby does hold that experience has 
representational content.  
Nevertheless, the Medium Content View remains silent on whether or not the 
experience fundamentally consists in this perceptual representation. As 
Logue puts it, “[t]o say that perceptual experience fundamentally consists in 
personal level psychological feature x is to say that it has some or all of its 
                                                          
24 Ibid. (223) 
25 Ibid. 
26 For clarity, experiential content is an umbrella term designed to capture all content of an experience, that is: 





other personal-level psychological features ultimately in virtue of x,” thus 
one could accept the Medium Content View whilst denying that this 
perceptual representation is what ultimately provides our philosophical 
account of perception.29 
Finally, the Spicy Content View is essentially an acceptance of that latter 
point on which the Medium Content View remains silent, and so involves a 
commitment to claims (i) – (iii) above, as well as to the following: 
(iv) perceptual experience fundamentally consists in the subject 
perceptually representing her environment as being a certain way.30 
This fourth claim entails that perceptual experience necessarily involves 
representation, and holds that it is via this representational process that we 
can articulate our philosophical account of perception. 
With these three ‘flavours’ of content view introduced, it is possible to clarify 
some terminology that will feature in what follows. As I shall use the term, 
representationalism is the name given to any view which endorses above 
claims (i) – (iii) at the least. By that, I mean that representationalists may (and 
often do) endorse (iv) as well – such views are also representationalist. Views 
which endorse (iv) as well, and hold that representation is all that is 
fundamental to our philosophical account of perception, I shall call austere 
representationalism (in view of the fact that they do not appeal to 
explanatory resources outside of representation and representational 
content).31 Probably the most popular contemporary articulation of (often 
austere) representationalism is intentionalism. 
Intentionalism holds at its core the claim that representational content 
determines phenomenal character (here understood as the Nagelian ‘what it 
                                                          
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid. (224) 
31 I follow Schellenberg (2014) in this naming convention. The austerity in question is to be explained by the 
minimal reference to any theory other than representationalism (such as relationalism). The converse will 
apply later to austere relationalism. In the context of the representationalism versus relationalism 
compatibility debate, distinguishing austere forms of the theories from versions of them incorporated into the 
overall reconciliatory view I later advance will be useful. I take the austerity terminology to facilitate this. 
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is like’-ness of an experience); that is, a supervenience relation holds 
between the two such that there can be no difference between the 
phenomenal character of two distinct experiences without a difference in 
representational content.32 Intentionalists of all stripes adhere to this claim, 
yet many disagree as to how precisely it is to be cashed out. Many of these 
differences do not matter for my purposes, but one that does draws a 
distinction between strong intentionalism and weak intentionalism. Weak 
intentionalism is precisely the view I describe above – holding that the 
relation between representational content and phenomenal character is one 
of supervenience; strong intentionalism makes the stronger claim that the 
relation instead is one of identity.  
I take it that the Mild Content View – that each experience e is merely 
associated with some content – is at the very least prima facie plausible.33 
However, for the relationalism versus representationalism debate that is my 
main focus, it is not as relevant as the others, as it can be held by (at least 
almost) all parties to the debate. For the purposes of addressing that debate, 
it is worth noting as Siegel does that “[when philosophers of perception] 
criticise the idea that experiences have contents, their criticism is best 
understood as directed at [the Spicy] Content View according to which 
experiences are fundamentally structured as a propositional attitude.”34 It is 
important to realise, as Siegel’s words suggest, that screening off objections 
only stand to render representational and relational theories incompatible 
provided they are each making a claim to be the fundamental 
characterisation of our perception. It is this sort of content view that is most 
relevant to my overall purposes in what follows, and which I previously 
identified as falling under the banner of representationalism.35  
                                                          
32 Byrne (2001: 204) 
33 See Siegel (2010) and especially Logue (2014) for arguments to this effect. 
34 (2010: 363 – 364); emphasis mine. 
35 Representationalism is sometimes used as an alternative name for what I have called ‘strong intentionalism’, 
according to which an identity relation obtains between representational content and phenomenal character. 
This has been acknowledged as creating an unhelpful confusion (c.f. Macpherson (2009: 507)). Confounding 
things further, I believe my usage goes against the grain, but I believe utilising this terminology makes the 
31 
 
To reiterate, as I am phrasing things, representationalism is simply the view 
that perception has representational content, and that this plays a key role 
in our philosophical account of perception. This comes apart from the claim 
that it is all there is to the construction of such an account. The latter view – 
that perception is fundamentally to be explained by representational 
content, and nothing else – is called austere representationalism. One of the 
main goals of this thesis is to argue against it. I take up this task in Chapter 
4 onwards. Now, I consider further the nature of the representational 
content that is at the heart of the theory. 
 
1.3: The nature of content 
The task for this section is to provide some idea of the different positions 
that philosophers of perception have taken on the further particulars of 
representational content. For the purposes of keeping things broadly 
relevant to my overall enterprise, I am not discussing in what follows the 
mere association thesis of the Mild Content View. The reason for this, 
alluded to above, is that the overall project of this thesis is to make progress 
in the debate as to whether or not content views are compatible with 
relational views of perception, and it seems overwhelmingly plausible that 
the Mild Content View is compatible with relationalism. This is true even if 
the proponent of the Mild Content View accepts all steps of the Screening 
Off Argument on the side of relationalism. Even if the content in question 
provides no explanatory insight whatsoever because all that needs to be 
explained is explained by something else, this is perfectly compatible with 
the experience in question being associated with some content or other.36 
                                                          
overall discussion to follow far clearer, insofar as it centrally pertains to the compatibility of the 
representational and relational views of perception. 
36 A similar argumentative move is made by Siegel with respect to an experience’s accuracy conditions when 
she contends that “the claim that experiences can be accurate or inaccurate can be true even if the 




The first point to be raised about the nature of experiential content is that 
talking about the content of experience is not the same as talking about the 
content of a belief generated on the basis of that experience.37 To clarify: 
assuming the intentionality of both experiences and beliefs, it follows by 
definition that each is about something. The point being made here is that 
even if the respective contents of a subject’s experience and the belief that 
they are disposed to form on the basis of that experience both end up being 
contents to the effect ‘that p’, for example, they are not the same thing – one 
is the content of an experience, the other is the content of a belief 
formulated on the basis of undergoing that experience. Insofar as the two 
are distinct, what is being centrally discussed in this section is the 
experiential content, not the content of the belief generated on the basis of 
that experience. 
 
1.3.1: (Non)conceptual content 
A prominent debate as to the nature of representational content is whether 
it is conceptual or nonconceptual. It is this distinction and debate that I shall 
focus on presently, though it is worth noting that my aims at this point are 
purely exegetical: I am introducing the debate, as well as highlighting some 
reasons in favour of conceptual or nonconceptual content put forward in the 
relevant literature. What I am not attempting here is the advancement of my 
own view on the content of experience as it figures into my views on 
perception (in particular viz. reconciliatory theories thereof). 
Defining each of the views in the conceptualism/nonconceptualism debate 
seems a sensible place to start. From McDowell, we have that “conceptualism 
does not take concepts merely to impose a top-down constraint on the range 
of permissible experiential contents. They are intimately involved in the 
production of that content.”38 There are two claims here. The first is that the 
                                                          
37 See Macpherson (2011) for further discussion on this point. 
38 Wright (2015: 181) 
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concepts possessed by a subject impose restrictions on the representational 
contents their perceptual experiences can permissibly have; the second – 
which explains the first – is that the concepts possessed by the subject play 
an integral part in generating the representational content of the 
experience(s) in question. If, for instance, one construes perceptual 
experience as being representational in the same vein as belief is 
representational, one might think that the content of experience integrally 
involves “an exercise in our grasp of concepts” in just the same way as our 
thoughts and judgements do.39 Nonconceptualism, meanwhile, can be 
characterised in terms of the specification of correctness conditions, the 
idea being that “while concepts would have to be exercised in providing a 
(theory-relative) canonical statement of a given content’s correctness 
conditions, having an experience with that content does not require 
possessing or deploying any of those concepts.”40 The key point here lies in 
the second part of the quotation – nonconceptualism is a rejection of the 
view that states that in order for a subject to have an experience with 
representational content, the subject in question must exercise (and 
therefore possess) concepts relevant to that content.41 More specifically, 
there is a distinction between content nonconceptualism and state 
nonconceptualism: the two are related, though the former is a denial of the 
claim that an experience’s representational content is comprised by its 
concepts, whilst the latter denies that in order to be in a certain 
representational state, one must possess the concepts reflective of that 
state’s representational content; conceptualism, meanwhile, tends to be a 
view that accepts both of the claims that these distinct versions of 
nonconceptualism deny.42 
With these working definitions of conceptualism and nonconceptualism in 
place, I turn now to examining the merits of each view, starting with 
                                                          
39 Campbell (2014: 45) 
40 Wright (2015: 181) 
41 Where ‘relevant’ is taken in at least the sense required for providing a complete specification of the accuracy 
conditions applicable to the experience in question. 
42 Ibid. (182) 
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conceptualism. Perhaps the most familiar argument in favour of conceptual 
content stems from the idea that perceptual experience is linked to our 
beliefs, knowledge and reasons for action. As Wright puts it: 
If perceptual experience has the same sort of conceptual content as our thoughts 
about the world we can literally believe what we see, see what we want and so 
forth. In such a circumstance, it seems unproblematic to hold that perceptual 
experiences are capable of both justifying beliefs and feeding their contents into 
our decision-making and action-planning processes.43 
The point being made here is that conceptual contents make for a much 
smoother story as to the relationship holding between perception and 
reason. This is a weaker claim, however, than that made by Brewer which 
looks to actively refute nonconceptualism, namely: that reasons positively 
require conceptual contents.44 More elaborately, he holds that a subject has 
reasons for believing something iff they are in a conceptual state, where a 
conceptual state is understood as being a mental state which is such that it 
“has a representational content that is characterisable only in terms of 
concepts which the subject [themselves] must possess and is of a form 
which enables it to serve as a premise or the conclusion of a deductive 
argument, or of an inference of some other kind (e.g. inductive or 
abductive).”45 The thought here seems to boil down to acceptance of the 
claim that reasoning requires the possession and deployment of concepts, 
together with the view that we want a neat story as to how exactly it is that 
perception is linked to reasoning. If we accept Brewer’s story that reasons 
require conceptual contents, then it seems as though concept possession 
and deployment runs the whole way through the chain from perception to 
rational action, with reasoning and beliefs as intermediaries.46 Despite being 
different processes, the conceptualist thought goes, the link between 
                                                          
43 Ibid. (183) 
44 (2002: 149) 
45 Ibid.; though Brewer has since become a relationalist, maintaining that these considerations constitute an 
objection to non-conceptual content. (2017: 219f) 
46 “We can make sense of an experience being a subject’s reason for believing something about the state of 




experience and belief justification can occur precisely because the same 
conceptual capacities are operative in both, and these impose an order on 
our sensory deliverances of the sort that is arguably required for thought 
and experience to be related rationally.47 
A basic consideration in favour of nonconceptual content comes in the form 
of imagining a subject observing two colour samples that are near-identical 
shades of red, just distinct enough that the subject’s sensory system can 
pick this up. For instance, samples which would be directly adjacent to one 
another on some colour organisational system, yet can be distinguished 
between despite the subject’s ignorance of the colour organisational system, 
would be qualitatively distinguishable despite the subject’s lack of some 
salient concepts.48 If there is a difference in phenomenology, and thereby in 
phenomenal character, then at least according to intentionalism there should 
be a difference in representational content. If there is a difference in 
representational content, then it is not clear how the conceptualist might 
explain this since, by hypothesis, the subject lacks the concepts to account 
for the difference in contents. 
Additionally, there is the consideration that conceptualism – given its 
commitment to the claim that having states with representational content 
requires possession and deployment of concepts – seems to spit out the 
curious result that infants and non-human animals that are incapable of 
concept possession are similarly incapable of undergoing states with 
representational content.49 When coupled with the assumption that 
perception is representational, this seems to implausibly suggest that they 
are incapable of perception. 
As I have stated, I do not take a side on this matter, as my present aims are 
wholly expository, but I do think that the devil will be in the details. To that 
end, the putative arguments offered above in favour of conceptual and 
                                                          
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid. (181 – 182) 
49 Ibid. (188) 
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nonconceptual content respectively may fall foul of the mistake that is 
taking the available options in the debate to be either the view they advance 
or the view to which they take themselves to be opposed, with no middle 
ground to be had.50 A point counting against this interpretation can be seen 
by considering again the biconditional, laid out above, that a subject can 
have reasons for believing something iff they are in a conceptual state. 
Brewer advances this as an objection to nonconceptual content, yet it is not 
clear that one may go as far as this. What appears to be ruled out is the 
absence of conceptual content. What is much less clear is that the presence 
of nonconceptual content is ruled out: as Wright observes, 
“[n]onconceptualism doesn’t rule out states with conceptual content; it just 
denies that the latter exhaust all representational content-bearing 
experiential states.51 A conceptual state, recall, is one which possesses a 
representational content that is characterisable only in terms of concepts 
possessed by the subject and is of the form that can be utilised in reasoning 
of some description. There is certainly room in logical space to claim that an 
experience involving its subject being in a conceptual state, as Brewer 
defines such a state, may also have nonconceptual content, particularly if 
one considers that perceptual experience – and therefore perceptual 
processing – is something which occurs over time, so it is not even the case 
that such a suggestion implies a subject possessing an experience that has 
conceptual and nonconceptual content simultaneously.52 
Though nothing that has been said in this section decisively settles the 
conceptual/nonconceptual content debate, I hope to at least have 
accomplished (i) elucidating precisely what each of these terms means in the 
context of the philosophy of perception, and (ii) highlighting some standard 
arguments made in favour of either sort of content. I have also suggested 
                                                          
50 A mistake not dissimilar to that made by many relationalists and representationalists. I discuss the perils of 
this particular mistake at length in chapters to follow, once I have fully introduced and discussed each of the 
purportedly incompatible theories of perception. 
51 (2015: 182) 
52 See Wright (2015: 191 – 193) for discussion of empirical support for the sort of middle ground position 
whereby perceptual processing involves both conceptual and nonconceptual content over time. Peacocke 
(1992: 90-91) also supports the view that nonconceptual content has “relations” to certain conceptual 
content, and suggests that the two form something of a “holism”. 
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that matters may not be quite so black and white, however nothing in what 
follows hangs on this suggestion. 
 
1.3.2: Wide/narrow content 
Another set of options regarding the nature of representational content 
concerns whether or not it is – to use the terminology commonly deployed in 
the literature – wide or narrow content. Simply put, the view that 
representational content is narrow is the view that it supervenes on the 
internal configuration of the subject, and does not rely on the mind-
independent world for its constitution. On this view, if two subjects are 
identical with respect to all brain states that do not involve a relation to their 
respective environments, then those subjects have in common all 
representational contents of their experiences.53 Conversely, those who posit 
that representational content is wide reject this supervenience claim, and 
accept that the mind-independent physical world enters the explanatory tale 
of content generation at some point. 
Considerations regarding whether representational content is wide or 
narrow are numerous.54 Perhaps the area where this debate rages most 
fiercely, though, is that of intentionalism; the reason for this is that 
intentionalism closely ties the notion of representational content to that of 
the phenomenal properties of experience – the Nagelian ‘what it is like’, or 
phenomenal character. The latter can additionally be taken to be either 
entirely ‘in the head’ (phenomenal internalism) or else as somehow world-
involving (phenomenal externalism). Commitment to the weak intentionalist 
supervenience thesis suggests, on the grounds of parsimony, that one 
should be of the view that phenomenal character and representational 
content are either both wholly in the head or are both best explained by 
reference to matters outside of the subject, in the mind-independent world; 
                                                          
53 Block (1996: 20) 
54 See Chalmers (2004) for extensive discussion on many of these. For the purposes of providing one example, I 
confine discussion here to a more contemporary development in the debate. 
38 
 
obviously, the strong intentionalist identity thesis leaves no room 
whatsoever in logical space for disagreeing with this contention. Whether 
strong or weak intentionalist, this linking of representational content with 
phenomenal character leads to fierce debate concerning whether or not 
content is wide or narrow, and I spend the remainder of this section 
introducing and responding to Adam Pautz’s argument against the view that 
content is wide. 
Pautz’s argument is designed to target any form of phenomenal externalism, 
but it is relevant to the wide/narrow content debate if a commitment to 
intentionalism is plugged in. He contends that doing this results in 
something akin to an intentionalist position whereby the representational 
states enjoyed by the subject of an experience in some way track the 
instantiation of properties occurring in the mind-independent physical 
world. This tracking plays a key role in the generation of the 
representational content of the subject’s experiences – a view he calls 
tracking intentionalism.55 
Pautz contends that tracking intentionalism is vulnerable to what he calls 
coincidental variation cases. These are hypothetical yet physically possible 
cases in which a pair of subjects track the same physical property, yet 
intuitively differ in phenomenal experience: this flies in the face of tracking 
intentionalism – the same property is tracked, and thereby represented, yet 
there is a phenomenal difference. Pautz's offers the following as a 
coincidental variation case for gustatory experience: 
[S]uppose Yuck and Yum belong to different species that evolved in separate 
environments containing some berries. Now you might suppose that Yuck is an 
actual human – me or you – and Yum is some hypothetical creature. Or you 
might suppose that Yuck and Yum both belong to hypothetical, human-like 
species. It does not matter. In any case, the berries are extremely poisonous to 
Yuck. By contrast, in Yum’s environment, the berries are a very important food 
source, since other food sources are scarce. So Yum’s species evolved immunity to 
the berries. In addition, when Yuck and Yum taste the berries, their taste systems 
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undergo radically different ensemble activation states (spatiotemporal neural 
patterns).56 
In the context of the example, ensemble activation states are distinct 
patterns of neurons that fire when a subject undergoes particular taste 
sensations. Consequently, two subjects undergoing different ensemble 
activation states should entail a difference in their respective taste 
experiences. So, supposing that poison dart frogs are extremely poisonous to 
Yuck and Yum, we can imagine that Yuck's ensemble activation state after 
eating the berries is akin to his ensemble activation state upon eating a 
poison dart frog; conversely, Yum's ensemble activation state after eating 
the berry is more akin to his ensemble activation state after eating a nice 
banana. Additionally, we can imagine that there are differences in their 
behavioural responses, for example Yuck vomits and withdraws violently 
from the berries, whilst Yum rubs his belly, and so on. However, this 
difference in behaviour does not alter the fact that the physical (i.e. 
chemical) properties instantiated by the berries are identical, and therefore 
that Yuck and Yum’s respective experiences track these same properties.  
Here is Pautz again: 
Despite these differences, we can stipulate that Yuck and Yum are similar at the 
receptoral level. Indeed, we can stipulate that, when they taste the berries, the 
postreceptoral ensemble activation patterns in their taste systems, although 
different, optimally track the very same complex chemical property of the berries, 
C. This chemical property C will likely be a disjunctive property, because many 
different combinations of chemical properties can produce the same response in 
the taste system. So I am stipulating that their ensemble activation states track the 
same disjunction of chemical properties C, the very one with which tracking 
intentionalists and other objectivists about taste would identify the taste perceived 
by Yuck and Yum.57 
In sum, then, the case of Yuck and Yum is set up so that the tracking 
intentionalist is committed to the taste experiences of Yuck and Yum being 
                                                          




phenomenally identical, despite differences in ensemble activation states 
and behaviours, since by stipulation they are tracking the same physical 
properties of the berries. There is also no difference in their sensory systems 
that would account for a phenomenal difference between their experiences. 
There are two possible conclusions to draw from the case: 
Same Experiences: Yuck and Yum have phenomenally identical experiences 
when eating the berries. 
Different Experiences: Yuck and Yum have phenomenally distinct experiences 
when eating the berries. 
Pautz argues that Different Experiences is more plausible, due to the 
subjects’ contrasting behaviours and ensemble activation patterns, and we 
should therefore accept this conclusion.58 Since tracking intentionalism is 
committed to Same Experiences, it is tracking intentionalism that should be 
rejected. 
The moral of the Yuck and Yum case generalises into the internal 
dependence argument, which runs as follows: 
1) If tracking intentionalism is true, then in every possible coincidental variation 
case, the right verdict is Same Experiences. 
2) But it is much more reasonable to suppose that, at least in some coincidental 
variation cases, the right verdict is Different Experiences (call this internal 
dependence). 
3) So, tracking intentionalism is (probably) mistaken.59 
The argument is valid, and Pautz appears to think it sound even against 
views advocating a complex tracking relation – one which may feature 
further relata involved in the subject tracking a physical property. This is 
because of the 'same tracking' stipulation: regardless of how complex the 
                                                          
58 Ibid. (256) 
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the appeal to reasonable supposition in (2). 
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tracking relation is, it is stipulated that in coincidental variation cases, the 
subjects are tracking the same property. 
Despite the apparent effectiveness of the internal dependence argument 
against tracking intentionalism, an appeal to Millikan’s biosemantics permits 
a view both compatible with tracking intentionalism’s tenets and capable of 
sustaining the Different Experiences conclusion, thus challenging Pautz’s 
argument. To achieve this, the view must satisfy two criteria:  
(i) it is compatible with tracking intentionalism's tenets, and  
(ii) it can uphold the Different Experiences conclusion in coincidental 
variation cases without violating (i).  
In the rest of this section, I will outline biosemantics and explain how it 
satisfies (i). In the next section I will articulate a more refined form of 
biosemantics, arguing that this satisfies (ii). Finally, I conclude with some 
more general remarks about my argument and its potential to be generalised 
for views besides mine. 
Broadly, Millikan’s view is that representational systems can be thought of as 
consisting in a producer of the representation, and a consumer of the 
representation – it is the latter of these that she takes to determine 
representational content.60 This is because without the consumer 
understanding the representation, the representation cannot be deemed to 
have been successful. The producer must therefore produce a sign that 
corresponds to the state of affairs represented in a manner intelligible to the 
consumer. Further, the view claims that this successful correspondence and 
conveyance is a “normal condition for the proper functioning of the 
consumer device as it reacts to the representation.”61  
The most fundamental kind of representations, according to Millikan, are 
known as 'pushmi-pullyu' representations: when they occur in a normally 
functioning system, these are both descriptive, in that they inform the 
                                                          
60 Millikan (1989: 286) 
61 Ibid. (287) 
42 
 
subject enjoying them as to what is the case, and directive, in that they also 
inform the subject what they should do, given this presentation of the 
world.62 For example, consider the dance that honeybees perform. This dance 
maps on to the location of nectar (descriptive), as well as the direction and 
duration of flight required of on-looking bees to reach it (directive). 
Consequently, had either variable been altered sufficiently, the nectar would 
have to be in a different location relative to the observing bees in order for 
the representation to be successful.63 If we take the dancing bee to be the 
producer of the representation, and take an on-looking bee to be the 
consumer of the representation, then in more abstract terms, what Millikan 
takes to happen here is that "the producer produces a sign that will be true 
or satisfied only if it maps on to some affair or affairs [. . .] in the world in 
accordance with certain 'semantic' rules. These are rules of correspondence 
between signs and world affairs that have been instantiated in the past when 
the consumer and producer or their ancestors have succeeded in performing 
their cooperative function(s)."64 Thus, we have it on this theory that 
descriptive and/or directive representations are interpreted by the consumer 
according to certain rules, which are established by the successful conveying 
of information within this system by producer and consumer, or by their 
evolutionary ancestors. Hence, the view has it that a given representation 
fulfils a particular function, and is integrated into the system of 
representation because it fulfils that function.65 
In virtue of being a naturalised theory of representation, I take biosemantics 
to be straightforwardly compatible with tracking intentionalism's 
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65 This is not to suggest that the content of intentional signs (the bee dance in the above example) is 
determined by what particular task it (in conjunction with its consumer(s)) normally accomplishes, for one sign 
may serve to accomplish various tasks in different circumstances; rather, the content is determined by the fact 
that "whatever inferences its consumer makes when functioning properly, the result will be (nonaccidental) 
true belief or successful action only if it actually represents according to a certain correspondence rule." (Ibid. 
(400)) This serves to highlight the importance of the correspondence rules to this theory, for it is of course 
possible that true information may be conveyed to the consumer accidentally (i.e. not via the relevant 
correspondence rule) in a manner which benefits the consumer, yet this will not constitute the system 
operating in its normal conditions. 
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commitment to objective reductionism. Since it takes representational 
content to be determined widely, acceptance of any view on which the 
phenomenal character is thereby also determined widely (such as 
intentionalism) results in objective reductionism. The point here is not that 
biosemantics entails objective reductionism, merely that it is compatible 
with it. 
Interpretation of the intentional sign in accordance with the relevant 
correspondence rules is, I take it, an internal process; it is also one that 
involves being sensitive to the intentional sign that maps on to properties 
instantiated by external stimuli. Biosemantics satisfies the second tenet of 
tracking intentionalism, by requiring that successful representation occurs 
only when the consumer undergoes an internal representational state that 
can be described as tracking the instantiation of intentional properties in 
external stimuli.  
Admittedly, since biosemantics is a theory of representation rather than one 
of the phenomenology of experience, it is not obvious that a proponent of 
the view is bound to accept the intentionalist thesis that constitutes the 
third tenet of tracking intentionalism. A biosemantics on which the 
intentional properties of experience are explained in the manner described 
above, yet the experience's phenomenal properties are explained by 
something else, is conceivable. This does not preclude satisfaction of 
condition (i) above, however – biosemantics does not entail intentionalism, 
but is compatible with it. The neutrality on phenomenal properties (and their 
connection to intentional properties) leaves intentionalism open as a view to 
be accepted in conjunction with the commitments of biosemantics, which is 
all that (i) requires. Call the biosemantic view that does endorse 
intentionalism biosemantic intentionalism. This view would satisfy all three 
tenets of tracking intentionalism, thereby fulfilling criterion (i) identified 
above, and I will now argue it satisfies criterion (ii). 
Millikan’s biosemantics views representation as a product of evolutionary 
selection: representation fulfils a teleological function and is selected for 
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because it does so. Organisms track physical properties because doing so 
benefits the organism. Let us return to Yuck and Yum. Yuck - according to 
biosemantics - has evolved from ancestors for whom the berry was 
poisonous, and thus has come to represent the berry as being 
bitter/disgusting by way of tracking chemical property C in the berry. Yum, 
conversely, is such that the berry is not poisonous to him and has, by 
stipulation, evolved from ancestors who generated an immunity to the berry 
due to it being an important food source. Comparing this with the bee 
example from earlier, we could say that the bee dance itself parallels the 
berry flavour in this instance, as both convey information to the consumer of 
the representation. Further, there is a descriptive element in the tracking of 
the berry’s chemical properties that mirrors the tracking of the nectar’s 
location, as well as a directive element that suggests to Yuck and Yum to 
respectively avoid or consume the berries, which tracks historical benefits 
this course of action has had for their ancestors. This mirrors the tracking of 
the observing bees’ location relative to the nectar. 
For Yuck and Yum (and their evolutionary ancestors), there is benefit in 
tracking chemical properties in the berry. By Pautz's 'same tracking' 
stipulation, both track chemical property C of the berry. Pautz's attack on 
tracking intentionalism claims that this ensures the intentional properties of 
both Yuck and Yum's experiences are identical, meaning that - due to 
intentionalist commitments - their gustatory experiences must be 
phenomenally identical. 
It is not clear that the intentional properties of Yuck and Yum's experience 
of the berries are identical, however. One way that this conclusion could be 
established is by demonstrating that Yuck and Yum, for all that has been 
said, are not tracking the same physical properties. Consequently, there can 
be a difference in the intentional properties of their experiences, and 
Different Experiences can be maintained without violating tracking 
intentionalism. This is what has been called the pluralist response, and 
accounts both for subjects tracking two different physical properties in the 
same object, and for one or both subjects tracking a property not 
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instantiated by the object (thereby undergoing an illusion). This is not the 
response I wish to make here. Pautz stipulates that whatever is required for 
Yuck and Yum to be tracking the same physical properties obtains, and so it 
will not be effective. Instead, I advocate for biosemantic intentionalism, and 
claim that this view correctly delivers the Different Experiences conclusion.  
On this view, the Tracking tenet will be a necessary though not a sufficient 
condition for identity across the intentional properties of Yuck and Yum’s 
respective experiences. 
If the intentional properties of an experience can be defined as what that 
experience is about, then it seems that Yuck's experience is - on Millikan's 
view - in some way about the fact that the berry is poisonous to him. Avoiding 
the poison is precisely the beneficial effect for Yuck (and his ancestors) that 
caused tracking to occur in this case. Conversely, the benefit for Yum (and 
his ancestors) is that the berry is an important food source since other food 
is scarce, and so it makes sense to say that in some respect this is what his 
experience is about for him. If Yuck and Yum differ in what is beneficial to 
them in this in this respect, then it is arguable that what their respective 
experiences are about (on biosemantic intentionalism) differs, and therefore 
the intentional properties of their experiences differ. This accounts for the 
Different Experiences verdict in a manner that doesn't violate any 
intentionalist commitments. 
Furthermore, this is not the pluralist response discussed above that Pautz’s 
‘same tracking’ stipulation comes ready to rebut, and so the 'same tracking' 
stipulation cannot be used in this way, especially not "without going into the 
details of Millikan’s sophisticated consumer-based theory of 
representation."66  
Thus, I am assenting to the view that Yuck and Yum are tracking the same 
physical properties, but disagree with Pautz’s contention that this alone 
entails that Yuck and Yum have experiences with the same intentional 
properties. I am contending (in line with biosemantics) that it is not merely 
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tracking that determines the intentional properties of an experience; rather, 
the function that the tracking fulfils for the organism, and appropriate usage 
of correspondence rules, both play vital roles in doing this. On biosemantic 
intentionalism, then, it is possible for two subjects to track the same 
physical properties whilst having experiences which differ in 
representational content so long as the correspondence rules that determine 
this content are different. Given the evolutionary story told in the Yuck and 
Yum example, it is plausible that the correspondence rules in operation for 
the subjects’ respective communities are different. This accounts for a 
difference in the intentional properties of the subjects’ experiences, thus 
allowing Different Experiences, and the three tenets of tracking 
intentionalism, to be maintained. Hence, criterion (ii) from the preceding 
section is satisfied. 
Accepting that biosemantic intentionalism is a form of tracking 
intentionalism falsifies the conditional claim that if tracking intentionalism 
is true, then in every coincidental variation case, the right verdict is Same 
Experiences. Since this conditional constitutes premise (1) of Pautz’s internal 
dependence argument, the argument is refuted. I do not see any obvious 
rejoinder available to the proponent of the internal dependence argument 
that can help re-establish (1). The basis for accepting it was that subjects in 
all such cases had experiences with the same intentional properties, and 
therefore had phenomenally identical experiences. In light of the above point 
about differing correspondence rules, assuming these play a crucial role in 
determining intentional properties, any treatment of coincidental variation 
cases such as Yuck and Yum which concludes that the subjects have 
experiences with the same intentional properties forgoes any claim to being 
realistic – a feature that Pautz is eager to maintain in order to mitigate the 
non-actual nature of his coincidental variation cases.67 The commitments of 
biosemantic intentionalism suggest that the role of correspondence rules in 
determining the intentional properties of experience cannot realistically be 
ignored. If the foregoing is correct, then premise (1) of the internal 
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dependence argument cannot be established, and therefore the argument 
fails. 
The purpose of this section has been to highlight some contemporary moves 
being made in the debate regarding wide/narrow content, and the role this 
plays in the larger question as to the nature of representational content, 
particularly when intentionalism is accepted. I have discussed Pautz’s 
internal dependence argument as it purportedly weighs against wide content 
intentionalism, and offered a response that I take to show that such a 
position is not refuted by Pautz’s argument. As with vast majority of this 
chapter, my aim here has been purely expository, and to show that none of 
the variety of views I have discussed are radically implausible.  
For all that has been said in this section, it is worth observing that narrow 
content is a live option as things stand. One objection to narrow content 
which I do not intend to discuss comes from Block, who advises against this 
move for intentionalists, as narrow content intentionalism must embrace 
functionalism. This, he argues, brings with it several concerns to which the 
intentionalist cannot respond due to their qualia scepticism.68 In the 
following section, I address a debate on type of content, which looks to have 
numerous ramifications for proponents of narrow content. I wish to 
emphasise that my aims in this section and the next are purely expository. I 
survey arguments about the matters discussed merely to provide the reader 
an overview of the relevant discussion points. Nothing in the chapters to 
follow relies on these debates being resolved in a particular way. 
 
1.3.3: Types of content 
Another issue surrounding representationalist theories of perception 
concerns the type of content such views appeal to: a stance must be taken 
on what exactly constitutes this content. One influential response to this 
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issue holds that the contents of a given representation simply consist in the 
worldly extensions of the of its constituents: if S represents that Freya is 
charismatic, then according to this view the contents of the representation 
are Freya herself, and the property of being charismatic, as these are the 
extensions of the words ‘Freya’ and ‘charismatic’.69 On this reading, one 
constituent of the representational content (Freya) is the referent of a 
singular term (i.e. one that refers to an individual), rather than descriptions 
that pick out different things depending on what in the world satisfies them, 
whilst the other (charismatic) is a property this individual instantiates. Such 
contents have often been called Russellian contents, “because at one time 
Russell advocated the view that singular terms contribute only their 
referents to the proposition expressed by sentences in which they occur (or 
utterances of such sentences)”.70 
Russellian contents, in virtue of being purely extensional – i.e. reducible to 
worldly objects and their properties – are wide contents. If one is an 
intentionalist, then one’s commitments arguably preclude one from holding 
that the determination of phenomenal content and that of phenomenal 
character can come apart.71 The wide nature of the content on this view 
entails that if two subjects are internal duplicates, then the content of their 
respective experiences must be determined by the same worldly extension of 
the proposition associated with the content. A tension between Russellian 
content and phenomenal internalism was observed with regards to colour 
experience by Ned Block via his spectral inversion cases.72 A similar tension 
is observed by Brad Thompson, where we are asked to consider 
representational content of experiences of size and shape – i.e. spatial 
content.73 According to the Russellian account of content, two subjects with 
phenomenally identical spatial experiences must be such that their 
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experiences attribute the same properties to the objects perceived. 
Thompson provides two thought experiments designed to show that this is a 
problematic commitment. 
The first of these thought experiments is Doubled Earth. The setup we are 
asked to consider is a world that is identical to ours in every respect, except 
that everything is twice the size on Doubled Earth as it is on our planet.74 We 
are asked to consider a pair of subjects: Oscar and Big Oscar, who are 
functional duplicates enjoying experiences – on Earth and Doubled Earth 
respectively – of objects which are counterparts to one another. 
Consequently, if the object Oscar is experiencing is ten metres away from 
him, then the object Big Oscar is experiencing is twenty metres away from 
him.75 Since everything else is held constant, including the scale of spatial 
relations obtaining between various objects (such that Doubled Earth is a ‘to 
scale’ duplicate of Earth), the thought goes that Oscar and Big Oscar are 
phenomenal duplicates.76 
Were this to be the case, then in the event that Oscar and Big Oscar had 
phenomenally identical experiences which were such that Oscar’s is caused 
by an object ten metres away whereas Big Oscar’s is caused by something 
twice that distance away from him, the argument runs that we would not be 
inclined to say that either of their experiences failed to be veridical (as 
privileging one over the other would merely be chauvinism). If each 
experience is veridical, then each must truly attribute a different spatial 
(physical) property to the objects respectively perceived. This, based on the 
commitments of Russellian content identified above, entails that if one 
                                                          
74 Other differences between Earth and Doubled Earth are limited to those necessary, in light of the key 
difference in sizes, for experiences on the two planets to be functionally identical to one another. A reduction 
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twice the size of their Earthly counterparts) will yield that they are still ten metres away in that system. The 
important point is that the space itself occupied by everything on Doubled Earth doubles. 
76 Thompson (2010: 155 – 156) 
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wishes to uphold intentionalism, then representational content pertaining to 
size is not Russellian.77 
A corresponding thought experiment, based on the preceding one, is also 
constructed so as to motivate a similar conclusion regarding experiences of 
shape. The setup is extremely similar, except that Doubled Earth has been 
replaced with ‘El Greco World’ – a world in which everything is twice the 
height of its relevant counterpart on Earth. More specifically, it is stretched 
vertically, relative to the centre of the planet: a ball rolling on earth is such 
that all points on the surface (circumference) of the ball are equally far from 
the radius; a ball rolling in El Greco World, on the other hand, is such that it 
not only looks like an ellipse, but there are two points on the ball’s surface 
that are furthest from the radius – one touching the ground and the other on 
the top – and these constantly change as the ball rolls. Comparably, we can 
return to Oscar, who is such that the distance between the top of his head 
and soles of his shoes is six feet, whether he is standing up or lying down. 
Stretched Oscar of El Greco World, on the other hand, is such that the 
distance between the top of his head and soles of his shoes is six feet whilst 
he is lying down, but twelve feet when he is standing up.78 As Thompson 
puts it, the vertical ‘stretch’ in El Greco World is plastic, rather than rigid and 
one-off.79 Again, it is submitted that Oscar and Stretched Oscar are veridical 
perceivers phenomenal duplicates, despite the counterpart objects they are 
respectively perceiving having different shapes. If this is so, then for similar 
reasons as above, Russellianism about the content of visual experiences with 
regards to shape also seems to be false. 
Taken together, the thought experiments appear to show that upholding 
intentionalism comes at the cost of conceding spatial content is not 
Russellian if phenomenal character supervenes on the subject’s internal 
configuration. An argument is made by Simon Prosser in his (2016) that a 
similar tension holds for the content of our temporal experiences. We are 
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asked to consider Slow Earth: an atom-for-atom physical duplicate of Earth, 
except that everything that happens on Slow Earth happens at half the rate it 
does on Earth, perhaps because Slow Earth lies in a region of space where for 
some reason all matter is governed by laws of physics isomorphic to those 
of the rest of the universe, but is slowed down by half.80 With regards to 
one’s experience, it is observed that if one were to enter the slowed region of 
space, one would not notice everything slowing down, as all processes – 
including one’s own bodily and particularly neural functions – would slow 
down together at the same rate; one would be disposed to make all of the 
same observations one would have made outside the slowed region, one 
would just make them more slowly.81 
With the now familiar Twin Earth-like scenario in place, an argument 
analogous to those above is made for our experience of time. We are asked 
to consider Horatio and Slow Horatio, who are internal duplicates in every 
respect, and whose lives are identical in every way, except that Slow Horatio 
occupies Slow Earth, and therefore his life unfolds at half the rate of 
Horatio’s. If the spatial scenarios plausibly involved phenomenal duplicates, 
then it seems equally plausibly that Horatio and Slow Horatio are 
phenomenal duplicates: all events that befall them are identical, though 
those that befall the latter occur at half speed, yet do so to scale – 
phenomenally, there should be no subjectively detectable differences for 
either subject. 
If they are truly phenomenal duplicates, then intentionalism and 
phenomenal internalism together entail that Horatio and Slow Horatio’s 
phenomenal content is identical. Given the setup of the case, it follows from 
this that “the phenomenal content of rate-of-change phenomenology cannot 
consist in objective rates of change,” because by hypothesis the respective 
objective rates of change on Earth and Slow Earth differ, yet the rate-of-
change phenomenology – and the phenomenal content that determines this – 
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for Horatio and Slow Horatio is the same.82 This constitutes an analogous 
argument to Thompson’s, but for the temporal case. Consequently, it is 
arguable that temporal content is not Russellian if phenomenal character 
supervenes on the subject’s internal configuration. If one also finds the 
spatial case plausible, then the case can be made that this conclusion applies 
to the content of both spatial and temporal cases. 
Though appeal to phenomenal externalism is one option available for those 
wishing to reject the preceding arguments, it is not the only one: there are 
alternative views on the type of content that representational content is that 
are capable of upholding phenomenal internalism and intentionalism 
together. One popular alternative to Russellian content presented in the 
literature is Fregean content, which holds that rather than being wholly 
reducible to objects and their properties, the contents of experience are 
instead composed of the modes of presentation of those extensions.83 The 
key notion here is that objects (and the properties instantiated by them) may 
have multiple modes of presentation: they may, broadly speaking, appear to 
the subject in different ways or occupy different roles in their reasoning.84 A 
popular philosophy of language example that illustrates this concerns 
Hesperus and Phosphorus – also called both the morning star and the 
evening star – which are names that denote the planet Venus. A subject 
might rationally accept the proposition ‘Hesperus is the morning star’ whilst 
rejecting or remaining neutral on the proposition ‘Phosphorus is the evening 
star’, if they are ignorant of the fact that Hesperus is Phosphorus, and hence 
of the fact they are simply different modes of presentation of the planet 
Venus. In such cases, the propositions the subject assents to (or not) cannot 
differ in their truth value, as they refer to the same object, but the different 
modes of presentation play different roles in the subject’s reasoning, such as 
listing Hesperus in the set of celestial objects visible in the morning but not 
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in the set of celestial objects visible in the evening (or vice versa with 
Phospohorus).85 
Fregean contents of experiences play a similar role, and can attribute a 
difference in representational contents of two experiences of the same 
property (or properties) to a difference in modes of presentation: i.e. to a 
difference in how the object is represented. Views according to which 
experiences possess both a Russellian wide content and a Fregean narrow 
content – where the latter is the mode of presentation of the former – have 
been argued to avoid the unpalatable consequences of the above 
arguments.86 The Fregean content of experiences of the colour green, on such 
views, can be something like ‘the property that typically causes experiences 
with phenomenal character G in me’ and this then determines the Russellian 
content: whatever the relevant extension is.87 Importantly, this allows for 
Inverted Spectrum cases, where for me that extension might be something I 
would call green, whilst for an alternative subject the very same Fregean 
content might pick out something that I would call red: in such cases, the 
experiences are alike in Fregean narrow content, but differ in Russellian wide 
content.88 
Consider again Horatio and Slow Horatio. Suppose that each is staring at 
their microwave waiting for their food to defrost. They both experience the 
duration of the wait: it is ten minutes (their microwave timers confirm this 
fact), and is equally dull for each of them. By hypothesis, their phenomenal 
experiences are identical, yet the objective duration of Horatio’s wait is half 
that of Slow Horatio’s. The view of content described immediately previously 
can make sense of this, as both subjects will have experiences with identical 
Fregean contents of something like ‘the duration that brings about temporal 
experiences of ten minutes elapsing for me’, which account for their 
identical experiences’ phenomenology whilst functioning as modes of 
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presentation for distinct Russellian contents: the different objective 
temporal durations that they pick out.89 
The Fregean intentionalist view of content described above is not the only 
alternative to straightforward Russellian content, however, and others have 
been sought. One reason for this is that the Fregean view of content makes 
ineliminable reference to phenomenal character of experience, and is 
therefore non-reductive – a fact which has not appealed to those with 
physicalist aspirations.90 An alternative approach that does not do this is 
defended in Simon Prosser’s (2011), which contends that phenomenal 
contents are affordance relations, where these are understood to be relations 
obtaining between a subject and objects in their environment, and which 
pertains to the possibilities for causal interaction between the two.91 
Considering the content of the utterance ‘x is heavy’, the thought is that in 
describing x as heavy, I am not describing a property merely of x, but am – 
strictly speaking – describing a relation between x and myself that pertains 
to the possibility of causal interaction between us.92 In particular, I am 
articulating that x is going to be difficult for me to lift. I am featured 
inalienably, though only implicitly, and this point generalises: according to 
Prosser’s view, contents specified as simply ‘heavy’ or ‘poisonous’, for 
instance, involve the subject of the experience as an unarticulated 
constituent.93 My experience of the property of weight, then, correlates on 
this view with the ‘heaviness’ phenomenology for a given subject, which in 
turn is cashed out in terms of an affordance relation defined in terms of the 
causal powers of both the subject and object in question.94 
                                                          
89 This example I am using is borrowed from Prosser, whose view differs from the Fregean content view. This 
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view below. 
90 Ibid. 
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‘SEF relation’ (Subject-Environment Functional Relation), but on the whole the view of content defended is the 
same, save for the former discussing spatial content whilst the latter discusses temporal content. 
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This notion of affordance relation is taken to deal with spatial content of the 
sort addressed by Thompson and described above. Since ‘big’, ‘small’, ‘near’ 
and ‘far’ can all be analysed as relations between the subject experiencing 
those properties and the objects to which they are predicated, in terms of 
possibilities for causal interactions between the two. Returning to Oscar and 
Big Oscar, we can imagine a pair of scenarios to illustrate the point. Suppose 
that each is out walking in woodlands and a stream crosses each of their 
respective paths. We can suppose further that the opposite bank is 
objectively two Earth-metres away, such that Oscar would be correct to 
report it as being two metres away, whilst Big Oscar would be correct to 
report it as being one metre away (because of the scaled-up nature of 
Doubled Earth). In considering whether or not the bank is too far away to 
simply step over the stream, we can imagine that Oscar would conclude that 
it is, whereas Big Oscar would reach the opposite conclusion. Analysing ‘far’ 
(more specifically, ‘too far for me’) as an affordance relation in the manner 
described above therefore makes sense of this spatial case. Temporal cases 
are treated with a similar analysis: since objectively the different durations 
occurring in Horatio’s experience of ten minutes and Slow Horatio’s 
experience of ten minutes play identical roles in each of their lives, the 
objective duration of the former stands in the same relation to its subject as 
the objective duration of the latter does to its subject. All possibilities for 
causal interaction remain identical between the two, and this functional 
identity accounts for the phenomenal sameness of their respective 
experiences, despite the objective durations of the experiences differing. 
I cannot attempt to provide decisive arguments for or against any of the 
types of content identified in this section, and stress again that my aims for 
this chapter are purely expository. I take the discussion to have identified 
several different directions that those wishing to decisively settle what type 
of content representational content is have taken, with some considerations 
for why the hold the views that they do offered, and with examples provided 
to assist in understanding these. The view to be advanced in later chapters 
remains largely ecumenical on these issues and provides further discussion 
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in instances where it does not. I shift focus now from types of content to 
types of representing. 
 
1.3.4: Types of representation 
The final distinction I wish to discuss in this part of the chapter is not so 
much about the nature of representational content per se so much as it is 
about the way in which it is represented. It is the distinction between 
allorepresentation and autorepresentation that is due to Charles Travis. I 
shall first briefly define each of these terms, before moving on to discuss 
Travis’s argumentative utilisation of them, and thereafter highlighting a 
response to his argument due to Brogaard. I close with some remarks on 
where the discussion of this subsection leaves content views viz. the nature 
of representation and representational content. 
Travis’s distinction focuses around the thought that representational 
content is commonly thought to involve taking things in one’s environment 
to be ‘thus and so’, that is to say that it is part of the content of a subject’s 
experience that their environment – what they are perceiving of it, at least – 
is a particular way. With this in mind, Travis first defines autorepresentation 
as simply “representing something to oneself as so.”95 By way of clarification, 
this is contrasted with either producing or being aware of something that 
represents something as being a certain way, whereby one can then accept 
this production or object of awareness as thus representing.96 The reason for 
the ‘auto’ in autorepresentation is that the subject is – as the above 
emphasis highlights – representing things to themselves as being a 
particular way. Allorepresentation, on the other hand, is precisely that which 
was being contrasted with just previously, and does centrally involve being 
aware of or producing something that represents things as being some way, 
such that the subject is then open to accepting or rejecting this.97 The key 
                                                          
95 Travis (2004: 61); emphasis mine. 
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97 Ibid. (61) 
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difference upon which the distinction hangs lies in the answer to the 
question ‘what is doing the representing?’. In both cases, it is the subject of 
the experience who is being represented to (i.e. they are the recipient of the 
represented information). In the case of autorepresentation, it is the subject 
that is actually representing things as so; in the case of allorepresentation, it 
is something extraneous to the subject that is representing something to 
them – they are the passive recipient, who can either accept or reject what is 
being represented (that things are thus and so). 
With these varieties of representation in play, I turn now to reconstruct 
Travis’s argument to the effect that, as Brogaard puts it, “no mental state 
represents, except in a derivative sense,” where this is understood to mean 
“that it’s not perceptual experience that represents but the experience 
together with certain higher-order epistemic states; viz. those that involve a 
commitment on the part of the agent to things being thus and so.”98 So as to 
remain as consistent as possible with what is to follow, here is Brogaard’s 
reconstruction: 
P1) If perceptual experiences represent [in either sense], then they represent the 
way things perceptually appear/look to be. 
P2) If perceptual experiences themselves represent, then they represent 
independently of the agent’s particular epistemic states (i.e. their rational 
decisions, beliefs, etc.) [which is to say: they allorepresent]. 
P3) There is no unique way that things perceptually appear/look to be, 
independently of the agent’s particular epistemic states identified in (P2). 
C1) Hence, perceptual experiences are not [allo]representational.99 
The first premise looks to be safe from criticism, at least from anyone who 
wishes to resist Travis’s conclusion – as we saw from the arguments of 
Logue and Siegel in favour of the content views, something like (P1) is an 
integral part of such theories. Additionally, if ‘the way things perceptually 
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appear/look to be’ implies a uniqueness of how things seem for the subject 
of the experience, then the argument is valid.100 The second premise finds 
support in the observation that the content of experience and the content of 
beliefs formed on the basis of that experience are two distinct things, 
together with the contention that certain aspects of early perceptual 
processing are not subjectively accessible: both potentially support the 
contention that (at least conscious) perception involves immediate 
awareness, as opposed to mediated awareness or any sort of inference.101 
Motivation for the third premise comes from two contrasting ways in which 
the word ‘looks’ (or, alternatively, ‘appears’) might be utilised. One of these – 
call it the comparative use – is the sort being utilised when I say ‘Mark looks 
like his sister’.102 This refers in particular to the appearance of things (say, 
visually). In contrast, there is another (arguably less strictly correct) usage of 
the word ‘looks’ which might be called the epistemic use of looks: as in ‘it 
looks as though the answer is 4’ where this usage is not independent of the 
speaker’s epistemic states in the way that the comparative use is.103 The key 
point for motivating Travis’s third premise is that the comparative use is 
compatible with many different ways in which things may look alike, and 
therefore fails to pick out a particular way things look, and therefore cannot 
fix representational content, unlike the epistemic use of ‘looks’ which – 
although saddled to the subject’s epistemic states such as beliefs and so on 
– does successfully pick out a particular way things look, and therefore can 
fix representational content.104 If this latter point is correct, then it seems as 
though there is no way that things can look a particular way to a subject that 
is independent of that subject’s higher-order epistemic states – precisely the 
                                                          
100 Ibid. 
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102 I alter the example slightly from Travis’s original ‘Pia looks like her sister’ so as to illustrate that the 
comparative ‘looks’ operates over comparisons of the form ‘x looks like y with respect to z’. Presumably Mark 
and his sister do not look identical – perhaps, for instance, they merely have the sort of similarity with respect 
to facial bone structure that one frequently sees with non-identical siblings, including those of distinct 
biological sex. 
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claim being made in the third premise. Together with the validity of the 
argument, it seems therefore as though the conclusion follows and is true. 
It is the third premise to which Brogaard provides a response.105 Her 
response ultimately boils down to an observation that humans have evolved 
to have the sort of visual system that can calculate, e.g., constancies in size, 
colour and shape according to what she (after Pylyshyn (1999)) calls 
“perceptual principles”.106 Importantly, these perceptual principles operate 
independently of an individual’s beliefs or other epistemic states, and so do 
not imply that perceptual experience is cognitively penetrated (although they 
are not inherently incompatible with such a position either); rather, they 
depend not on rational capacities of a subject, but instead on the visual 
system that that subject has evolved to have – in this way, they are 
“constitutive of perceptual experiences in beings like us.”107 As these 
perceptual organising principles are capable of calculating a particular way 
that things are to appear to the subject, and operate independently of that 
subject’s epistemic states, it seems that they constitute the required 
counterexample to Travis’s third premise, and thus his overall argument is 
blocked. 
I do not take the above presentation to decisively settle the matter, but it is 
worth noting that if Brogaard’s argument goes through, then perceptual 
representation is not ruled out in the manner that Travis suggests. In any 
event, this matters less for my purposes, as I instead think that an earlier 
step in Travis’s argument is mistaken. He argues that if perceptual 
representation occurs at all, then it does so in the form of 
allorepresentation, as it cannot do so in the form of autorepresenting. I think 
                                                          
105 This may strike some as surprising, given the apparent potential to block the second premise via reference 
to cognitive penetration (see Siegel (2012)). This looks like precisely the sort of case that would undermine the 
premise in question inasmuch as it involves beliefs influencing the nature of perceptual experience. Yet if one 
relies on this as a response, as Brogaard (2017: 279) observes, then Travis’s overall point goes through – there 
is no way that things perceptually seem to the subject independently of higher-order epistemic states. 
106 Ibid. (279) 
107 Ibid. (280) 
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this statement is misguided, and shall provide below his reasons for making 
the claim, before providing an argument in support of my contention. 
We saw above that the second premise of Travis’s argument is supported by 
the observation that perceptual experience and the beliefs formulated on its 
basis are separate. In addition, it has been widely accepted that the former 
operates to some degree independently of the latter, which is to say that 
doxastic or other epistemic states cannot influence perceptual experience 
without limit.108 A classic example of this is the Müller-Lyer illusion, whereby 
two lines of equal length are placed next to one another, and one is 
embellished with inward-pointing hashes at either end, whilst the other is 
embellished with outward-pointing hashes at either end. One can apparently 
believe wholeheartedly that two lines are of equal length, yet nevertheless 
experience one (the one with outward-pointing hashes at either end) as being 
longer than the other. Further, claims Travis, autorepresentation does not 
permit one the option to accept or reject the content of the representation – 
to autorepresent something just is to accept it.109 If perception is a source of 
information, then autorepresentation falls short of it, on Travis’s view, 
precisely because it is not a source of anything but, in the manner described, 
is a matter of having already accepted the content of the autorepresentation 
as being so – it is a matter of registering, or at least of presuming to.110 Since 
perception is plausibly a source of information – a source that one can 
accept or reject – it is concluded that perceptual representation cannot 
involve autorepresentation. 
Travis presents the two latter points as independent, though on reflection it 
is hard to see a meaningful distinction: that autorepresentation is a matter 
of (presuming to) register information seems just to be a function of taking 
the content of that information to be how things are. In any case, I take his 
conclusion to be misguided. For one thing, the initial justification that 
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perceptual experience operates at least somewhat independently of beliefs 
formed on the basis of (or about) that experience provides us with a means 
to accept or reject the deliverance of perceptual experience, even if the latter 
has already been accepted – or registered – in our experience via 
autorepresentation. More generally, it is simply not obvious that the capacity 
to accept or reject what the senses tell us is actually exercised at an earlier 
point in the perceptual process than the subject forming judgments on its 
basis. Consider again the Müller-Lyer illusion: we saw that our experience of 
the lines will be of them as differing in length, but rejection of this sensory 
deliverance is a matter of us believing that they are the same length – our 
visual experience will, in Travis’s terms, accept their difference in length as 
so, and will do this independently of any belief we exercise on the matter. It 
is not, therefore, the case that autorepresentation functioning as a 
registration precludes our ability to accept or reject the deliverances of 
perceptual experience. This conception also does not preclude the contents 
of representations as being assessable for accuracy in a manner that upholds 
their independence from the subject’s doxastic state: if the representational 
content of experience e is simply that p, and this is taken to be so because of 
how autorepresentation works, then whether this content is accurate or not 
can still be determined by whether or not p obtains in the mind-independent 
world.  
It may nevertheless be argued that when representation occurs in 
perception, it de facto occurs independently of the subject’s doxastic states, 
and so Travis’s second premise does go through and autorepresentation is 
ruled out. Whilst respecting the notion that beliefs cannot influence 
perceptual experiences without limit, there is still some evidence to the 
contrary. Returning to the Müller-Lyer example, one proposed explanation of 
our experience of the lines as different in length is that the hashes on the 
end trigger our mechanism of depth perception, such that the line with the 
outward-pointing hashes is interpreted by our visual system as being further 
away than the one with inward-pointing hashes and, since they are in fact 
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the same length, these two factors together result in one appearing longer 
than the other.111 
In particular, this is because the hashes are thought to resemble common 
depth-indicative angles as seen in architecture familiar to us. The outward-
facing hashes suggest a line that is at the end of a plane furthest from us, 
whilst the inward-facing hashes suggest a line that is at the end of a plane 
closest to us. The thought would be that those familiar with these angles and 
their indications of depth in this way have, in appreciating the typical 
interplay between depth, distances, lengths, angles and so on in this way, 
come to learn facts about these properties when they typically come 
together, and so beliefs with contents involving these facts have become part 
of – or penetrated – their cognitive system.112 As a result of this alleged 
cognitive penetration, it may be that many of us who experience the lines as 
being different lengths cannot help imagining the lines as being further away 
or closer to us due to our familiarity with the relevant angles between the 
lines and hashes in our highly geometric architecture; consequently, our 
imagination may combine with the experience of the two lines to yield an 
experience in which the lines appear to be of different lengths.113 
A point of note about this explanation of the Müller-Lyer illusion is that it is 
reliant on familiarity with certain angles in architecture for its 
persuasiveness. Consequently, one would expect that if this were indeed the 
correct explanation of the illusion, the experience of subjects less familiar 
with these angles in their surrounding architectural environment would 
differ. This is empirical question, and there has been some study undertaken 
to assess differences in experience of the Müller-Lyer illusion across subjects 
from cultures with varying architectural styles. There were findings of the 
sort envisaged above, whereby subjects from cultures with less angular 
architecture were reported as being virtually immune to the illusion.114  
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114 See McCauley & Henrich (2006). 
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There are several ways that the findings of studies like this can be called into 
question – for instance, it seems reliant on subjects’ self-reporting, the 
reliability of which may be questioned. Despite not conclusively settling the 
issue, however, I do take the present example to provide at least some 
empirical evidence against Travis’s contention perceptual representation 
must, if it occurs, be allorepresentation that occurs independently of a 
subject’s doxastic states. Between this and Brogaard’s argument considered 
earlier, I take it to at least be not obvious that Travis’s argument is 
successful, and therefore that representationalism still merits serious 
consideration as a front-running philosophical theory of perception. On this 
outlook, the question of whether perceptual representation is 
autorepresentation or allorepresentation remains. I offer now one final 
consideration in favour of the former over the latter before moving on.  
Allorepresentation, as Travis conceives of it, will provide us as subjects with 
a representation – one that we may then accept or reject. In this respect, 
allorepresentation is like the English sentence ‘pigs swim’, in that the mere 
sentence itself can be utilised as an assertion of how things are, or not, and 
in the former case this assertion of how things are can in turn be accepted or 
rejected.115 The language of English is not saddled with a commitment to 
‘pigs swim’ being how things are simply because it can compose that 
sentence, and Travis thinks that in just the same way our perceptual 
representation would not be saddled with being committed to representing 
things as so in every case, but rather only in certain cases of committed 
representation, in which what is being represented is accepted as how things 
are. As we saw, Travis argues that autorepresentation involves the 
commitment to what is represented being how things are: “to autorepresent 
something just is to accept it [as how things are].”116 
If this is the distinction between types of representation that Travis wishes 
to draw, I submit the following consideration in favour of 
autorepresentation. I presume that Travis does not wish to deny that we may 
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believe or disbelieve the deliverance of our perceptual experience (however 
this is taken to work). I may come to believe that I am experiencing a 
hallucination or illusion, and may therefore reject the information being 
provided by my senses, like the Müller-Lyer subject who knows that the lines 
are of equal length. This process must be independent of the perceptual 
experience itself, by Travis’s own lights. Supposing that perceptual 
representation is allorepresentation, the representation might be accepted as 
how things are or rejected, and this process must be independent of the 
aforementioned belief and disbelief about the deliverances of perception. 
On the face of it, this simply does not square with our experience at all. Once 
I experience something, I may accept or reject that things are the particular 
way that I am experiencing them to be, but this is an exercising of my 
doxastic capabilities. In terms of the perceptual aspect to my experience, 
things have already been accepted as being a particular way, and it is this 
that I can believe to be how things are or not. This alone does not entail 
autorepresentation, for it may just be committed representation: a central 
case of allorepresentation that actually does represent things as being a 
particular way.117  
The difference between committed allorepresentation and 
autorepresentation is not obvious, however one fact about 
autorepresentation is that it centrally involves the subject representing 
something to themselves as being so. I take this to be a particularly plausible 
explanation for what goes on when we perceive kind properties. It seems 
strange to suggest that my perceiving something as being a doorknob – as I 
can for variously shaped metal objects in a hardware store – is somehow a 
property intrinsic to the metallic mass, which could just as easily have been 
fashioned into something else. If perceptual representation of kind 
properties occurs at all, it is far more plausible that it is autorepresentation. 
I return to the issue of perceiving kind properties in Chapter 4.  
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I hope in this section to have illustrated that, unlike Charles Travis, we 
should consider perceptual representation to be a plausible occurrence and, 
therefore, should consider representationalism as a plausible candidate for 
our philosophical theory of perception. In considering Travis’s arguments, I 
have also touched on a distinction between autorepresentation and 
allorepresentation. Against Travis, I argue that autorepresentation is the 
more plausible of the two, as it squares more intuitively with our lived 
experience, and because his argument for the opposite conclusion can be 
challenged on both theoretical and empirical grounds. 
 
1.4: Misrepresentation 
I turn now to address the representationalist account of non-veridical 
experience, which must be supplied if the theory is to avoid the arguments 
from hallucination and illusion (presented in §1.1), according to which 
perceptual experience cannot give us awareness of mind-independent 
objects. 
Broadly, the representationalist response to such cases hinges on the view’s 
focus upon the intentionality of experience – the directed ‘aboutness’ of it – 
a notion made salient in philosophical discourse initially by Franz 
Brentano.118 A consequence of the view that experience is intentional which is 
relevant to the present discussion is that experience of objects is not 
relational in the sense that the objects experienced serve as constituents of 
the experience.119 Thus, on this view, “experience is not itself what is 
intentionally present ‘in’ it.”120 As a consequence of this, there is no 
entailment from an experience of an object to any object of the sort existing; 
“an experience,” to quote Husserl, “may be present in consciousness 
together with its intention, although its object does not exist at all, and is 
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perhaps incapable of existence.”121 This insight distinguishes the 
representationalist position not only from the relational view to be discussed 
in the following chapter, but also from sense-datum theory according to 
which experience is a relation to some non-physical sense-data.122 
Since representationalism appeals to the intentional aspect of experience in 
this way, a fact about perceptual experience that is brought to the fore as a 
result is that perceptual experience can be accurate or inaccurate: the 
experience has accuracy conditions. According to the view, it is the 
satisfaction of these accuracy conditions – in turn – which entails a 
perceptual experience being veridical: that is, an experience is veridical iff its 
content matches the way the world actually is in the appropriate way.123 To 
put it another way: a perceptual experience on the representationalist view 
leaves open the possibility that the world will match the content of that 
experience, and the possibility that the world will fail to match the content 
that experience; the experience is veridical in the case where the two match, 
and is non-veridical otherwise. Since the content of the subject’s experience 
specifies that experience’s accuracy conditions, the difference between 
veridical and non-veridical experiences is not located in the content, but the 
state of affairs in the world, which determines whether these accuracy 
conditions are met or not.124 
This allows the representationalist a response to the arguments from 
illusion and hallucination. According to these, non-veridical experiences 
should be accounted for in the same manner as veridical experiences, and 
one cannot say of non-veridical experiences that they constitute awareness 
of mind-independent objects and their properties, so one cannot say this for 
veridical experiences either. The arguments from illusion and (the earlier 
articulation of) hallucination, appeal to the Phenomenal Principle (introduced 
in §1.1), according to which when one undergoes a non-veridical experience 
                                                          
121 Ibid. (98 – 99) 
122 Crane & French (2015) 
123 Where ‘in the appropriate way’ is designed to rule out so-called veridical hallucinations, where the world 
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as of an object, there nevertheless exists something of which one is aware. 
We have seen from the above considerations of representationalism’s appeal 
to intentionality that the view can straightforwardly reject the Phenomenal 
Principle to answer these articulations. 
Another articulation of the argument from hallucination simply sticks to the 
more basic observation that hallucinations do not involve direct awareness 
of mind-independent objects (at least with regard to the hallucinated 
elements), and combines this with the contention that whatever story one 
tells about veridical experience should match that told about non-veridical 
experience to yield the argument’s conclusion. Here, the representationalist 
accepts the latter contention on the basis that it is read as the common kind 
assumption (CKA): 
(CKA): Whatever fundamental kind of mental event occurs when one veridically 
perceives, the very same kind of event could occur were one hallucinating.125 
The representationalist accepts this claim and overcomes this version of the 
argument from hallucination by holding that one’s experience of a snow 
leopard on the path ahead, for example, is accounted for by one 
representing a snow leopard on the path ahead; this is the story the 
representationalist tells whether the experience is veridical or hallucinatory. 
Representationalism can accept this, whilst avoiding the conclusion of the 
argument from hallucination by distinguishing between two readings of the 
conclusion: 
(C1): Veridical experiences are not fundamentally cases of perceptual awareness 
of mind-independent objects. 
(C2): Veridical experiences do not give us perceptual awareness of mind-
independent objects.126 
So long as (C2) does not follow, the representationalist can argue, the 
argument from hallucination can be satisfactorily answered. Consequently, 
                                                          




the representationalist bites the bullet of (C1), and denies that any sort of 
perceptual experience fundamentally consists in perceptual awareness of 
mind-independent objects.127 
Instead, representationalism holds that what perceptual experiences of all 
types fundamentally consist in is representation. As we have seen, this is 
compatible with both accurate and inaccurate experiences. The view salvages 
the perceptual awareness of mind-independent objects that we take 
ourselves to have by appealing to cases where the world matches the 
representational content of experience. Instances where this fails to occur 
are deemed misrepresentations, and this term broadly covers both illusory 
cases – where the representational content of one’s experience correctly 
identifies an object as present, but incorrectly identifies its properties – and 
hallucinations, where the totality of the apparent object is misrepresented. 
Since representational content is a constant across all levels of veridicality 
and can be identical in both veridical and hallucinatory cases, this provides 
the representationalist with a rich story regarding the phenomenal character 
of hallucinations. This is particularly striking in their account of how certain 
veridical perceptions and hallucinations can be subjectively 
indistinguishable from one another – the sameness in phenomenology is to 
be accounted for by the sameness in representational content. I return to 
this point in Chapter 4. 
This chapter has constituted an exegesis of representationalism: the view 
according to which perceptual experience is fundamentally a matter of a 
subject representing their environment as being a particular way. The view is 
founded upon the notion of experience being intentional, and utilises 
representational content in order to account for many of the questions facing 
philosophical theories of perception. There are many different articulations 
of the view that share this common core. I have discussed several 
distinctions drawn regarding both the nature of content (Russellian, Fregean, 
etc.), content determination (internalism versus externalism), as well as types 




of representation (allorepresentation versus autorepresentation), as well as 
providing some dialectical context-setting for the view, and illustrating how 
it is thought to deal promisingly with certain problems in the philosophy of 
perception. Having thereby provided a thoroughgoing exegesis of one of the 
two theories in the debate I am centrally concerning myself with, I devote 







The preceding chapter introduced and provided an exegesis of one party of 
the representationalism versus relationalism debate. With that analysis of 
features of and motivations for representationalism complete, this chapter 
will turn to the task of providing the same for the other party to the debate: 
relationalism. The chapter will have four parts. The first part serves to 
provide some considerations designed to provide context for what is known 
as the relational view, or relationalism – i.e. the contemporary articulation of 
the direct, or naïve realist position to which representationalism was 
opposed. This context will illustrate the place in the philosophy of 
perception dialectic of contemporary relationalist theories. The second part 
provides a more thoroughgoing exegesis of this sort of view by considering 
two influential articulations of it, due respectively to John Campbell and Bill 
Brewer, with some further analysis provided of the relation of direct 
acquaintance that lies at the heart of each articulation. The penultimate third 
part discusses the motivations and merits of relationalism in instances of 
veridical perception. Finally, the fourth part provides an analysis of the ways 
in which relationalism deals with non-veridical experiences, discussing the 
varieties of the relationalist position known as disjunctivism about 
perceptual experiences. 
 
2.1: A dialectical context for relationalism 
The preceding chapter set the context for representationalism as arising in 
part out of dissatisfaction and concern about some of the less palatable 
commitments of direct realism. These theories, we saw, tried to argue that 
perception was fundamentally a matter of direct acquaintance with the 
object perceived. However, in order to accommodate the possibility of 
subjectively indistinguishable hallucinations and the reality of illusions, 
proponents of these views concluded that the object with which the subject 
71 
 
had direct acquaintance was not, in fact, the mind-independent object itself. 
Upholding such a view led to the advancement of metaphysically 
questionable positions, and consequently one narrative regarding the advent 
of representationalism portrays the view as a response to the desire to avoid 
such commitments. Another narrative, that particularly relevant to 
intentionalism, focuses on the interplay between the intentional properties 
and the phenomenal properties of experience. It is this narrative that will 
also serve to conveniently carve out a place in the philosophy of perception 
dialectic for the contemporary form of direct realism, which I am calling 
relationalism.128 
Before I proceed, I must first present an important caveat that relates the 
scene-setting above to the discussion below. For all that has been said, I do 
not mean to suggest that the discussion to follow in this section – which 
relates among other things to phenomenal properties, qualia, and Frank 
Jackson’s knowledge argument – is to be taken as an accurate depiction of 
the historical motivations for relationalism.129 The considerations I discuss in 
what follows serve as the focus of discussion instead because they (a) 
provide a transition between considerations introduced in the previous 
chapter and new considerations to be addressed in what follows, and (b) 
throw into sharp relief how the two views – relationalism and 
representationalism – differ in their explanatory approaches to a central 
issue in the philosophy of perception. Moreover, they differ in their 
approach in a manner that will become relevant to discussion in later 
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One of the key questions that philosophical theories of perception must take 
a stand on, if we are to view them as adequate, is what the nature of the 
relationship between the intentional properties of experience (what that 
experience is about – representational content falls on this side, for example) 
and the phenomenal properties of experience (the phenomenal character – 
what the experience is like for the subject). One response to this issue comes 
in the form of the following thesis: 
Separatism: The phenomenal and intentional properties of experience are 
independent of one another, and are entirely separable. 
The intentionalist positions discussed in the preceding chapter, both strong 
and weak intentionalism, clearly reject this separatist thesis. They hold that 
a relation of supervenience (weak intentionalism), if not of identity (strong 
intentionalism), holds between the two sorts of properties. One might fairly 
hold that this rejection of separatism is a positive feature of such views. 
Introspecting upon one’s own experience, it seems fair to say that there is at 
least some link between what the experience is about and what it is like for 
one to undergo. 
This does not mean that rejecting intentionalism thereby commits one to 
separatism, however. Theorists in search of a middle ground are required to 
establish some sort of link between the intentional and phenomenal 
properties of experience – one that is non-trivial and goes beyond ‘they are 
both experiential properties’, for example – yet also to stop short of 
suggesting that a perceptual experience’s phenomenal character is wholly 
determined by its representational content. It is possible, for example, to 
hold the following: 
i) There are concepts that a subject can only possess if they have perceptual 
experiences with phenomenal character, and 
ii) There are representational contents, constituted by such concepts, which can 
only be attributed to a subject if that subject has perceptual experiences with 
phenomenal character, while also maintaining that 
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iii) We need to invoke the instantiation of non-representational phenomenal 
properties of experience – i.e. qualia – if we are to account for the phenomenal 
character of conscious perceptual experience.130 
Here, the first two propositions ensure a rejection of separatism by 
maintaining that representational content is essentially grounded in 
phenomenal character. Possessing the concepts constitutive of the 
representational contents of one’s experience requires that one must 
undergo experiences with phenomenal character. The third proposition 
ensures that the view does not collapse into intentionalism: the latter 
accounts for phenomenal character in terms of the representational 
properties of experience, yet this view does not.  
Instead, phenomenal character is to be accounted for by invoking the notion 
of qualia. Qualia (plural of quale) are properties of one’s phenomenal 
experience which are non-representational. Strong intentionalists, who are 
committed to the phenomenal character of an experience being identical to 
that experience’s representational content, will of course reject the notion 
that such properties exist. Their view simply leaves no room for such 
experiential properties as qualia. This is not to say that there are not 
independent reasons for rejecting the existence of qualia, however. In the 
next section, I will discuss such reasons in more detail, with a view to 
elucidating the relationalist position to be discussed in the remainder of the 
chapter. 
 
2.1.2: Qualia & Mary 
As we have seen, the qualia theorist can reject the strong claim of 
separatism – that intentional and phenomenal properties are totally 
separable from one another – by maintaining that the representational 
content of a given perceptual experience is explained by its phenomenal 
character, and then by accounting for the latter in terms of non-
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representational, phenomenal properties (i.e. qualia) that the experience also 
has. Whilst it does allow one to do so, this view has not enjoyed universal 
support from those who wish to reject separatism. In addition to 
intentionalists who are qualia sceptics because their view leaves no room for 
these experiential properties, there are those who reject the qualia theorist’s 
position on independent grounds. In this section, I shall discuss briefly 
reasons both for and against this qualia view, before progressing to the next 
section to discuss where relationalism fits into the picture of both qualia and 
the broader (anti-)separatism question. 
Support for perceptual experiences possessing qualia as part of their 
phenomenal properties can be found in the work of self-identified “qualia 
freak” Frank Jackson.131 Broadly speaking, Jackson appears to find intuitive 
the idea that knowing all of the physical facts related to, say, feeling pain or 
experiencing jealousy simply would not confer upon one all that there is to 
know about the hurt of that pain or the pangs of that jealousy. He 
recognises, however, that this intuition-based rejection of physicalism is not 
intuitively obvious to all, and so undertakes the task of providing a valid 
argument such that even the most enthusiastic physicalists must assent to 
its soundness.132 
In his familiar (1982) example, Jackson asks us to consider Mary: 
[. . .] a brilliant scientist who is, for whatever reason, forced to investigate the 
world from a black and white room via a black and white television monitor. She 
specialises in the neurophysiology of vision and acquires, let us suppose, all the 
physical information there is to obtain about what goes on when we see ripe 
tomatoes, or the sky, and use terms like 'red', 'blue', and so on.133 
If the physicalist (and so, with them, the intentionalist and qualia 
sceptic) is correct, then knowing these facts constitutes knowing all 
there is to know about the phenomenal character of the experience of 
seeing the colour red, for example. If so, then in coming to learn all 
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about these concepts and physical facts, Mary should be in precisely the 
same epistemic state with respect to the phenomenal properties of an 
experience of red as a subject who has undergone such an experience, 
despite being deprived of phenomenal colour experience.  
The natural question to ask, says Jackson, is consequently whether – 
upon being released from the black and white room and seeing a red 
thing for the first time – Mary learns anything.134 In his Knowledge 
Argument, Jackson contends that it is obvious that Mary will, upon 
experiencing colour for the first time, “learn something about the world 
and our visual experience of it,” and so despite knowing all that there 
was to know in terms of the physical facts of colour experiences, Mary 
did not know all that there was to know about colour experiences in 
general.135 The qualia theorist stands ready to accommodate this 
intuition. They can claim that what has happened here is that – despite 
being in possession of all of the physical facts, and thereby 
representational properties, of experiencing colour – Mary has for the 
first time become acquainted with some non-representational 
phenomenal properties, only available to those undergoing colour 
experience. She becomes acquainted, in other words, with the qualia of 
her colour experience. 
So far, so good for the qualia freaks. Let us now assume, however, that 
Jackson’s picture is correct. This allows for the following adaptation: if 
it is known that colour perceivers become acquainted with qualia upon 
perceiving colours, then it is plausible that Mary could come to add this 
fact to her body of knowledge about colour perception in an entirely 
theoretical manner (that is: despite her own lack of qualia 
acquaintance).136 Assuming that Jackson’s thought experiment is correct 
and that this is a plausible assumption to add to it, then upon seeing 
colours for the first time, Mary gains a certain sort of knowledge 
                                                          
134 Ibid. 
135 Ibid. 
136 Soteriou (2016: 91) 
76 
 
regarding qualia. Yet she already possessed theoretical knowledge about 
qualia, so what knowledge is it that she has gained? A plausible answer 
would be that she has gained knowledge about the intrinsic nature of 
the qualia by becoming directly acquainted with it. 
The problem with this position is that what experience is like for a 
subject simply does not cohere with it: if new knowledge of qualia is 
gained via the subject’s experience, then they should be able to 
introspectively attend to their new knowledge – to the qualia; what the 
subject discovers, however, is in fact just knowledge regarding 
properties of physical objects themselves.137 If this is correct, it would 
seem to suggest that any knowledge gained by acquaintance with qualia 
is actually not introspectively (and thereby mentally) accessible to the 
subject. Combining this with Jackson’s claim that qualia are 
epiphenomenal (that is to say: they are causally impotent with regards 
to the physical word) and one can argue based on the conjunction of 
these claims that it is not obvious what explanatory role qualia play, 
beyond enabling an ad hoc denial of separatism. 
This is far from a complete account of the debate surrounding the (a) 
existence of, (b) nature of, or (c) plausibility of (the epiphenomenalism 
of) qualia.138 It is, I hope, nevertheless enough foundation to progress to 
the next section which situates relationalism within the context of these 
considerations, providing sufficient background before moving on to 
provide a thorough exegesis of that view. 
 
2.1.3: Mary and Naïve Realism 
Returning to the question of what new sort of knowledge one would 
acquire were one to be in a similar position to Mary (including 
                                                          
137 See Campbell (2005) for arguments specific to colour, and (2002, esp. Ch. 7) for a more general argument 
about knowledge gained through experience. 
138 Fully exploring such a debate, however, is not the point of this chapter. 
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potentially complete theoretical knowledge of qualia), one certainly 
does not seem to be newly acquainted with qualia. Recall that these are 
supposed to be phenomenal properties of one’s experience which are 
non-representational. By hypothesis, one has complete knowledge of 
the representational phenomenal properties that such an experience 
would have, and therefore it cannot be the case that one is newly 
acquainted with such properties. 
Campbell’s view proposes a middle ground between these two options 
by accepting each of them, which together yield acceptance of the claim 
that a subject in such a situation is not newly acquainted with a 
property of experience. Rather, he holds that this newly gained 
knowledge takes the form of acquaintance with properties of objects.139 
Such a view enjoys intuitive plausibility for several reasons. For one 
thing, objects and their properties are what a subject like Mary have 
been newly introduced to, and so accounting for the knowledge gained 
by appealing to those objects has a certain elegance in its explanatory 
simplicity. One encounters a red object for the first time and, in so 
doing, what one gains is knowledge about the colour red itself – as 
instantiated by some mind-independent object – as opposed to 
knowledge about one’s own phenomenal experiences. 
Aside from this intuitive plausibility, the view in question would achieve 
the following things. First, it would accommodate the intuition that 
Mary does in fact learn something new upon leaving the black and white 
lab and seeing the colour red for the first time. She would learn about 
the property itself, as a property instantiated by objects rather than by 
her own phenomenal experience. Second, it sustains a rejection of 
separatism, upholding the idea that there is some important way in 
which an experience’s intentional and phenomenal properties are 
connected. Yet it does this is a way that does not collapse into 
intentionalism: the phenomenal properties of experience are accounted 
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for not wholly in terms of representational content, but rather by 
objects and their properties in the mind-independent world. Moreover, 
this is all accomplished without reliance on qualia. Though the above 
discussion was far from conclusive about whether one ought to be 
sceptical about qualia or not, it is clear that proponents of a view which 
makes no appeal to such properties need not concern themselves with 
such debate, as the objections and criticisms brought against the qualia 
theorist cannot affect the plausibility of their own view. 
Though these points may be thought to count in favour of the view in 
question, for all that has been said so far it remains unclear that this 
view will avoid concerns shared by many about naïve realist positions. 
The accommodation of intuitions offered by this view is very similar to 
that offered by theories of the latter sort. Consequently, contemporary 
relationalists have been at pains not only to offer an alternative to 
representationalism, but also to offer such an alternative that 
accommodates various intuitions that more primitive naïve realist 
positions were thought to, whilst not falling prey to the same objections 
as those earlier views did. 
The purpose of this part of the chapter was to provide an appropriate 
historical and dialectical context in which to situate what I am calling 
relationalism. This took the form of introducing issues such as the 
question of separatism or Jackson’s Mary, which various theories of 
perception have weighed in on differently based on their respective 
commitments. By highlighting the ways that other theories – 
particularly representational theories, with varying views on qualia – 
have addressed such issues, I have located the place that relationalism 
finds itself within the dialectic. Having done so, I turn now to provide a 






As we saw in the preceding section, John Campbell’s relational view 
accommodates many of the intuitions that earlier incarnations of direct 
realism did. In order to assess motivations for accepting it above any 
other theory of perception, its workings shall need to be explained in 
some depth, however. This is the task of this part of the chapter. As we 
shall see, there are various features of the view, and two prominent 
articulations of it. In the first section of this part, I will outline the view 
as portrayed by Campbell, with some remarks on his motivations and 
aims, as this runs to the heart of contemporary relationalism. Then, in 
the second section, I provide an exegesis of a variant of the view, due to 
Bill Brewer, known as the Object View of perception. This is notable for 
its distinctive treatment of perceptual appearances, but also provides 
an illuminating analysis of perceptual knowledge that will be useful for 
my later purposes. 
 
2.2.1: The relational view140 
Insofar as the relational view departs from representational ones that 
claim phenomenal character is determined by representational content, 
it is itself an alternative account of the phenomenal character of 
perceptual experience. The view takes as its point of departure the 
claim that perceptual presentation cannot be wholly reduced to, or 
manufactured out of, perceptual content.141 In suggesting the 
impossibility of such complete reduction or manufacturing, Campbell’s 
relational view is due us an alternative account of the phenomenal 
character of perceptual experience. Quassim Cassam summarises 
                                                          
140 Though in subsequent chapters I shall use the term ‘relationalism’ to refer broadly to the sort of 
contemporary naïve realist position proposed by both philosophers under discussion, for the remainder of this 
chapter I shall (following them) use the relational view to refer to Campbell’s relationalist position, and the 
Object View to refer to Brewer’s variant thereof. 
141 Where perceptual presentation is taken to broadly cover those aspects – purportedly of the physical, mind-
independent world – that are ‘given’ to a subject via their perceptual experiences. 
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Campbell’s take on phenomenal character into the following 
Constitutive Thesis: 
(CT): The qualitative character of sensory experience is constituted by the 
qualitative character of the objects and properties of the scene observed.142 
This suggests that the alternative explanation of phenomenal character is to 
be given in terms of the mind-independent objects in the physical world. In 
this regard, the relational view is on track to appeal to direct realists. 
Concerns raised in the preceding chapter regarding the apparent 
phenomenal commonalities between veridical and corresponding non-
veridical experiences looked to provide reasons to pause before accepting 
the direct realist conclusion that what we most directly perceive are mind-
independent objects themselves. As a result, Campbell’s view will need to 
illustrate that the same fate does not befall it. The remainder of this section 
first examines exactly how the relational view conceives of perceptual 
experience – focusing on the workings of the perceptual relation from which 
the view derives its name – and then proceeds to discuss the role that 
phenomenal character is then taken to play, before concluding with a 




2.2.1.1: The direct acquaintance relation 
The name relationalism (or, even more particularly, the relational view) 
suggests an elevated importance of some relation. The relation in question is 
the perceptual relation, and to fully appreciate the relational view, one must 
be aware of what this relation obtains between, and of what the relation 
itself consists in. 
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An obvious answer to the first of these points is that the perceptual relation 
obtains between the subject of the perceptual experience and the object they 
are perceiving. This is along the lines that rudimentary direct realist 
positions tended towards. Such views run into problems not only with 
respect to the arguments from illusion and hallucination, but also from 
considerations regarding perceiving the same object from different angles 
(the thought being that the phenomenal character is different from different 
perspectives, and a simplistic relation between subject and object will be 
insufficient for explaining this fact). The relation being proposed by the 
relational view, then, will need to be more complex. 
In accordance with this, Campbell contends that it is insufficient simply to 
hold of perceptual experience that subjects stand in some relation with 
mind-independent objects and properties. Instead, an adequate articulation 
of the perceptual relation must also take into consideration how such 
subjects stand in that relation. That is to say: an account must be given of 
how exactly a perceptual experience relates its subject to the worldly objects 
(and their properties) of which it is a perceptual experience.143  
The means of factoring how some subject stands in relation to an object into 
that relation itself, by relationalist lights, involves the expanding of the 
relation: 
We should think of consciousness of the object not as a two-place relation between 
a person and an object, but as a three-place relation between a person, a 
standpoint, and an object. You always experience an object from a standpoint. 
And you can experience one and the same object from different standpoints.144 
So, we have the addition of a third relatum. In addition to the subject and 
the object perceived, we have the notion of a standpoint. This is meant to 
capture the perspectival nature of perceptual experience and thus 
encompasses the relative position of what is perceived to the perceiver, the 
sense modality via which they are perceiving, and various other factors that 
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might impact the precise phenomenal experience the subject may have (e.g. 
lighting conditions in visual perception, or temperature in gustatory 
perception). In short: the standpoint is as it sounds, and is the perspective 
from which the subject is perceiving, involving all features of this that work 
together to influence the exact nature of their perceptual experience. 
The addition of this third relatum, intuitively common to all perceptual 
experiences, accomplishes much of what is required of naïve realist 
positions such as Campbell’s. For one thing, it upholds that perception is a 
matter of being related to mind-independent objects. The view only differs 
from this exact statement by emphasising that perception is a matter of 
being related to mind-independent objects from a particular standpoint. In 
addition, aforementioned concerns regarding how direct realism accounts 
for the same object being perceived from different angles can now be 
accommodated, as the relational view can simply invoke the third relatum 
and say that in such cases the subject and object are held fixed, and 
perceptual differences simply mirror the difference in standpoint.  
As to the nature of the relation itself, it is taken to be a relation of direct 
acquaintance between the subject and object of experience.145 This at once 
captures the unmediated nature of the relation between subject and object 
(from a particular standpoint), and also speaks to the epistemological aspect 
of perception. Our perceptual experiences allow us to know things about our 
respective environments; they afford us a certain awareness of what is going 
on around us. In virtue of the perceptual relation being one of direct 
acquaintance, the thought is that “[w]e have to regard experience of the 
object as reaching all the way to the object itself, and thereby providing us 
with the conception of that categorical object.”146 I return to the business of 
acquiring knowledge of the intrinsic character of object properties below, 
but presently I continue this part of the discussion with some considerations 
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on what constraints we might be able to place on the structure of this direct 
acquaintance relation so as to further understand its nature. 
There are several ways an analysis of the structure of this direct 
acquaintance relation might proceed. One way may be to focus on its limits, 
as these may offer some insight into the appropriate restrictions to place on 
our view of its metaphysical structure. This would involve a contrastive 
analysis between what counts as standing in this relation and what does not, 
in the hope that this would illuminate appropriate delimitations and give us 
a better understanding of what the relation is capable of encompassing. 
Another way would be to abstract away from individual sensory modalities, 
and conduct a comparative analysis of what is common to apparent 
instances of the relation across sensory modalities. The thought, if direct 
acquaintance is a relation that can obtain in all sensory modalities, is that 
this would isolate features common to the perceptual relation across these 
modalities, without which the relation would not obtain.  
It is worth pointing out before proceeding that both analyses will proceed 
via introspection of perceptual experience – a method which has shown itself 
to be a very poor means of settling the relationalism versus 
representationalism debate.147 The goal here is nothing as lofty, however. 
Instead, the focus will be on what seems introspectively accessible in 
perceptual experience, as well as what does not – the latter being, itself, a 
finding that might arguably provide information on the nature of the direct 
acquaintance relation via establishing its limits. Essentially, the thought is 
that what we can become aware of via introspection of our perceptual 
experiences may not be exhausted by what we perceive, but might also 
include the way in which we perceive it.148 
One aspect of perceptual experience that we might think is localised to 
visual perception (at least in some significant way) is that we seem aware of 
spatial relations in our immediate environment and, more broadly, of space 
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itself. This is important because it seems as though the space we are aware 
of need not be occupied by anything in order for us to have this awareness. 
Seeing a distant object as distant seems to involve being aware of a greater 
deal of space between us and the object than the space we are aware of 
between us and a nearby object. It seems equally clear, however, that the 
space we aware of does not constitute all the space that there is (this is true 
even within our vicinity: we are usually not visually aware, for instance, of 
the space directly behind us) – we are aware only of a certain sub-region of 
it. One may go a step further than this, arguing that the space we experience 
is space we experience as being such a sub-region.149 
If this is correct, then it makes sense to say that there are outer limits to that 
which we spatially perceive. This seems to correlate well with our visual 
experience when subjected to introspection: it seems to us as though our 
visual field consists in certain a more central ‘front and centre’ region, with 
peripheral vision all sides constituting an outer boundary to our visual 
sensory field. Considering this boundary, we are not inclined to attribute to 
it the property of being physical – it does not seem to exist out there in the 
mind-independent world in the same way as the objects that we perceive. 
Consequently, it is strictly speaking more plausible consider this a limit of 
our sensory experience itself, rather than a limit of what it is we are 
experiencing.150 
The first structural aspect of the direct acquaintance relation to be 
identified, then, is this notion of our spatial sensory field in vision. This 
notion can be thought of as relatively invariant with regards to its structure 
– it obtains, in some form, irrespective of what object(s) are being perceived. 
It may be thought of, therefore, as explaining why perceiving spatial 
locations of objects seems to us to be perceiving some sub region of space in 
which those objects are located.151 This in turn allows for a neat account of 
the relationalist claim that the phenomenal character of experience is 
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literally constituted by the objects themselves. The thought is that we have 
this relatively invariant spatial sensory field, and the objects that fall within 
it are the objects of which we are visually aware, and are therefore those 
which can constitute the phenomenal character of that experience. 
The areas of our spatial sensory field that are not occupied by objects, 
meanwhile, still constitute space of which we are aware, yet we are aware of 
them as empty space in which objects could be seen. This story provides us 
with a way of accounting for the empty space we are aware of, whilst 
avoiding the need to ascribe to it something like a negative representational 
content.152 I take this to be a positive outcome, as the nature of such negative 
representational contents seems hard to pin down, and would require at 
least one additional layer of analysis. 
If this spatial sensory field were exclusive to vision (I do not argue that it is) 
then it should, in this respect, to be thought of as isolating a structural 
aspect of that sense modality, as contrasted with others. In general, that we 
might arrive via contrastive means at an understanding of a structural 
aspect of particularly visual experience is arguably unsurprising. Not only 
are humans predominantly visual animals (in the sense that we are mostly 
reliant on vision to provide us with perceptual knowledge of the world), but 
the overwhelming majority of literature on perception reflects this, and 
mostly consists of research into visual perception, at least in cases where it 
is about one specific sensory modality. 
Let us now consider cases that are definitively not localised to one specific 
sensory modality. In accord with the method discussed above, this will 
involve proceeding via a comparative analysis (across sensory modalities) to 
try to identify similar limits to our sensory awareness of our surroundings. 
We saw from our focus on vision specifically that we have a spatial sensory 
field that constitutes a structural feature of our perceptual awareness by 
functioning as a limit upon it. It certainly seems true to say that our spatial 
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awareness is primarily visual.153 In identifying limits on our sensory 
awareness, however, one approach we may try is to consider whether there 
are any structural features that are equally apparent to all sensory 
modalities. 
In this respect, and since we have already identified a spatial sensory field, it 
makes to consider the notion of a temporal sensory field, which will function 
is a similar way to its spatial counterpart, and which can be demonstrated 
via hearing. The thought is that our auditory perception is such that we are 
consciously aware of intervals of time in which sound could be heard in just 
the same way as our spatial sensory field is such that it functions as 
something we are consciously aware of, and in which objects could be 
seen.154 Continuing the analogy: just as this characterisation of the spatial 
sensory field allowed for an account of perceiving empty space when objects 
did not occupy regions of the spatial sensory field, so too does the 
characterisation of a temporal sensory field allow for an account of 
perceiving silence when no objects are heard within the interval constituting 
our temporal sensory field at that time.155 
Just as before, such a characterisation also allows one to avoid appeal to 
negative representational content. This is particularly useful if one’s view of 
the representational content of veridical experiences is such that the content 
stands in a causal relation to objects in the world. We are perfectly capable 
of envisaging an experience of silence that is veridical, yet it seems this 
cannot be said to be caused by objects heard, but rather by lack of them. The 
notion of a temporal sensory field provides an alternative explanation 
according to which an auditory experience of silence is a positive perceptual 
experience: rather than being acquainted with a negative representational 
                                                          
153 Primacy does not entail exclusivity, though. Hearing a familiar sound at a notably quieter volume – a siren, 
for example – causes us to believe that there is an emergency vehicle far away from us; if it is gradually getting 
louder, then we may also come to believe that it is approaching us. Similarly, as it goes past us, it may sound as 
though it is ‘to the left’ or ‘to the right’ (see Lee (2006)). Though fair points, all these really establish is that the 
spatial sensory field is not limited to vision – a point already established by Gareth Evans’s (2002) on 
Molyneux’s question. What is not established here is any new sort of limit on sensory awareness. 




content, or positively acquainted with a lack of sound, one is instead 
positively acquainted with an interval of time – one in which no sound is 
heard.156 
Further elucidation of the notion comes from considering when we have the 
relevant contact with intervals of time. Plausibly, for example, one does not 
have conscious contact with intervals of time, such that one positively 
perceives either sound or silence, when one is asleep.157 That the temporal 
sensory field extends beyond the auditory can be supported by considering 
visual perceptions of slight movements: the movement of the hour hand on 
a clock face, for example. Of course, if we look away for an hour or two and 
then look back at the clock face, we will judge the hour hand to have moved. 
Importantly, though, we have not perceived its gradual motion in the same 
way that we can with the second hand. Its movements may be so slight and 
incremental that any discernible movement falls beyond the limits of our 
temporal sensory field. That is to say, its perceivable movement does not 
occur wholly within the interval of time with which we are directly 
acquainted, and consequently we fail to experience the motion of the hour 
hand, despite it moving, when we continually stare at it.158 
Finally, it seems as though there is a degree of transparency regarding the 
conscious awareness of intervals of time being discussed. Introspectively, we 
are arguably unable to temporally locate our experiences of durations of 
time as being located at temporal points extrinsic to those durations of time; 
that is to say: there is no distinct point of view from which we seem to have 
conscious awareness over temporal intervals.159 This seems to be a point that 
can be upheld whilst remaining ecumenical on the issue of whether we 
perceive temporal intervals in the form of instants or of more substantial 
length.160 
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157 Ibid. (129) 
158 Ibid. (129 – 130) 
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160 An issue that crops up in the literature on the specious present concerns how its contents – that “house the 
change and persistence we encounter in our immediate experience” – relate to ordinary objective time 
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Overall, the above analysis of the direct acquaintance relation has yielded 
two potential structural features of our perceptual relation to the world 
around us. The first of these pertained to conscious awareness of spatial 
properties, and was cashed out in terms of a spatial sensory field; the 
second pertained to conscious awareness of temporal properties, and was 
cashed out in terms of a temporal sensory field. Though possessing 
differences, which were discussed above, both sensory fields illuminated 
structural limitations on our conscious perceptual awareness, and each 
provided a satisfying account of more ‘negative’ perceptual experiences such 
as seeing empty space or hearing silence. This concludes my analysis of the 
relation of direct acquaintance appealed to by the relational view, and to the 
Object View variant to be discussed in a later section. I turn now to consider 
the role that the phenomenal character plays in the relational view. 
 
2.2.1.2: The role of phenomenal character 
The phenomenal character of perceptual experience, on the relational view, 
is actually constituted by properties of the mind-independent objects 
themselves. We saw this in the above statement of the Constitutive Thesis 
(CT) – whatever qualitative properties the object in question possesses, is it 
by these properties that the phenomenal character in question is 
constituted. This direct link between the subjects of perceptual experiences 
and the mind-independent objects in the world that they are perceiving 
allows the relationalist to draw appealing epistemological conclusions on the 
back of phenomenal character – as the direct relation of perceptual 
acquaintance is inseparably bound up with phenomenal character, according 
to the relational view. Establishing exactly what epistemological role 
                                                          
(Dainton (2011: 395)). The literature divides between extensionalists (who hold that these contents are 
temporally extended in the fashion they appear to be) and retentionalists (who hold that they are not 
temporally extended in this fashion, yet have the appearance of being so). Extensionalist views have been 
advanced by John Foster (1982, 1991), Ian Phillips (2010), Barry Dainton (2000) and others; retentionalist 
views are advanced by Edmund Husserl (1991) and Geoffrey Lee (2014). 
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phenomenal character plays on the relational view is the task of this 
subsection. 
Perhaps most importantly to proponents of the view, phenomenal character 
as the relational view conceives of it not only allows us to have knowledge 
about various truths regarding our respective environments, but also plays 
the vital epistemological role of accounting for how we come to even possess 
the concepts that we have of the objects and properties that we perceive.161 
Not only does the relational view hold that phenomenal character provides 
us with perceptual knowledge, but it also furnishes us with the very tools 
required in order to possess and articulate such knowledge in the first place. 
Another way of putting this is that phenomenal character plays the role of 
grounding our knowledge of the world around us. 
One consequence of elevating phenomenal character to play this role is that 
experience of objects becomes more primitive than our ability to think about 
those objects.162 It is this primacy that allows the relationalist to contend 
that, when Mary sees the colour red for the first time, she is not newly 
acquainted with qualia, but rather with what the colour red is like, as well as 
what it is like to see the colour red. According to the relational view, she 
learns what it is like to see the colour red because she becomes acquainted 
with the colour red itself and learns what it itself is like.163 The relationalist 
will view this as a feature of their view rather than a problem, as they submit 
that one aspect of the way that we can think of mind-independent objects we 
perceive is of them as being mind-independent. 
The role of being that which lets us conceive of mind-independent as mind-
independent is heavily intertwined with the notion of concept possession. 
Representationalists hold that this role is played by representational 
content, taken on several prominent articulations of the view to itself be 
conceptual. The relational view, conversely, holds that this role is played by 
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163 Soteriou (2016: 95) 
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phenomenal character directly, itself accounted for in terms of acquaintance 
with mind-independent objects from a given standpoint.164 It bears saying 
that the relationalist need not be wholly sceptical about representational 
content. The mere existence of representational content is perfectly 
compatible with relationalism; what is not compatible with (austere) 
relationalism is that representational content plays a prominent role in 
explaining perceptual experience.165 The two views disagree about what 
exactly explains this grounding role of perception, but it is precisely this 
grounding role of perception that the relational view accounts for in terms 
of the phenomenal character of experience itself, in turn constituted by 
mind-independent objects and their property instantiations. 
One final point to note about this role that the relational view ascribes 
phenomenal character is that it is this that preserves the relationalist’s 
rejection of separatism. The intentional properties of experience are indeed 
linked to the phenomenal character of the experience – indeed they are 
explained by it on the relational view – however the phenomenal character is 
not itself accounted for in terms of representational content, but rather in 
terms of the mind-independent objects perceived. Consequently, the view 
constitutes a theory of perception that is distinct from representationalism, 
yet which rejects separatism nonetheless. 
 
2.2.2: The Object View variant 
Before moving on to discuss the motivations and points in favour of 
relationalism, I wish to draw attention to a variant on the relational view, 
namely: Bill Brewer’s Object View (OV). Brewer’s view agrees with Campbell’s 
that that we view a mind-independent object is insufficient for a satisfactory 
theory of perception – we also need to bring in how we view the object. In 
                                                          
164 I do not attempt to argue for one side or the other on this point. See Campbell & Cassam (2014) for 
discussion of the topic. 
165 For clarity: austere relationalism holds that the perceptual acquaintance relation, and not representation, is 
what does the crucial explanatory work in our philosophical theory of perception. 
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this regard, the claim that the qualitative character of a sensory experience is 
constituted by the qualitative character of the objects and properties of the 
scene experienced is not simply an appeal to the properties and 
characteristics of the mind-independent objects being perceived themselves, 
but rather how those objects and properties present to the subject S, 
standing as S does in relation to those objects and properties in particular 
viewing conditions – i.e. the standpoint relatum discussed above.  
I do not intend to rehash in this section an exegesis of how (OV) works when 
it is in complete agreement with Campbell’s relational view. Instead, I shall 
focus on where the two vary. At its core, Brewer’s view is a relationalist view 
as much and as legitimately as Campbell’s is; (OV) simply has its own way of 
cashing out certain points that not all relationalists would wish to assent to, 
but explaining these is nevertheless prudent in setting up for the discussion 
that follows. Consequently, it is this that I shall be focusing on in this 
section. 
As alluded to above, the views agree on perception being a three-place 
relation involving the subject S, some mind-independent object o, and a 
particular standpoint such that S is directly acquainted with o from a 
standpoint, or within particular circumstances of perception c. Recall that it 
is variation in standpoint that accounts for the same object being viewed 
from multiple angles (possibly, but not necessarily, by different subjects). 
Intuitively, we would expect the same object to look different from different 
standpoints. One of the key points of Brewer’s (OV) is that it offers a means 
of cashing out perceptual looks or appearances within a relationalist 
framework. The remainder of this section will be spent explaining how this 
works and what consequences fall out of it. 
Although the conscious relation of acquaintance proposed by (OV) is, 
according to the chief proponent of the view, unanalysable, what it is for an 
object o to look some way F to a subject S is analysed in terms of what are 
called thin looks and thick looks. Brewer contends that “an object o thinly 
looks F iff o has, from the viewing conditions in question, appropriate 
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visually relevant similarities with paradigm exemplars of F.”166 Here, visually 
relevant similarities are taken to be similarities with respect to various 
processes “enabling and subserving visual acquaintance”, e.g. similarities in 
how light reflects and transmits from the objects present in the scene before 
S, as well as in how such stimuli are processed by S’s visual system given 
their evolutionary history, and so on.167 In other words, visually relevant 
similarities simply are similarities with respect to those features in the world 
that are salient to vision. One can imagine a similar account being given of, 
e.g., auditorily relevant similarities, where these would be similarities with 
respect to those features of the world that facilitate hearing – similarities in 
how sound waves interact with the acoustics of their immediate 
surroundings, and how the subject has evolved to interpret this, etc.168 
A great deal of the work in supporting Brewer’s account of looks is done by 
the paradigm exemplars to which o is to have visually relevant similarities. 
These are taken to be instances of the physical kinds “whose association 
with the terms for those kinds partially constitutes our understanding of 
those terms, given our training in the acquisition of the relevant concepts.”169 
The thought here is that in coming to grasp and subsequently correctly 
apply the relevant concept of F, there are certain paradigm instances of F 
that underpin this. For example, suppose I say that a doughnut looks 
circular to me. According to (OV), the doughnut must bear visually relevant 
similarities to paradigm exemplars of circular things, from the standpoint 
from which I am seeing it. This is to say that it must bear visually relevant 
similarities to those physical manifestations of circular things which played 
a central role in allowing me to grasp and correctly apply the concept 
‘circular’ to objects. 
Meanwhile, o thickly looks F iff o thinly looks F and the subject registers the 
visually relevant similarities to the paradigm exemplars of F that this entails, 
                                                          
166 Brewer (2017: 216) 
167 (ibid.) 
168 I am merely using this example to elucidate the notion of visually relevant similarities. I am not ascribing 
this to Brewer’s (OV), though I see no reason in principle why the view could not assent to such a position. 
169 Brewer (2011: 104) 
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where registration can be thought of as potentially involving the deployment 
of the concept of F, though room is left for other forms of registration that 
do not involve deployment of the concept in question.170 The thought behind 
the distinction is that some object o may bear visually relevant similarities to 
paradigm exemplars of F, yet subject S may fail to realise this. In such cases, 
we wish to say that the subject still sees the object, they merely do not see it 
as being F. Brewer reserves the notion of o thickly looking F to S for those 
occasions where o bears visually relevant similarities to F, and S does 
appreciate and endorse this fact. In this case, it is not just that S is in a 
position to see o as being F, S actually does see o as being F. 
This structuring and cashing out of perceptual appearances allows (OV) to 
provide a pleasingly straightforward yet intuitively plausible story about 
what happens in cases of illusion. The view maintains the view of illusion 
that states that in illusory experiences the subject does indeed experience an 
object, but does so incorrectly. Given (OV)’s account of looks, it becomes 
fairly straightforward to give an account of a subject experiencing an object 
as being a certain way when it is actually not that way. This is because, as 
Brewer observes, it does not follow from perception being taken to be a 
relation of direct acquaintance with an object o that, in instances of S being 
acquainted with o which looks F to S, o actually is F.171 Using the apparatus 
described above, (OV) can accommodate the notion that from a given 
standpoint an object o can seem to S to bear visually relevant similarities to 
paradigm exemplars to F (when o is in fact G), and this mistaken association 
can be attributed in turn to features of the standpoint from which S is 
acquainted with o. A basic example would be a blue car appearing to be 
green thanks to the lighting conditions in which it is being seen. 
I return to the relationalist’s accounts of non-veridical experiences, both 
illusory and hallucinatory, in subsequent sections. This also concludes my 
exegesis of the Object View and indeed of relationalism as a whole. The next 
part of this chapter proceeds to consider motivations for relationalism: 
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arguments for why one might be inclined to accept it, and what further 
positive things fall out of the theory. 
 
2.3: Motivations in veridical cases 
In this part of the chapter, I set out and consider some arguments that have 
been thought to support relationalism in its role as a theory of veridical 
experience. What the relationalist ought to say about non-veridical 
experience has been a matter of considerable debate, and the following part 
of the chapter is devoted in its entirety to that question. 
 
2.3.1: The grounding role of experience 
Referring to objects in the world is an exceptionally commonplace activity; 
that we are generally able to do this is not in question. It is also an 
uncontroversial assertion that, in some cases, distinct mind-independent 
objects of the sort to which we might refer can seem so similar that we 
cannot tell from their qualitative appearance alone which is which. An 
obvious example of this is the case of identical twins, however I take it to 
apply in a similar way to mass-produced everyday items, such as a pair of 
plain white cups. In each of these cases, if we were to cease attending to one 
of the pair and – unbeknownst to us – the two were switched, we would be 
none the wiser on the basis of appearances alone. Subjectively, however, it 
seems to us in each case as though we are referring to one of the pair in 
particular: we are referring to that cup, or to that twin. 
Concentrating now on visually identical cups, Campbell observes that when 
we are each having an experience distinct white cups of this sort, I know 
which cup I am talking about when I say ‘that cup’, and you know which cup 
you are talking about when you say ‘that cup’.172 In considering the source of 
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this knowledge, a natural candidate seems to be our respective experiences 
of those particular cups.173 If experience does play this explanatory role of 
grounding our capacity for demonstrative reference, claims Campbell, then 
this serves as a point in favour of relationalism over representationalism. 
This contention is supported by considering how representationalism is 
committed to interpreting the preceding example. Assuming there is in fact a 
white cup in front of me, this view commits to my perceptual awareness of 
the white cup in front of me being a matter of representational content. This 
content will presumably feature the notion of a white cup, together with any 
further ways in which I am experiencing the cup in question. The problem is 
that your experience of a qualitatively indistinguishable white cup is, 
according to representationalism, to be accounted for via precisely the same 
representational content. In each case, that there is a white cup and it is in 
front of us will feature in the representational content, but the point is there 
is no way for the representational content of my experience to be described 
that doesn’t also serve as a way for the representational content of your 
experience to be described. Regardless of how the example is altered in my 
case, an analogous scenario can be articulated for yours. 
The overall point here is that representationalism looks to be committed to 
the representational content in each of our respective white cup experiences 
being identical, despite the mind-independent objects in question being 
distinct. Yet if this is all there is to perceptual experience – if explanation of 
it is exhausted by its representational content – then it is unclear how 
experience can pick out a particular object from a set of qualitatively 
indistinguishable ones. This squares poorly with the earlier thought that it is 
our experience of objects that gives us the right to use demonstratives such 
as ‘that cup’. If experience is to play this role of grounding our 
demonstrative reference, then it is difficult to see how experience itself 
could be anything other than a matter of being connected to particular mind-
independent objects.174 If we suppose that instead that experience plays this 
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grounding role and is fundamentally a matter of representational content, 
then our respective white cup experiences are both a matter of us each 
representing a white a cup as being in front of us. This representation is 
meant to account for how it is that we know which particular cup we are 
each talking about.  
The problem with this is that the question of justification is then rebounded, 
and the representationalist must provide an account of what right we have 
to use representations in this way. The representationalist seems committed 
to grounding our use of representations (to be able to refer demonstratively) 
in representations, and beyond simply building this grounding role in as a 
fundamental aspect of experience, it is not clear how else they might salvage 
their account into one possessing explanatory value in this matter. If they 
opt for claiming this as being an aspect of experience, however, then 
experience cannot have the explanatory role of grounding our capacity for 
demonstrative reference. Experience of mind-independent objects, on this 
view, presupposes our ability to think about them, and so simply cannot be 
used to explain this capacity.175 On this basis, it has been argued that only 
relationalism can provide a satisfactory account of our capacity for 
demonstrative reference. 
 
2.3.2: The problem of determinacy 
This line of reasoning proceeds by observing that since things we experience 
do seem to be a particular way, there must be some mechanism at work that 
determines which particular way things seem. With this in mind, it is then 
argued that relationalism, but not representationalism, can make sense of 
this. The thought, as Brewer puts it, is that “there are plausible features of 
the content-like aspects of perception that are quite unintelligible on the 
assumption that the perceptual system simply serves up specific experiential 
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contents fully formed and without any explanatory dependence upon more 
basic experiential facts in particular cases.”176 
There are two considerations at play in the opening formulation of this 
argument for relationalism, expressible via the following theses: 
Variety: For each environmental state of affairs C we perceive, there is a 
multitude M of ways that it may appear to us (where M is constituted by possible 
ways of appearing <a1, a2, …, an>). 
Constraint: When we have a perceptual experience of C, our experience 
constrains M in such a way that only one ai  M is how C appears to us. 
A toy example that illustrates Variety and Constraint is that of the Necker 
cube, whose wire-frame nature allows it to appear to us as a cube that is 
oriented in different ways depending on how we attend to it, or as a tilted 
hexagon with a symmetrical pattern of lines within it.177 The three different 
ways that the Necker cube can appear constitutes the M from Variety, whilst 
the fact that the cube only ever appears to us in one manner at a time – even 
if we can bring about aspect shifts by altering how we focus on the image 
before us – is Constraint at work. Non-illusory examples also work: the table 
in front of me is such that it may appear to me just to be a table, or an 
arrangement of planks of wood, or of particles (Variety). In general, though, 
my experience of the table is such that it only ever appears to me to be one 
of these ways at any given moment (Constraint), as I will only register one of 
them at a time. Of course, it may also appear to be green, the colour of 
emeralds, varnished, large, curved, and so on. The different sorts of ways 
things may appear to be can nest with one another, so that different aspects 
of the table, such as its size, shape and colour, are each subject to Variety 
and Constraint. 
The preceding quote from Brewer is intended to indicate that only 
relationalism can account for Variety and Constraint, and that this in itself 
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constitutes an argument for the view. Views according to which our 
fundamental account of perception revolves around representational 
content, as Brewer conceives of them, maintain that the two very different 
conceptions of looks encapsulated by Variety and Constraint are actually 
compressed into one layer of representational content.178 This notion of 
content, being all that the representationalist has to appeal to, must account 
for both Variety and Constraint. Brewer’s (OV), meanwhile, constructs its 
account of appearances out of thin and thick looks, as discussed in §2.2. 
Thin looks are defined as the visual similarities a perceived object o has to 
paradigm exemplars of various properties. Thus, o thinly looks F if it bears 
visually relevant similarities to paradigm exemplars of F. Since thin looks 
are, so described, independent of the subject actually registering the visually 
relevant similarities, there are a multitude of ways a given object may thinly 
look. Thin looks are thus ideally suited to account for Variety. Thick looks, 
conversely, are just those similarities that the subject does register, and so 
can arguably account for Constraint via the notion of conceptual registration 
via which they are defined. The thought is that conceptual registration on 
the part of the subject makes determinate the appearance of an object to 
that subject, and this completes the journey from Variety to Constraint that 
appears to capture the richness of the world and the particularity of our 
experience of it.179 
The representationalist might reject this argument on the basis of a two-step 
argument of their own. The first of these steps is just to accept Variety for 
what it is: an admission that how things actually appear to us to be is only 
one out of numerous ways that it might appear to us to be, and this fact 
operates independently of the particularity of how things actually appear. 
The second step is to adopt the position that our perceptual experience does 
involve a particular representational content, and that this content in 
particular stands in a causal relation to the object we are perceiving, thereby 
satisfying Constraint. In adopting this position, the representationalist could 
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arguably complete the journey from Variety to Constraint. They would also 
be articulating their view in such a way that it is founded upon the notion of 
representational content, whilst making clear the connection between this 
content and the mind-independent world.180 
This does not leave the representationalist in the clear, however. The appeal 
to causation employed in this representationalist response to the worry, the 
relationalist can counter, simply moves the problem one step up. Now, 
rather than explaining how the representational content of experience is 
constrained in the manner described above, the representationalist must 
explain how the relevant causal relation at work in determining a particular 
content is constrained to subjects having experiences phenomenally like our 
own.181  
Failure to provide this account leaves their view no closer to satisfying 
Constraint than it was before. If we accept that experience does work in the 
manner suggested by Variety and Constraint, and that this is something for 
which our philosophical theory of perception must account, then it is not 
clear how the representationalist might answer this challenge. For fear of 
their view collapsing into relationalism, they should not argue for a more 
primitive perceptual relation to the mind-independent world. It also seems 
that they should not appeal to representational content to fix the causal 
relation discussed above. Doing so would create circularity: the causality is 
already explaining the determination of the representational content, so 
determinate representational content cannot explain the causality. 
Abandoning the causality altogether leaves them once again in the position 
described by Brewer, where their initial means of accounting for Variety and 
Constraint is wholly unclear. Consequently, considerations of determinacy 
arguably motivate relationalism. 
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For all that has been said so far of relationalism as a theory of perception, 
one could be forgiven for thinking that the view still requires an account of 
non-veridical experiences. The exposition of the variants of the relational 
theory discussed above proceed, in the most part, by providing accounts of 
veridical experience, and focus largely on the attractive epistemological story 
that such accounts provide, contrasting this with arguable shortcomings that 
come from embracing representationalism. The Object View’s analysis of 
appearances allowed for an account of illusory experience to be derived 
from the view’s account of veridical experience, but so far as it goes, this 
achieves little beyond gesturing towards some features of veridical 
perception, and hoping to explain illusion by simply observing that it lacks 
these features. More importantly, nothing at all has been said about how the 
relationalist is to account for hallucination. Infamously, no philosophical 
theory of perception is to be treated as satisfactory unless it can 
accommodate the complications that these two sorts of non-veridical  
experiences often throw into the works. 
Relationalism must consequently provide an account of non-veridical 
experiences. Inevitably, this will differ from the one provided by 
representationalism, since the latter derives its explanation of illusion and 
hallucination from the notion of representation, which plays no prominent 
role in a purely relationalist picture. Also providing restriction on the 
relationalist account of non-veridical experience are the arguments from 
illusion and hallucination. Each of these arguments concludes that we never 
have perceptual experience of mind-independent objects – a conclusion to be 
resisted by representationalists and relationalists alike. The theories differ in 
exactly how they resist this conclusion, a fact illustrated by which premises 
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of the argument from illusion and the argument from hallucination they 
respectively reject. 
One contention that is relevant to both of these arguments is that when a 
subject undergoes a non-veridical experience, there is arguably nevertheless 
something of which they are aware. Representationalists reject this step, as 
they will hold that “[it] is not generally true that when a representation 
represents something as being F, there has to actually be something which is 
F.”182 By rejecting this premise, the representationalist undercuts the 
arguments in question before the arguments use a spreading step to move 
from the notion that we are not aware of mind-independent objects in non-
veridical experience to the conclusion that we are never aware of mind-
independent objects at all. 
The spreading step in question suggests that the same account must be 
given of veridical and non-veridical experiences, and it is this step in the 
argument that relationalists are inclined to question. This approach 
contrasts with representationalism, in that the latter is often referred to as a 
‘common factor’ theory, and suggests that there is some experiential, 
intentional feature of qualitative experience that is common to veridical 
perceptions, illusions and hallucinations. The experiences are therefore 
thought to be of the same fundamental kind, with the difference between 
them located in how well the world matches up with their experiential 
content. 
The remainder of this section explores the relationalist alternative to this, 
broadly known as disjunctivism. Traced back to Hinton, the view broadly 
holds that when one has an experience as of e, one is either having a 
veridical perception of e, or is undergoing a non-veridical experience (an 
illusion or hallucination) in which it merely seems that e is present, thus 
denying that the same account must be given of the so-called ‘good’ 
(veridical) and ‘bad’ (non-veridical) cases.183 The exact way in which this 
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denial is articulated can vary: it can be thought of as merely acknowledging 
epistemological difference, or as a stronger, more metaphysical claim that 
the two sorts of experience are of a different psychological kind.184 
Whichever mental aspect serves as the vertex of the two disjuncts, a further 
claim can be made that what is present in the ‘good case’ disjunct and 
absent in the ‘bad case’ one is fundamental to that mental aspect.185 A 
proponent of this sort of view is also of the view that the good and bad cases 
are of fundamentally different kinds. I acknowledge this here, but as much 
of what follows in subsequent chapters denies that perceptual experience 
deals in such fundamentals, I shall not pursue it further. In what follows, I 
discuss the metaphysical and epistemological versions of disjunctivism in 
more detail, highlighting what each allows the relationalist to say regarding 
experiences of hallucination and illusion. 
 
2.4.1: Metaphysical Disjunctivism 
The most influential way that the disjunctivist denial of a common factor 
between veridical perception and hallucination has been articulated is what I 
am calling metaphysical disjunctivism. This position holds that the mental 
events of veridically perceiving and hallucinating are of different 
psychological kinds, even when they are subjectively indistinguishable. Since 
perceptual experiences (veridical perceptions, illusions or hallucinations) are 
such that they are of some psychological kind or other, by asserting that 
veridical and hallucinatory experiences are of different psychological kinds, 
the metaphysical disjunctivist guarantees that the two experiences are to be 
accounted for in different ways. This, in turn, blocks the so-called spreading 
step of the arguments from illusion and hallucination, according to which 
veridical and non-veridical experiences are to be accounted for in the same 
manner. Note that as I am using the term metaphysical disjunctivism here, 
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the view is broadly equivalent to what Byrne & Logue (2009) call moderate 
disjunctivism, as distinct from their articulation of metaphysical 
disjunctivism, which is such that there is no mental event common to 
veridical perception and hallucination.186 I take both views to be legitimate 
and distinct from one another, but do not think that anything that follows 
hangs on their distinction. Consequently, I maintain my usage, viewing the 
difference between the moderate and metaphysical (in their sense) versions 
of the view as a matter of degree. 
This version of disjunctivism is not uncontroversial, however, and one 
significant challenge raised against the view is to provide an explanation for 
causally matching hallucinations. The idea is this: suppose one veridically 
perceives a glass of water. Once one goes far enough down the causal chain, 
it makes sense to say that the physical glass of water in one’s immediate 
environment is a cause of one’s veridical experience. In considering the most 
proximate cause of the veridical experience, it makes sense to conclude that 
one’s brain state caused one’s experience, however. The thought then runs 
that it is conceivable that one might have one’s brain artificially brought into 
this state, and that this would lead to a qualitatively indistinguishable 
hallucination occurring, which had the same proximate cause as the 
corresponding veridical perception. Because of this latter point, the 
argument runs, the two experiences should be accounted for in the same 
fashion, blocking the disjunctivist solution to the argument from 
hallucination.187 
Many disjunctivists have rejected this argument, however, citing as a reason 
their commitment to the relationalist’s constitutive claim regarding 
phenomenal character. The suggestion, identified as the Constitutive Thesis 
(CT) earlier, was that the phenomenal character of a veridical experience is 
literally constituted (at least partially) by the mind-independent objects 
perceived. Consequently, it is open to the disjunctivist to argue that the 
same mental event cannot occur in both a veridical perception and its 
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causally matching hallucination. Both mental events have phenomenal 
character, and (CT) entails that the phenomenal character of the veridical 
experience is constituted by the mind-independent object(s) perceived. By 
definition, the corresponding, subjectively indistinguishable, hallucination is 
such that its phenomenal character cannot be accounted for this way, as 
there is no salient mind-independent object being perceived. Since the 
presence of a mind-independent object is essentially constitutive of the 
phenomenal character of veridical experience, then even if one could 
artificially bring about the same brain state to achieve a causally matching 
hallucination, the events would not be of the same psychological kind. This 
is because an essential constituent of the veridical phenomenal character is 
missing from the hallucinatory case.188 As a result, even if the disjunctivist 
allows that the veridical perception and hallucination are causally matching, 
their relationalist commitment to (CT) allows them to resist the claim that 
mere causal matching entails a sameness in accounts given for the different 
experiences.189 
This fails to completely overcome the concerns posed by hallucination. The 
opponent of disjunctivism can modify the principle at play in their causal 
argument from ‘if two events, e1 and e2 have the same proximate cause, then 
they are to be explained in the same way’, to something like ‘if events e1 and 
e2 are brought about by the same proximate cause in circumstances that do 
not differ in any non-causal conditions necessary for the occurrence of an 
event of kind K, then they are both of kind K, and are to be explained in the 
same way.190 It is then possible for them to argue that all that is required for 
a hallucination as of E – let this be of kind H – is that a subject is in a specific 
brain state, and this brain state would also be present in the corresponding 
veridical perception of E. Consequently, even if one can argue that a veridical 
perception of E is of kind V due to being constituted by whatever E is, it is 
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also of kind H since there is no difference in the non-causal circumstances 
necessary for the occurrence of the brain state in either case.  
From here, the argument continues, we run into a screening off objection. 
The hallucination of E has a phenomenal character that is grounded in its 
being of kind H, and if this is so then it is hard to see how the veridical 
perception of E being of kind V explains the phenomenal character of that 
experience better than its being of kind H, since being of kind H is itself 
sufficient to account for this.191 As Robinson puts it, “[if] simple 
indiscriminability is enough to constitute the phenomenology of 
hallucination, how could it fail to do the same job for a perception 
indiscriminable from the hallucination?”192 
The most popular way for the metaphysical disjunctivist to address this 
issue is to adopt the so-called negative epistemic conception of 
hallucination. According to this view, most prominently articulated by 
Michael Martin, all there is to a hallucination being as of a particular scene 
with a certain phenomenal character is that it is subjectively 
indistinguishable through introspective reflection from a veridical 
perception of that scene.193 If that is so, Martin observes: 
[The] property of being a veridical perception of a tree never has an explanatory 
role, since it is never instantiated without the property of being indiscriminable 
from such a perception being instantiated as well. But if the property of being a 
veridical perception lacks any explanatory role, then we can no longer show that 
being indiscriminable from a veridical perception has the explanatory properties 
which would screen off the property of being a veridical perception.194 
In this way, the disjunctivist can utilise the apparent fact that the 
explanatory power of the hallucination being of kind H is parasitic on the 
explanatory power of the corresponding veridical perception being of kind 
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V.195 This arguably allows the disjunctivist to overcome this screening off 
problem. 
In spite of this, the negative epistemic account of hallucination is not 
without fault. It accounts for hallucination in a manner wholly devoid of a 
positive account of its phenomenal character. When contrasted with the rich 
story that the representationalist can provide of hallucination, this seems 
lacklustre: the representationalist can tell an illuminating story of 
hallucinatory experiences via the appeal to misrepresentation, underpinned 
by their common factor approach. In conjunction with their rejection of the 
notion that this entails that veridical perceptions and hallucinations must be 
accounted for in an identical fashion, their theory can resist the argument 
from hallucination. As the disjunctivist attempts to circumvent this 
argument by denying the common factor, this approach is not available to 
them. Since the latter view is so minimal, negative and singularly focused on 
a hallucinating subject’s epistemic state, despite its claims that the bad and 
good cases differ on a psychological and metaphysical level, it is arguably a 
fair criticism that the view fails to account for all that we wish to explain 
about hallucination. 
The notion of indistinguishability being used to account for causally 
matching hallucinations, for one thing, is arguably incapable of doing all that 
it is supposed to. We can see this once we clarify the notion of 
indistinguishability being used. Recall that, according to Martin, all there is 
to the phenomenal character of such hallucinations is that they are 
indistinguishable from their corresponding veridical perceptions.196 Since 
Martin is committed to providing different accounts of phenomenal 
character for veridical and non-veridical experiences, it follows from this 
that on his view there is something more to the phenomenal character of 
veridical experiences. We have seen above that this something more is 
constituted by the sensible properties of the mind-independent objects 
perceived: it is because the objects of veridical perception seem to us to have 
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the properties they do that we recognise the experience as being 
phenomenologically the experience that it is.  
If this is how we recognise veridical experiences phenomenologically, and 
they are indistinguishable via reflection from causally matching 
hallucinations, then the disjunctivist is open to the following problem. 
Suppose we recognise a veridical experience, v, as being phenomenologically 
the experience that is because it seems to present property F. It is plausible 
that any experience subjectively indistinguishable from v – e.g. causally 
matching hallucination h – is one that we also recognise phenomenologically 
because it seems to present property F. If so, Martin must make sense of the 
following: since h is recognised as indistinguishable from v in virtue of 
appearing to present F, it cannot be that this F appearance is explained 
wholly by indistinguishability, yet his view seems committed to this.197 The 
above characterisation of our recognition of the phenomenology of v is a 
commitment of disjunctivism. Meanwhile, the claim that the phenomenology 
of indistinguishable experiences is recognised in the same way seems a 
plausible truth about indistinguishability.  
An alternative approach might be to claim that the subject of h’s impression 
of how their experience phenomenologically appears is the result of an 
unconscious inference – one which occurs quickly and delivers to them the 
impression that their experience is just like the one they would be having 
were they having v. Given that v has the clear phenomenology of appearing 
F, however, it seems implausible that this impression of similarity would 
occur without h also striking the subject as appearing F – a positive 
phenomenal feature of the sort that Martin’s view precludes. Consequently, 
the only path of resistance for Martin is to insist that h’s seeming to be F is 
not to be analysed in terms of its possession of the intentional of 
phenomenal object F, but rather that its having that object should be 
analysed in terms the experience’s indistinguishability from v’s having that 
object.  
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Indistinguishability is not yet out of the woods. Susanna Siegel raises the 
point that for two experiences to be indistinguishable (as defined by Martin) 
is for a subject to be unable to judge – by introspective reflection alone – 
that they are different, and argues that this problematises accounting for 
cognitively unsophisticated hallucinators. Giving the example of a dog, she 
claims that since the dog lacks the cognitive sophistication to form 
judgements, the dog a fortiori cannot form judgements of difference via 
introspective reflection or otherwise, and this will have the consequence that 
all the dog’s experiences are indistinguishable.198 This has the implausible 
consequence that any dog hallucination will be indistinguishable from each 
and every dog experience.  
In responding to this, Martin argues that the notion of indistinguishability 
being appealed to in his account is impersonal – i.e. it is not due to some 
deficiency in the subject, and holds of things that are indistinguishable per 
se.199 This allows his view to circumvent concerns regarding cognitively 
unsophisticated hallucinators, such as dogs. This response also faces 
problems. One can ask more of a pair of indistinguishable experiences than 
whether they are impersonally indistinguishable – one can ask in what 
respect(s) they are indistinguishable.200 Here, a natural answer for v and h is 
that they both appear F. Yet this positive feature cannot be accommodated 
by Martin’s view, because on that view no positive feature of hallucinations 
aside from their indistinguishability from counterpart veridical perceptions 
can be accommodated.201  
It also seems plausible that we would like a way of picking out which state it 
is that is (impersonally) indistinguishable from the corresponding veridical 
perception in an acceptable manner that does not beg the question.202 Here, 
Martin’s view arguably faces further problems because the experience in 
question cannot be identified by any robust positive trait, for on Martin’s 
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view it has none. Similarly, the notion of impersonal indistinguishability 
cannot help, for “we are trying to explain what it is for a state of the dog’s to 
have the [indistinguishability] property in the first place, so we cannot get a 
fix on which state we are talking about by appeal to its being the one that 
has that property.”203 
I return to the prospects of Martin’s view for explaining all that we want a 
philosophical theory of perception to explain about hallucination in Chapter 
4. I turn now to consider an alternative metaphysical disjunctivist account of 
hallucination. William Fish discusses a disjunctivist position that is 
eliminativist about phenomenal character: the view maintains that all that we 
wish to explain about hallucinations can be explained via the beliefs the 
hallucination brings about in the subject, and these will include the belief 
that they are having an experience with phenomenal character.204 In short, 
the cognitive effects of a hallucination account for its apparent 
phenomenology. 
If one accounts for things in this way, then one can maintain that 
hallucinations in fact lack phenomenal character altogether, whilst 
explaining hallucinators’ beliefs to the contrary. This arguably allows the 
disjunctivist to explain the qualitative identity of hallucinations and their 
corresponding veridical perceptions in such a way that the disjunctivist 
commitment to there being no shared phenomenal character between the 
two sorts of experience. After all, if hallucinations lack phenomenal 
character altogether then they cannot possibly share any with their veridical 
counterparts, regardless of what particular phenomenal character is 
possessed by the latter.  
Fish’s disjunctivism is committed to the controversial view that the subject 
is fallible with respect to whether their experiences have phenomenal 
character – a consequence that brings with it new complications regarding 
the seems/is distinction. One can be forgiven, for instance, for accepting that 
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if my experience seems to me to have a phenomenal character, then that is 
what that experience is like for me, and the experience therefore has 
phenomenal character by definition. Fish’s position is committed to the 
falsity of this, and therefore owes us an account of our fallibility in this 
respect. 
A more serious issue arises when we consider different sorts of 
hallucinations. It is fair to say that most philosophical accounts of 
hallucination are founded upon considerations of at what are might be 
called philosophers’ hallucinations: mundane hallucinations that are 
qualitatively indistinguishable from a correspondingly mundane veridical 
perception. More properly, however, a philosophical conception of 
hallucination should additionally encapsulate experiences resulting from 
taking hallucinogenic substances, and experiences which are such that the 
world could never be as the experience presents it to be, because what is 
hallucinated could never possess a veridical counterpart.205 
According to Fish’s view, hallucinations lack phenomenal character. The 
phenomenal character that they seem to have is simply the result of the 
hallucination’s cognitive effects, and the resulting false belief generated can 
explain all further behaviour based on the hallucinatory experience. In the 
case of philosophers’ hallucinations, this can be further cashed out in terms 
of the corresponding veridical experience: subjects of such hallucinations 
mistakenly believe that they are having an experience with the precise 
phenomenal character that the corresponding veridical perception would 
have. 
The problem as I see it with Fish’s view is that it is not applicable to the 
other sorts of hallucinations just mentioned. If indeed it is possible to 
hallucinate impossible figures, or if the hallucinatory visuals resulting from 
ingestion of hallucinogenic substances do not correspond to a way the world 
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could possibly be, then it is difficult to see how to accommodate the fact 
that such experiences seem to have phenomenal character. This is because 
the hallucinations in question do not even seem to be veridical. Fish is 
committed the view that these hallucinations do not actually possess 
phenomenal character. Yet if this is to be explained via cognitive effects of 
the hallucination, and by false beliefs formed, the question arises as to what 
this false belief is based on? It cannot be on any corresponding veridical 
perception in these cases for, as was just established, they lack such 
counterpart veridical experiences. 
There are two options I can see for Fish. The first is to commit to a sort of 
error theory across hallucinatory experiences, providing two different 
accounts – one for philosophers’ hallucinations, one for other hallucinations 
– which both involve us being wrong about our non-veridical experiences. 
The reason two accounts are needed is that the earlier point stands: why 
hallucinations with no counterpart veridical experiences seem to have 
phenomenal character, yet do not, cannot be explained by his account 
described above. This avoids the issue by separating the two sorts of 
hallucinations, accounting for each slightly differently, yet maintaining 
eliminativism about the phenomenal character of hallucinations under the 
common banner of an error theory.  
The second option is to accept that certain hallucinations that seem to have 
phenomenal character do have phenomenal character, and to restrict his 
eliminativism about the phenomenal character of hallucinations to 
philosophers’ hallucinations, building this hard distinction in to the 
comparative phenomenology of philosophers’ hallucinations and other 
types. This avoids the issue by conceding that different sorts of 
hallucinations have a different sort of phenomenology, and restricting 
eiliminativist claims about phenomenal character to philosophers’ 
hallucinations alone. 
If Macpherson is right, however, and the overall philosophical conception of 
hallucination must be inclusive of both sorts of hallucination, then either 
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approach will lead to the overall account of the philosophical conception of 
hallucination in question being disunified. The first approach requires two 
separate accounts in order to construct a single error theory; the second will 
involve a disunified story of the phenomenology of hallucinations. If we end 
up with a disunified account of hallucination, then it is unclear what 
commonalities they possess that merit the two being presented under the 
banner of ‘hallucination’. Insistence that the two are indeed of a common 
psychological type – hallucination – will not help. For this leads (of all things) 
to a screening off objection.  
This is easiest to see in considering the second approach, according to which 
some hallucinations can have phenomenal character. If having phenomenal 
character is sufficient to account for the phenomenology of hallucinations 
which are not philosophers’ hallucinations, then it is hard to see why the 
relation to veridical counterpart experiences with phenomenal character 
must step in to play this role only in the case of philosophers’ hallucinations 
in a manner that isn’t ad hoc. In terms of the first approach, a similar 
argument could plausibly be deployed by substituting phenomenal character 
with whatever explains the error theory for hallucinations that are not 
philosophers’ hallucinations. 
In order to avoid this screening off objection, the insistence that the two 
sorts of hallucination are of a common psychological type must be dropped. 
Yet once this has happened, there are parallels to metaphysical 
disjunctivism that are difficult to ignore. Recall that one of the base 
principles of the position was that since veridical perceptions and 
hallucinations are of different psychological type, they must not be 
accounted for in the same way. That is to say that they are not to be thought 
of as the same sort of experience as one another. It is not clear, if the above 
analysis is correct, why we must adopt this approach for the disunity of 
types of experience (veridical perception and hallucination) and not for the 
disunity of hallucinatory experience.  
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The above is an objection that only applies to Fish’s account of hallucination, 
because only that view involves eliminativism about phenomenal character. 
To that end, Martin’s metaphysical disjunctivism is unaffected by such 
considerations, because his view permits hallucinations to have phenomenal 
character across the board, but the story told about the phenomenal 
character of philosophers’ hallucinations is very minimal. 
Before proceeding to discuss a different variety of disjunctivism in the next 
section, it remains to be addressed how the metaphysical disjunctivist ought 
to account for illusory experiences. As described above, metaphysical 
disjunctivism divides experience up into two kinds: veridical and illusory. 
The question naturally arises: on which side of this distinction do illusions 
fall? Adopting first-letter abbreviations, answers fall mainly into two camps: 
VI vs H, and V vs IH – where the former groups illusions in with veridical 
perceptions as being radically different to hallucinations, and the latter 
groups illusions in with hallucinations as being radically different to 
veridical perceptions.206 In virtue of illusions failing to be fully veridical, 
Logue notes that several relationalists adopting metaphysical disjunctivism 
accept V vs IH without argument.207  
As there is nevertheless some veridical element to illusions, however, this as 
it stands seems unsatisfying. For one thing, it leaves open the question of 
how illusions and hallucinations differ. That being said, it can also be argued 
that the V vs IH / VI vs H distinction is too crude. Disjunctivism is in essence 
a negative thesis (that hallucination and veridical experience lack a common 
nature) that was constructed in order to support a positive one (that 
veridical perception is fundamentally a matter of the subject bearing a 
conscious perceptual relation to objects in the world); it does not follow 
from this that there should be a unified account of all the ways an 
                                                          
206 Logue (2015: 210) 
207 Ibid.; Logue correctly identifies Martin (2006: 360) and Campbell (2002: 117) as doing this. 
114 
 
experience may not be veridical: there is no restriction on the number of 
ways in which things may go wrong in our experience.208  
Nevertheless, it is worth examining what disjunctivists are committed to, 
because of their accounts of hallucination, in terms of accounting for 
illusion. The view of hallucination offered by Fish, for example, cannot be in 
the V vs IH camp in the simplest sense. This is because his view claims that 
hallucinations lack phenomenal character altogether. If illusions are like 
hallucinations in this respect, then it is extremely difficult to see how 
illusions may be maintained as being partially veridical, as this would seem 
to suggest at least some phenomenal character to the experience.209 
Moreover, if there is experiential continuity between veridical perception and 
illusion – as seems plausible – then much of our experience is somewhat 
illusory; placed in conjunction with Fish’s account of hallucination, this 
implies that we only occasionally enjoy experiences with phenomenal 
character, and erroneously believe that we do in the vast majority of cases.210 
In dialectical terms, it is not the case that in virtue of being committed to not 
endorsing V vs IH, Fish is committed to endorsing VI vs H. Upon closer 
inspection, one can find ways to make room in logical space for views that 
are not wholly on one side or the other of that distinction. As Fish puts it: 
The fact that illusions all involve some features of an object being seen correctly 
and other features being seen wrongly [. . .] should not blind us to the fact that 
there are significant differences between the sorts of scenarios that fall under the 
broad banner of illusion.211 
This hints the broad strategy that Fish’s own view employs: observe that 
multiple sorts of experiential state are each legitimately classed as illusory, 
highlight the reasons for difference in a finer-grained classification of these 
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types of illusions, and offer different explanations of these types of 
experiences. 
Fish identifies three types of illusions: physical illusions, optical illusions, 
and cognitive illusions. Physical illusions are predictable, intersubjective 
illusions which occur solely because of the way the mind-independent world 
is. The example of a straight stick appearing bent in water is given, with the 
observation that not only can this type of illusion be wholly accounted for 
without any appeal to what happens after light hits the subject’s retinas, but 
it also has the property of being able to be photographed.212 In accounting 
for these illusions, which are wholly explicable by appeal to worldly states of 
affairs, Fish concludes that they are actually a special case of veridical 
perception.213 In particular, they are a case of veridical perception that 
“involves the successful perception of somewhat unusual facts.”214 These are 
taken to be facts which preclude the successful perception of other facts, 
but are nonetheless themselves veridically perceived.  
With regards to the stick in water, this amounts to the water distorting the 
way in which we see the stick, thus precluding us from perceiving the fact of 
the stick’s straightness, yet enabling us to see how the stick appears when 
viewed in glass of water from a certain angle.215 Consequently, physical 
illusions can be accounted for in the following general way: in virtue of 
veridically perceiving some facts, we are precluded from perceiving others. 
On the basis of veridically perceiving these unusual facts, we might be prone 
to formulate false beliefs, however explaining this requires the resources of 
the next type of illusion to be discussed.216 
Cognitive illusions must be explained by appealing to the particular 
contribution made by the subject to the misleading appearance, and may be 
less intersubjective and predictable, to varying degrees, than the other types 
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of illusions.217 Fish provides an account of these that is similar to his account 
of hallucinations, inasmuch as false beliefs are formed that account for the 
subject’s consequent behaviours. Considering as an example a subject with 
ophidiophobia (fear of snakes) taking a coiled rope to be a snake, Fish argues 
that the ophidiophobia and accompanying heightened anxiety cause the 
subject to misdeploy their recognition capacity, leading to the mistaken 
belief that the coiled rope is a snake.218 Once the subject becomes aware of 
their error, the illusory experience does not persist – in the example given, 
the ophidiophobe stops illusorily experiencing a snake upon becoming aware 
that what is there is actually a rope. 
Cognitive illusions differ from hallucinations, however, in that they are still 
causally connected to the mind-independent world. In virtue of this fact, 
even with an explanation that is wholly rooted in the role of the subject of 
the experience, there is some constraint upon how erroneous the illusory 
aspect of the experience can be.219 The ophidiophobic subject’s condition, 
together with their viewing of a coiled rope of a greenish-brown colour in 
certain lighting conditions accounts well for their experience as of a snake. 
Conversely, it accounts poorly for an experience as of a chessboard. In the 
latter case, we would be inclined to conclude that the subject was 
hallucinating, as intuitively there is no such limitation imposed by the mind-
independent world onto how erroneous a hallucination can be. I return to 
this point for different reasons in Chapter 4. 
Optical illusions are predictable and intersubjective, as physical illusions 
were, however they are not explicable without some reference to processing 
carried out by the subject resulting in the misleading appearance.220 In this 
respect, they are like cognitive illusions, in that the subject forms false 
beliefs about what they are seeing, and these beliefs account for further 
behaviour the subject exhibits.221 Examples are numerous and familiar in the 
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literature, such as the Müller-Lyer illusion and the Adelson chessboard. They 
differ from cognitive illusions, however, in the sense that the illusory 
experience can persist after the subject’s error has been pointed out to them: 
once one is aware that the two longest lines in the Müller-Lyer illusion are of 
the same length, one nevertheless can continue to experience one of them as 
being longer than the other.222 
Optical illusions also differ from both physical illusions and cognitive 
illusions in the following sense. The illusory aspects of physical and 
cognitive illusions are accounted for wholly by appeal to the mind-
independent world and the subject respectively; in contrast, optical illusions 
will appeal to both. The appeal to the role of the subject is described above. 
According to Fish, appeal to the worldly aspect will vary in specifics 
according to the particular optical illusion, but will be to “the relevant 
illusion-inducing features of the perceived scene.”223 Returning again to our 
Müller-Lyer lines, if the subject is presented with only the two longest lines, 
they will correctly report that they are of the same length. It is when the 
inward and outward-facing hashes are added to the ends of these lines that 
the illusory experience occurs. In this case, then, the worldly features 
appealed to are the hashes, and the processing that these lead the subject to 
perform constitutes the cognitive element of the explanation of the illusion. 
In general, since it divides the broader class of illusory experiences up in this 
way, Fish takes his view to operate at “the level of individual facts that the 
subject is acquainted with in experience, rather than at the level of whole 
experiences.”224 Observing this division into veridical perception of unusual 
facts and false beliefs about worldly facts on the part of the subject (or a 
combination of these two), the view itself has a disjunctive element to it. On 
this view, a subject seemingly acquainted with a worldly fact either is 
acquainted with that fact or is mistakenly believing that they are acquainted 
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with that fact.225 In summing up what these two claims mean for the view of 
illusion, Fish concludes: 
Therefore, at the level of individual phenomenal properties, there is no class of 
illusion; there are only two ways of seeming to see a particular feature: either 
veridically or non-veridically. The key to the picture, however, comes with the 
recognition that any normal visual experience will seem to the subject to present 
not just one, but an array of worldly facts. At the level of whole experiences, 
illusions occur when some features are seen veridically and others non-
veridically.226 
As a result of this, Fish’s view as a whole can take classification of 
experience to be a spectral notion, with veridical perception and 
hallucination at either end, and illusion occupying the middle space. Since 
illusion involves this mixing and matching of feature veridicality, it is 
permissible – in cases such as only a single particular feature appearing non-
veridically – that the mistake will be so minor that the whole experience is 
still deemed veridical, however, with a similarly scalar divide obtaining 
between illusion and hallucination.227 
I have focused predominantly on Fish’s accounted of illusion, but that is not 
to suggest that it is the only option available to the relationalist. Since 
relationalism holds that the phenomenal character of perceptual experience 
is determined in part by a perceptual relation of acquaintance, this leaves 
open to the relationalist the possibility that illusory aspects of a given 
conscious experience are determined by non-relational aspects, which 
determine in part the overall phenomenal character of experience.228 This 
observation operates at a higher level than Fish’s account, and whilst it is 
compatible with his view, it neither entails it, nor is incompatible with being 
satisfied in other ways. 
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At its core, relationalism is a positive view on the fundamental account to be 
given of veridical experience. Disjunctivism, as has been hitherto discussed, 
is a negative view brought about to support this in light of the argument 
from hallucination. By adopting a V vs IH (as opposed to VI vs H) conception 
of experience, the disjunctivist effectively deals with the argument from 
illusion too, which may account for the content of Logue’s observation that 
this is what several disjunctivists have done without supporting argument. 
However, the supporting argument is necessary – if we are to treat illusions 
as kindred to hallucinations, there should be an account of illusion that tells 
us why we should do this. In the absence of this, it remains an open question 
how the relationalist should account for illusion. 
Since relationalism is a view regarding the fundamental account of 
perceptual experience, it is not incompatible with the occurrence of 
representation, as the representationalist uses the term. What it is generally 
taken to be incompatible with is that representation does the explanatory 
heavy lifting. If it is true that relationalism is a view about the fundamental 
account of veridical perception, however, then it is not clear that 
representation does not play some role in accounting for the illusory aspects 
of experience. Adopting Fish’s threefold distinction of physical, cognitive 
and optical illusions, the relationalist could even hold that representation 
accounts for the non-veridical aspects of illusion, whilst their preferred 
articulation of relationalism accounts for its veridical elements. This does 
not seem to violate the tenet that the acquaintance relation is what 
fundamentally accounts for veridical experience. I do not think this 
altogether implausible, for what it is worth, but concede that it may be 
uncomfortable for hard-line austere relationalists to accept and will not 
argue for it further here. 
A final observation on how the relationalist might account for illusion comes 
from the claim that the best wholly relationalist explanation of illusion may 
not involve what one is perceptually related to, but rather how one is related 
to it. This is the position occupied by Brewer’s account of illusion, discussed 
above in §2.2. According to this VI vs H position, when it illusory appears to 
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a subject S that an object o is F, when it is in fact not F but G, what has 
happened is that o bears visually relevant similarities to paradigm exemplars 
of F to S from the standpoint that S is perceptually related to o. S registers 
this and as a result forms the mistaken belief that o is F. It is worth noting 
that Brewer’s view also features the notion of degraded acquaintance, 
whereby a smaller quantity of an object’s determinate features form part of 
the acquaintance relation in question, which can also lead to erroneous 
judgements as to o’s overall nature.229 Furthermore, there is nothing to 
prevent accounting for illusion of object properties further by appealing to 
certain hallucinatory elements to experience being ‘superimposed’ on a 
mind-independent object that one correctly registers the presence of.230 
There are, if anything, more options available to the disjunctivist regarding 
illusion than there are regarding hallucination, and this section has been 
structured so as to provide an outline of the various ways in which both 
might be accounted for by relationalists who adopt the view. In the following 
section, I turn to discuss a different, less metaphysical variety of 
disjunctivism, which the relationalist might nevertheless appeal to in order 




2.4.2: Epistemological Disjunctivism 
An assumption underpinning the metaphysical brand of disjunctivism put 
forward by Martin and endorsed by others, is that the difference between 
veridical perception and hallucination is to be located at the level of 
psychological states.231 One way to potentially avoid the objections to that 
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view, then, is to argue that the difference between the two sorts of 
experience is located somewhere else, and then claim that it is this difference 
that allows explaining the two sorts of experiences differently. One such 
account is put forward by John McDowell, in his (1982), and is commonly 
known as epistemological disjunctivism. 
This view advances an alternative, epistemological means of rejecting the 
Highest Common Factor thesis: 
(HCF): When you successfully perceive your environment, the warrant that you 
have for making judgements about your environment is no better than, no 
stronger than, the warrant that you would have for making such judgements if 
you were having a subjectively indistinguishable hallucination.232 
A rejection of (HCF) commits the epistemological disjunctivist to viewing a 
subject’s warrant for making judgements about their environment as being 
different in veridical and hallucinatory cases. In summary, epistemological 
disjunctivism supports this epistemological claim by arguing that in 
hallucinatory but not in veridical experiences, one’s experience falls short of 
the fact: 
In a deceptive case, one’s experiential in take must ex hypothesi fall short of the 
fact itself, in the sense of being consistent with there being no such fact. [. . . The] 
object of experience in the deceptive cases is a mere appearance. But we are not 
to accept that in the non-deceptive cases too the object of experience is a mere 
appearance, and hence something that falls short of the fact itself [. . .] The idea 
of a fact being disclosed to experience is in itself purely negative: a rejection of the 
thesis that what is accessible to experience falls short of the fact.233 
In cases of veridical perception only, then, the epistemological disjunctivist 
claims that what is accessible to experience is the fact itself. This is 
epistemologically appealing, since it is intuitively plausible that what makes 
it the case that a subject knows P, when it is in in fact the case that P, just is 
P itself experienced by the subject; this intuition can be neatly 
accommodated by a view according to which “the content of the experience 
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is the content of the knowledge.”234 Conversely, hallucinations are by 
definition such that it is not in fact the case that P (or, in the case of veridical 
hallucinations, it is not P that brings about the subject’s experience even 
though it is in fact the case that P), and consequently it cannot be P itself 
being experienced by the subject that makes it the case that they know P. 
The hallucinating subject does not know that P. The content of the 
experience cannot match the content of the knowledge if there is no 
knowledge. 
Examining the epistemic asymmetry between subjects of veridical 
perceptions and hallucinations further, epistemological disjunctivism 
further claims that what the subject has access to in the good case alone is 
conclusive perceptual warrant for believing that P.235 This conclusive warrant 
is P itself, and so is unavailable in the bad case. If this is correct, then it 
follows that the warrant one has experiential access to in the good case for 
making judgements about one’s environment is stronger than the warrant 
one has to do so in the bad case. This entails the falsity of (HCF), which is 
the conclusion that the epistemological disjunctivist wished to establish. 
The view must take account of the same particulars of hallucination as the 
metaphysical variety of disjunctivism, however. In addition to claiming that 
subjects in the good case have access to conclusive epistemic grounds for 
judgement for perceptual judgement that those in the bad case lack, the 
epistemological disjunctivist must acknowledge that when a subject is in the 
bad situation, they would fail to notice the lack of such epistemic grounds.236 
This is to acknowledge the subjective indistinguishability between the good 
case and the corresponding bad case. In the bad case, one is deceived with 
respect to the layout of one’s environment, as well as with respect to the 
kind of experience one is having.237 
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It is uncontroversial that what we can know is that things in our 
environment appear to be a certain way. What this amounts to, according to 
McDowell’s view is a disjunctive fact: either an objective state of affairs 
makes itself manifest to us, or a situation in which it is as though this is 
happening occurs.238 The subject is therefore fallible with regards to which of 
these disjuncts obtains. A possible objection to McDowell’s position is that, 
if one is only aware of the disjunctive fact, then one does not have the access 
to conclusive perceptual warrant previously described.239 However, it can be 
argued that experience therefore has a fallible capacity to provide us with 
conclusive epistemic grounds, and in situations where this fallibility does 
not kick in, it actually does provide us with conclusive epistemic grounds. 
Consequently, once defective and non-defective exercises of that fallible 
capacity are treated as epistemically asymmetrical, the claim that non-
defective exercises of the (fallible) capacity provide conclusive grounds for 
perceptually-based judgements can be upheld.240  
Cases where the subject has conclusive grounds for judgements about their 
environment highlight why epistemological disjunctivism might be appealing 
to relationalists. Perceptual experience provides the subject with conclusive 
grounds for judgements, whilst hallucination and illusion cannot, and so this 
is an epistemological aspect of perceptual experience for which we must 
provide an account. Since the epistemological disjunctivist claims that this 
epistemic asymmetry operates between good and bad cases, they hold that 
what provides the subject with conclusive grounds for making judgement is 
the presence in their environment of the mind-independent objects about 
which they are making judgements. This means that the epistemological 
aspect of perceptual experience to be explained here is to be explained in 
terms of the relation a subject stands in with some mind-independent 
object(s). This view matches well with relationalism, which claims that 
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perception is fundamentally a matter of a subject standing in a relation of 
perceptual acquaintance to mind-independent objects.  
As described, epistemological disjunctivism allows the epistemic asymmetry 
between the good and bad cases to be explained in in terms of relations to 
mind-independent objects. These mind-independent objects, according to 
the view, serve as conclusive epistemic grounds for subjects making 
perceptual judgements about their environment. In this respect, the subject 
has a reason (epistemically speaking) for judging their environment to be a 
certain way because of the presence of mind-independent objects. This is an 
important point, and I shall return to it in Chapter 4. 
One of the problems with metaphysical disjunctivism was that its minimal 
account of hallucination, which is negative and epistemic in nature, is 
underwhelming given the metaphysical difference between the good and bad 
cases that the view suggests. As should be clear from the preceding 
discussion, epistemological disjunctivism makes no claim to veridical and 
hallucinatory experiences being fundamentally different sorts of 
psychological states. According to epistemological disjunctivism, the 
difference between veridical perception and hallucination qua experience is 
epistemic in its entirety. Since this is all that the view then needs to explain, 
accounting for it in purely epistemic terms is not the lacklustre explanation 
that it seems to be for metaphysical disjunctivism. 
We saw above that what the metaphysical disjunctivist ought to say about 
illusion is up for debate. Although there was not nothing to be said, the 
commitments of the view raised the immediate question as to which disjunct 
of psychological states illusion – being non-veridical but also object-
involving – is to be aligned with. The metaphysical disjunctivist must 
propose and support an answer to this question, and an account must then 
be provided of how they explain this. A further benefit of epistemological 
disjunctivism is that it side-steps the need to make this decision. This is 
because the view makes no claim of a divide in psychological states to begin 
with. Clearly, there is a difference in epistemic state between the subject 
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undergoing an illusion and a veridical perceiver, and the view can 
accommodate this in a manner analogous to its treatment of hallucination. 
For epistemological disjunctivists, further explanation of illusory experience 
need not be couched in terms of their disjunctivist position at all, but can 
instead be couched in terms of positive relationalist apparatus. It can appear 
to a subject that a blue car viewed at night is actually green because of the 
yellow tint of the streetlight overhead and the otherwise poor lighting 
conditions, for instance. More broadly, this is a return to the point made in 
§2.2, to the effect that illusion involves a subject standing in a relation of 
perceptual acquaintance to an object, as in veridical perception, yet the 
standpoint from which they are related to the object is such that they judge 
it to be a way other than it is. Returning to the previous example of the blue 
car at night, its subjective indistinguishability from a green car is thereby 
explained wholly by the three-place relation of the subject, the car itself, and 
the standpoint from which the subject experiences it.  
It is worth re-emphasising that metaphysical disjunctivism is not precluded 
from adopting this approach, but this entails the further commitment that 
there is a difference in psychological state between illusory and 
hallucinatory experiences. The metaphysical disjunctivist may well 
accommodate this, so this consideration is not a decisive indicator of which 
variety of disjunctivism the relationalist ought to accept. That said, it is 
arguable that epistemological disjunctivism need not make any such 
commitment, and therefore that the view involves fewer complications than 
its epistemological counterpart. 
I conclude this discussion of the varieties of disjunctivism with two further 
brief points. The first of these pertains to an important commonality 
between epistemological and metaphysical disjunctivism. As described 
above, a feature common to both views is that veridical perception and 
hallucination differ with respect to the epistemic states of subjects 
undergoing each sort of experience. More precisely, veridically perceiving 
subjects possess, whilst hallucinating subjects lack, epistemic reasons for 
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forming judgements about the nature of their environment that are 
grounded in their experience. One appealing feature of relationalism 
explored above was that it can provide an account of what makes both 
knowledge and thought about the external world possible – claiming that 
experience plays the grounding role that enables both. Each of the varieties 
of disjunctivism discussed above maintain this grounding role of experience. 
It follows from this that regardless of which of the two accounts of non-
veridical experience the relationalist adopts, they are still able to uphold that 
experience plays this role. Since what the veridically perceiving subject has 
experience of is, on each view, some mind-independent object, it follows that 
relationalists can maintain that mind-independent objects themselves 
constitute epistemic reason for a subject to form judgements about their 
environment iff that subject veridically perceives the mind-independent 
objects about which they are forming judgements. 
Finally, the objector to disjunctivism may attempt to argue against any 
apparent benefits of adopting epistemological disjunctivism by arguing that 
the view is itself committed to the metaphysical variety of disjunctivism, and 
therefore susceptible to the same objections as that view is. In the first 
instance, the onus is upon the objector to argue this point. Assuming 
epistemological disjunctivism temporarily, veridical perception and 
hallucination both involve the exercise of an epistemic capacity, correctly in 
the former and defectively in the latter. It does not obviously follow from 
this alone that a subject is in a different psychological state in each of these 
cases; in other words, it is not clear that the radically different disjuncts of 
epistemological disjunctivism cannot share a common metaphysical essence 
of the sort precluded by metaphysical disjunctivism.241  
According to the epistemological variety of disjunctivism, what reason we 
have to form judgements on the basis of veridical experience does not fall 
short of the facts (i.e. of mind-independent objects in our environment), and 
so veridical experience directly – that is: non-inferentially – justifies our 
                                                          
241 Pritchard (2012: 24) and Soteriou (2016: 146 – 147) both make this point. 
127 
 
perceptual beliefs. Hallucination cannot do this, and so epistemically the two 
are importantly different. There is no logical connection, however, between 
this epistemic directness and the directness that centrally concerns 
metaphysical disjunctivism. The claim that veridical experience can directly 
justify our perceptual beliefs is compatible with any metaphysical view of 
perception according to which, after the veridical experience, there are no 
further evidential requirements imposed on the resultant perceptual belief.242 
In this regard the view is compatible with metaphysical disjunctivism, but is 
also compatible with sense-datum theory, provided that any inference from 
sense-data to mind-independent objects meets the aforementioned criterion, 
perhaps by being an unconscious or sub-doxastic inference.243 
On balance, it could nevertheless be argued that it is hard to motivate 
epistemological disjunctivism without appeal to its metaphysical 
counterpart.244 The objector could then claim that unless the epistemological 
disjunctivist motivates their position without appeal to metaphysical 
disjunctivism, their argument goes through. The issue with this approach is 
that it is not clear that the metaphysical disjunctivist can articulate their 
position without explaining matters in epistemic terms.245 Their good and 
bad cases differ qua experience just because the former puts the subject in a 
position to have perceptual knowledge, whereas the latter (according to 
Martin, at least) does not, and can only be described as a case that is 
subjectively indistinguishable from this. As we have seen, Martin develops 
this view and deals with the prospect of causally matching hallucinations in 
wholly epistemic terms.  
If this is correct, then the best our objector could hope for here is a 
strangely circular outcome for disjunctivism, in which they are right that 
epistemological disjunctivists cannot motivate their view without appeal to 
the metaphysical variety of disjunctivism, yet the converse is also true. Given 
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the above point regarding the logical independence of the views, this seems 
like an untenable outcome. Further, since there seem to be some 
considerations counting against the objector’s position, and none obviously 
counting in its favour, I support the conclusion that the success of 
epistemological disjunctivism should not be linked to that of metaphysical 




3: Explanatory Pluralism 
 
Thus far, I have argued that contrary to what until recently was apparently 
the orthodox mentality in the philosophy of perception surrounding the 
relational and representational views, an argument raising concerns or 
casting doubt upon one does not necessarily support the other. It is not, in 
other words, a ‘one or the other’ situation. This is because in many cases, an 
argument advertised as an argument against relationalism or 
representationalism is, in fact, an argument against the austere version of 
relationalism or representationalism.246 For this reason, it is in principle 
possible to split the explanatory labour between the relational and 
representational views and, I submit, also to utilise the arguments which 
allegedly raise problems for one view or the other in order to set some kind 
of guiding limitation on exactly how the explanatory labour might be split 
up.247 Given the distinction between austere and non-austere versions of 
relationalism and representationalism, the successful articulation of this sort 
of view would incorporate non-austere versions of each theory. Since neither 
of these versions commit their proponents to rejecting the alternative view, 
there is no tension following from the simple tenets of the views being 
accepted in the construction of the overall theory of perception. Also, since 
the view to be advanced incorporates (non-austere) relationalism and 
representationalism based on what it is about perception that each view can 
explain effectively that the other apparently cannot, then – to the extent that 
examples of such instances can be provided – it seems that such a view can 
constitute an explanatory pluralist view that can circumvent the Screening 
Off Argument.248 Ideally, though, this would be accomplished whilst also 
avoiding the charge of being an ‘anything goes’ relativist position which 
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holds that the preference or exclusion of explanations cannot be achieved on 
any level. For each individual thing to be explained, such a relativist view 
would deny that any ranking of potential explanations was actually possible. 
Taking together the thoughts that (a) the Screening Off Argument might be 
circumvented by appeal to explanatory pluralism, and (b) such an 
explanatory pluralist position must not become unrestrictedly relativist, it 
follows that there must be some means of ranking the suitability of 
explanations surrounding the issues of perception at hand (commitment of 
(b)), but also that there cannot be any global exclusion or preference rules 
operative over all explanations, or perhaps even all explanations of a 
particular type (commitment of (a)). 
The Screening Off Argument, introduced previously, has not yet been 
sufficiently addressed. Yet it seems that at the very least the reasoning 
involved in that argument is similar to that which might be used to deny the 
above contentions that an argument against e.g. austere representationalism 
is not an argument against the plausibility of a reconciliatory view which has 
features of representationalism within it. The main task of this chapter will 
be to commence in the process of dealing with the Screening Off Argument. 
In summary, the case to be made here will motivate and utilise the position 
known as explanatory pluralism, together with some other theoretical 
apparatus and terminology from the literature on explanation, to undermine 
the claim that finding, say, the representational view a place in our 
satisfactory philosophical theory of perception renders the relational view 
explanatorily redundant. Ultimately, this shall be because having the 
representational view (for example) constitute the entirety of our theory of 
perception is not, as I hope to show, the only plausible way to find a place 
for the view within our theory.  
In what follows, I shall first introduce explanatory pluralism in more detail, 
as it plays a role of paramount importance in what follows. Next, I observe 
the areas of discourse in which explanatory pluralism enjoys at least some 
support in terms of its motivation, and assess the case for its utilisation in 
resolving the relationalism/representationalism compatibility issue within 
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the philosophy of perception. Then I shall introduce and discuss some other 
notions from the literature on explanation, utilising these to further 
elucidate and augment the broad approach sketched out by Logue and some 
others. Overall, the chapter begins setting the scene for showing in Chapter 
6 that the Screening Off Argument can be overcome. 
 
3.1: Introducing explanatory pluralism 
The first task ahead is to define and provide some description of the 
workings of explanatory pluralism. As a first-pass definition of the view, 
following Bouwel and Weber, I take it that explanatory pluralists – broadly 
construed – are at least committed to the following two claims: 
1) There are no general exclusion rules with respect to explanations [...]; it is, for 
instance, impossible to rule out intentional explanation or functional 
explanations.249 
2) There are no general preference rules with respect to explanations […]; it is, 
for instance, unwarranted to claim that intentional explanations are always 
better than macro-explanations.250 
Unpacking what is going on in (1) and (2), immediately it can be seen 
that these are both negative claims and, more particularly, negative 
claims which each constitute a rejection of some principled, general 
rules regarding explanation. In the first case, the rules being rejected 
are exclusion rules – rules by which a given kind of explanation might 
be ruled out as an illegitimate explanation in virtue of the type of 
explanation it is. In the second case, the sort of rules being rejected are 
preference rules – rules by which two or more types of explanations 
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explanatory pluralist methodology in particular sub-disciplines will be focused upon in the next section, so I 
save discussion of such points for then. 
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might be arranged in a general preferential hierarchy of explanations, 
again in virtue of the type of explanations they are.  
To clarify, neither (1) nor (2) commit to the respective claims that either 
it is never possible to discount an explanation as illegitimate, or that it 
is never possible to prefer one sort of explanation to another. Saying 
anything that further elucidates how this is possible requires an 
examination what we might call the more positive commitments of 
explanatory pluralism. However, to achieve this it will be necessary to 
introduce and examine some further terminology and concepts from 
the literature on explanation.  
In the broadest sense, what is required first and foremost is the notion 
of explanatory context. To see the centrality of this notion, consider first 
the words of Schweder, who writes that “the reification of explanation, 
the belief that some propositions are, once and for all, explanations, is 
quite mistaken. Only particular statements, utterances or other acts of 
communication can be explanations, and whether they are so, or not, is 
contextually determined.”251 This, admittedly, does leave what an 
explanatory context actually is a little up in the air, and I will attempt to 
shed light on this in what is immediately to follow. On the view to be 
advanced here, though, this notion of explanatory context is crucial to 
explanations serving their purpose. 
In attempting to elucidate further the notion of explanatory context, 
Schweder provides a cursory analysis of the nature of explanation itself, 
and what this very notion implies or presupposes. Her analysis focuses 
on the format of explanation as suggesting an explanation-seeking 
agent and an explanation-giving agent or, simplifying slightly, as 
suggesting a model akin to an explanation-seeking question (henceforth 
an es-question) and an explanation-giving answer (eg-answer).252 More 
broadly still, an es-question may be thought of as involving “an 
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inquirer” whilst an eg-answer may be thought of as containing “an 
explainer”, a distinction which appears to map quite neatly onto the 
possibly more familiar explanandum/explanans distinction.253 By way of 
abstract example of how es-questions and eg-answers work in practice, 
we have the following schema: 
Es-question: “Why B?” 
Eg-answer: “B, because of A” or, equivalently (in the case of causal explanations) 
“A explains B.”254 
Here, B is going to play the role of explanandum, and is to be taken as a 
variable to which is assignable, in the simplest instances, the many ways in 
which an event may be described. For example, the event in which Saul goes 
to the shop may be described as (i) Saul walking down a sequence of streets 
(with emphasis on the route Saul has taken), (ii) Saul going to the shop (as 
opposed to elsewhere), (iii) Saul going to buy beer, (iv) Saul spending a part 
of the day doing a certain activity (as opposed to any other activities in 
which Saul may have potentially engaged), or (iv) Saul going to work, and 
presumably in several other distinct ways besides. Here though, it seems as 
though plugging in any of (i) – (iv) into the es-question part of the above 
schema admits of various sorts of question in turn. Say we plug in (iv); we 
have the question ‘why did Saul go to the shop?’, with the emphasis on going 
to the shop as being the particular activity in which Saul engaged. Yet here it 
seems again that this question, as phrased above, admits of various 
interpretations that alter based on how the question is asked: 
Non-contrastive: Why (as in: for what reason) did Saul go the shop? 
Property contrastive: Why did Saul go to the shop, as opposed to going for a walk 
on the beach? 
Subject contrastive: Why did Saul, as opposed to Seth, go to the shop? 
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Time contrastive: Why did Saul go to the shop at time t, as opposed to at some 
other time?255 
In their fully articulated forms, the distinctions between these questions are 
clear, yet they are all perfectly reasonable interpretations of the original ‘why 
did Saul go to the shop?’ question. The latter then, it seems, can be asked as 
an es-question that seeks different explanations in different instances and – 
in this way – what counts as a relevant eg-answer to it can vary. In other 
words, different facts are relevant to different interpretations of the same 
es-question, and different inquiring agents may be seeking different answers 
despite uttering identical words in asking their es-questions.  
As Schweder notes, the notion of reference class is a useful one to bring into 
play here, and can help elucidate the point: supposing the inquirer is asking 
a subject contrastive es-question – and wishes to know why Saul went to the 
shop, as opposed to anyone else – it seems that a fitting reference class 
would be all the people who live in a particular household, namely Saul’s 
household.256Alternatively, suppose that a different inquirer uttering the 
identical words ‘why did Saul go to the shop?’ is in fact asking a property 
contrastive (p-contrastive) question, wishing to know why Saul went to the 
shop, rather than going running or going to the beach. Here the relevant 
reference class is plausibly activities: going to the shop in question, as well 
as the various alternative activities in which Saul may have engaged.  
With the notion of reference class in place, it is more readily apparent that 
the same eg-answer may be satisfying to one inquirer but not to another. 
Taking the above pair of es-questions, suppose the agent who asked the 
subject contrastive es-question is offered the latter p-contrastive eg-answer. 
The relevant reference class for the es-question being answered was a certain 
set of people (or perhaps the reasons that guide their actions), yet the es-
question to which the p-contrastive eg-answer being given is associated has 
as its reference class activities. It is hopefully uncontroversial that these two 
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reference classes are mutually exclusive: no activity is itself a person; no set 
of people is a set of activities. We see, then, that certain eg-answers are 
simply not suitable as answers to certain es-questions.  
We also see, contends Schweder, that not only does the particular es-
question being asked provide a clue as to where to look for an answer (“it 
seems that the answer, to some extent, is anticipated in the question”), but 
also provides some insight as to the epistemic state of the inquirer – their 
background beliefs and suppositions – such that certain (possibly more 
coarse-grained or explanatorily prior) aspects of an eg-answer can be 
identified as being not in need of explanation for the agent asking the es-
question.257 In general, the thought here is that “the es-question encodes 
several important contextual features. “It comprises both the inquirer’s 
expectations as to what a relevant eg-answer should be, and his background 
knowledge and presuppositions.”258 On the whole, then, explanation is to be 
seen as being comprised by both question and answer, and “the explanatory 
value of an eg-answer can only be evaluated relative [to] an es-question.”259 
Alternatively, this point may be expressed as stipulating that “[a]n answer to 
an explanation-seeking question will be adequate for an explainee only if the 
explanans has the expected relevance relation to the explanandum.”260  
In addition to these important features of es-questions, eg-answers can also 
be treated to further analysis. For the sake of simplicity, the following few 
paragraphs conduct this analysis whilst focusing on causal explanations, as I 
take these to render what follows most readily understandable. Of course, 
there are other sorts of legitimate explanations besides causal ones, and in 
providing causal explanations in the following analysis, I do not mean to 
suggest that only casual explanations can constitute an eg-answer. 
Additionally, I take it that something like what is discussed below can be 
equally applied to other types of explanation besides causal, as these too can 
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be thought of as involving es-questions, eg-answers and explanatory 
contexts. 
As identified in the schema above, an eg-answer will generally be of the form 
“B explains A”. Contained therein though, contends Schweder, is a 
counterfactual claim: the eg-counterfactual. Essentially, the speaker of the 
utterance “B explains A” is purportedly saying that, had B not occurred, A 
would not have occurred either.261 This claim is supported by considering 
how we would go about disputing that B explains A: if it can be shown that A 
would have occurred irrespective of whether B occurred, then this 
constitutes a reason to doubt the claim that B explains A. That said, eg-
counterfactuals work in tandem with the notion of a reference class, 
discussed above. This serves to rule out various irrelevant (albeit true) 
considerations from a proposed explanation; for instance, it is true that 
being born is a necessary condition on one’s dying – if one had 
(counterfactually) not been born, then one could not die – yet in almost no 
instance of the es-question “why did they die?” would an appeal to their 
being born be considered a satisfactory eg-answer.262 
As well as ruling out explanatorily irrelevant factors, the reference class also 
holds constant various factors such that the explanatory factor (the one 
which is most relevant/active in the explanation) can be more readily 
identified. This explanatory factor, in turn, is the one that is taken to be 
most likely to render the eg-counterfactual true, given background 
presuppositions and prior knowledge (i.e. given one’s epistemic state).263 It is 
this greater likelihood of making the eg-counterfactual true that, Schweder 
contends, makes a subject more likely to select that particular explanation, 
rather than any of the viable alternatives, as the eg-answer to the es 
question. It is suggested that according to the pluralist position: 
In general, we should select the content of our explanation in such a way that it is 
adequate relative to our motivation for asking the question (that is, relative to our 
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epistemic interests). This strategy sometimes results in explanations containing 
remote causes, sometimes in explanations containing proximate causes. So we 
have a pragmatic reason for being pluralist in the remote causes [e.g. being alive 
as a cause, albeit in many cases an extremely remote one, of death] vs. proximate 
causes [say, liver cirrhosis as a cause of death] debate: depending on the context, 
one or the other type of explanation is the best relative to our motivation for 
asking the question.264 
In the above quotation, the proximate cause is going to be much more 
desirable as an explanation than the remote one. The thought that proximate 
causes always function as better explanations, though, is precisely the sort 
of preference rule that explanatory pluralists deny can effectively govern our 
preference with respect to explanations. By way of a concrete example, 
consider the memory-degenerative complex of conditions known as 
Wernicke-Korsakoff complex: comprising a co-presentation of Wernicke’s 
encephalopathy and Korsakoff syndrome, it is believed that the reason for 
their reliable co-presentation is that each is caused by thiamine deficiency, 
which in turn (in the ‘Western world’) is most reliably caused by 
alcoholism.265 Here, then, thiamine deficiency serves as a proximate cause, 
whereas alcoholism – being prior to and longer-running than thiamine 
deficiency – serves as the remote cause. The explanatory pluralist will 
conclude that the preferable explanation here will depend upon one’s 
interest; with examples of potential interests being (i) reliable intervention 
(i.e. providing treatment to those presently suffering from Wernicke-
Korsakoff complex),  (ii) preventing the development of the complex in the 
later lives of people, or possibly (iii) to understand the difference between 
two populations to the effect that one of them seems more reliably to be 
affected by the complex whilst the other does not.  
In the case of reliable intervention, manipulating the proximate cause (i.e. 
administering thiamine) is more effective than attempting to treat 
alcoholism, as there are other causes of thiamine deficiency (and, therefore 
of Wernicke-Korsakoff complex) besides alcoholism, such as eating 
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disorders.266 Conversely, with respect to the case of prevention, treating the 
alcoholism is likely the better choice, as prediction of those at risk of 
contracting Wernicke-Korsakoff complex can be accomplished in a more 
timely fashion by focusing on patterns of behaviour that further precede the 
undesirable outcome – namely alcohol abuse.267 Finally, with respect to 
explaining the differences between the two populations, citing a difference 
in their respective average thiamine levels will do little to demystify the 
explanandum, whereas there is a chance that examining their respective 
propensities for alcohol abuse has the potential to be much more 
informative.268 
We see, then, that according to explanatory pluralism, the explanation to be 
preferred depends on our interests. This comes at the cost of denying that 
there are any privileged levels or types of explanation, at least that aren’t 
relative to our epistemic states and interests. However, this is a far cry from 
saying that anything goes on such an account – there can nevertheless be 
guidelines, or procedural heuristics that can direct us towards the likely 
preferable explanation relative to our interests and motivations in asking the 
es-question. For instance, taking cases (i) – (iii) in the preceding paragraph, 
we might, for example, devise the following guidelines: 
A) If your interest is reliable intervention, focus on the explanation citing the proximate 
cause. 
B) If your interest is prevention, focus on an explanation citing a cause distant enough 
to allow for timely predictions. 
C) If your interest is to understand a contrast between two states of affairs, focus on an 
explanation citing a cause distant enough to be less mysterious than the 
explanandum.269 
Guidelines such as these are all conditional statements, each beginning with 
the antecedent “if your interest is…”, rendering them sufficiently 
contextualist such that they are compatible with the tenets of explanatory 







pluralism, yet also provide some restrictions and (conditionalised) guiding 
principles, such that they allow the explanatory pluralist to avoid any 
unwanted charges of unrestricted relativism with respect to explanation. 
 
3.2: Contextualising explanatory pluralism 
By way of providing some context of how my sketch of explanatory 
pluralism fits into the wider literature on explanation, credit should perhaps 
first be given to van Fraassen’s pragmatic theory of explanation. It is here 
that we find first the explicit distinction drawn between explanations and 
propositions or statements, in the sense that the former is essentially the 
answer to a why-question, and therefore a theory of explanations constitutes 
a theory of answers to why-questions.270 According to van Fraassen’s theory 
of explanation, if one takes a question – for example ‘why is this conductor 
warped?’ – the questioner has implied that the conductor is warped (call this 
proposition the topic of the question) and is seeking a reason.271  The 
question will also have a contrast-class, or a set of alternatives to the topic 
(e.g. that this conductor warped and not that one, or why this one warped 
instead of retaining its shape – distinct, more specified legitimate ways of 
interpreting the original question). Finally, we have a relation of explanatory 
relevance: pertaining directly to the respect in which the request for 
information was sought in the form of the initial question, this is highly 
context sensitive and will determine what does or does not count as a 
possible explanation.272 Sticking with the warped conductor, the respect in 
which a reason for the warping is requested might pertain to events that 
rendered the warping possible, which allows as relevant human error, 
unwanted moisture being present, and witchcraft (as the possibly relevant 
answers are evaluated after they are all gathered).273 Alternatively, the 
various conditions leading up to the warping may be understood and in fact 
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what is sought is information as to the immediate catalyst to the process 
(say the presence of a magnetic field).274  
 
Summing up this latter idea of explanatory relevance, van Fraassen writes:  
In a given context, several questions agreeing in topic but differing in contrast 
class, or conversely, may conceivably differ further in what counts as 
explanatorily relevant. Hence we cannot properly ask what is relevant to this 
topic, or what is relevant to this contrast-class. Instead we must say of a given 
proposition that it is or is not relevant (in this context) to the topic with respect to 
that contrast class.275 
Here the connection between his view and the explanatory pluralist one 
sketched above becomes clear: the conception of explanation as a question-
answer model, which admits of various legitimate answers whose very 
legitimacy is context sensitive, relative to the purposes of the initial request 
for information, is something that the two views have very much in common. 
Rather than viewing explanation as a two-place relation obtaining between 
theory and fact, they each view it as a three-place relation obtaining between 
theory, fact and context.276 The role of the latter cannot be understated, as 
what exactly is being requested by means of the question ‘why is it the case 
that P?’ varies with context, as does the background theory and data relative 
to which the question is evaluated, as does what part of this background 
information is used to evaluate how good an answer is, qua being an answer 
to the initial question!277 Saying that a theory can be used to explain a fact, 
then, is invariably elliptic for something like: “there is a proposition which is 
a telling answer, relative to this theory, to the request for information about 
certain facts (those counted as relevant for this question) that bear on a 
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comparison between this fact which is the case, and certain (contextually 
specified) alternatives which are not the case.”278 
Ultimately, the point here is that according to both views there is no 
explanatory power as such: there is simply explanatory power relative to 
certain contexts, in turn determined by the very request for information 
involved in the initial question. Comparatively, this illuminates how 
explanatory pluralism can surmount the Screening Off Argument, for it is 
not too large a stretch to conclude that if – according to one’s theory of how 
explanations work – there is no explanatory power simpliciter, then there 
equally may not be explanatory redundancy simpliciter, but rather only 
explanatory redundancy when two explanations are in competition relative 
to the same context of explanatory relevance, and one then clearly 
overshadows the other. 
For all their similarity, van Fraassen’s view does differ from that sketched 
above insofar as it proceeds through some fairly formal means to express 
how relevant explanatory factors are to be determined with respect to the 
context of the request for information, and to express how to evaluate these 
factors. I do not intend here to address the merits or drawbacks of his 
approach, opting instead to leave open precisely how best these tasks should 
be done. The purpose of this discussion, rather, was to set in literary context 
the sort of explanatory pluralist view I have sketched out. There are other 
views in the literature with which the above sketch (which I broadly attribute 
to Schweder) coheres well.279 
This is not to suggest that the methodology I have laid out is the only 
articulation of explanatory pluralism. Indeed, Mitchell et al. draw 
distinctions between different sorts of pluralism, such that it is in fact quite 
clear what position the view I am suggesting adopts. They draw two 
distinctions: one between competitive pluralism and compatible pluralism; 
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the other between isolationist pluralism and integrative pluralism. To the 
first distinction: the first of these – competitive pluralism – is taken as a view 
that “any fallibilist with respect to scientific truth must accept”, as it is 
simply the view that a pluralism of competing hypotheses being entertained 
makes for more rapid progression in terms of spotting flaws in theories and 
getting closer to correct ones.280 Whilst I do accept this point, it is not merely 
in this respect that the view I am endorsing qualifies as pluralist. Compatible 
pluralism, conversely, is far closer to the view I am endorsing. This flavour 
of pluralism appeals to “distinct levels of analysis”, in turn allowing for 
multiple distinct hypotheses to be accepted compatibly on different levels of 
analysis.281 Consequently, “different questions invoke different explanatory 
schemata,” and “answers to questions at the different levels represent 
compatible components of a pluralistic, multidimensional body of 
knowledge.”282 In other words, as Sherman puts it, “competition between 
alternatives appropriately occurs within and not among levels.”283  
Addressing the second distinction, isolationist pluralism does also employ a 
‘levels of analysis’ framework, yet limits the interactions between the 
theories that are being appealed to at various levels of a given explanatory 
domain.284 This isolation of theories that minimises their interaction may be 
good for modelling certain explanations without fear of unexpected 
variables impacting results, but again it is not the sort of pluralism to which 
I wish to subscribe. Integrative pluralism, on the other hand, has no such 
restriction, and is based on the observation that, when one moves away from 
idealisations and into actual application: 
 [O]ne can immediately see that causal models that provide answers at different 
levels are indeed related. Thus, although pluralism is to be defended, it is not the 
pluralism of questions and the consequent independence of answers, but rather a 
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pluralism of models of causal processes that may describe contributing factors in 
a given explanatory situation.285  
Thus, on these distinctions, the view I wish to endorse might be referred to 
as compatible, integrative explanatory pluralism: a view which, though 
admitting of partial autonomies of theories, concepts, and particularly levels 
of explanation, ultimately advocates a focus on how these distinct parts of a 
whole fit together.286 
With this summary of how explanatory pluralism works now laid out, I can 
turn in the next section to attempting to motivate the notion that such a 
view on explanation can or should be applied to the debate in the philosophy 
of perception that is the central question of this thesis: namely the matter of 
compatibility between relationalism and representationalism. 
 
3.3: Motivating explanatory pluralism 
So far in the above discussion, none of the resources which have been 
appealed to in order to elucidate explanatory pluralism have, in fact, 
constituted efforts to argue for the prudency of adopting an explanatory 
pluralist approach within the philosophy of perception.287 In lieu of any such 
efforts, an attempt to motivate the utilisation of explanatory pluralism in 
this way – which shall be required in some form or another for my effort to 
overcome Screening Off Argument – will need to take a form distinct from 
simply appealing to work already done to that effect. The way I see it, this 
leaves a live option open which is composed of two stages. In the first of 
these stages, one appeals to efforts made to motivate explanatory pluralism 
in other (sub-)disciplines, with a view to identifying just what it is that allows 
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the claim that explanatory pluralism is motivated in those areas to pass 
muster. In the second stage, one argues that the use of explanatory 
pluralism within the philosophy of perception can be similarly motivated, 
and that no defeaters emerge from the differences in (sub-)discipline 
involved. 
 
3.3.1: Explanatory pluralism in history and the social sciences 
Turning again to the work of Bouwel and Weber, cited above, we see that the 
examples they utilise are to the effect of motivating the use of explanatory 
pluralism in history and the social sciences. Of the various accounts to be 
discussed in this set of subsections, this is perhaps the one at greatest 
remove from the philosophy of perception, hence I begin here. 
Consider cholera. More specifically, two hypothetical yet realistic patterns of 
outbreaks thereof, such that both Koch City and Miasma City each reliably 
experience outbreaks every decade or so, after a summer of intense rain; one 
year (call it year X), it is stipulated that Koch City denizens remain healthy 
after a summer of intense rain whereas Miasma City’s population 
experiences a cholera outbreak once more.288 Supposing we wish to explain 
this change in outbreak pattern by way of a macro-level causal explanation, 
as are often relevant to history and social sciences (where one may wish to 
explain one social phenomenon by appealing to a distinct social 
phenomenon that caused it), we can once again draw a distinction between 
plausible causal explanations along the remote/proximate cause 
distinction.289 Keeping in mind this distinction, two possible explanations can 
be entertained: 
1) (Proximate cause): The population of Koch City remained healthy, while 
Miasma City was hit by cholera, because cholera bacilli were produced on a 
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large scale in Miasma City, while their number remained very limited in Koch 
City. 
2) (Remote cause): Koch City built a new sewerage system after the previous 
outbreak in the year X-10. Miasma City does not have a new sewerage 
system.290 
 
Supposing that each of these are indeed viable macro-level, causal 
explanations of the difference in cholera outbreak patterns in the year X, it 
would seem that we would ideally have some way of selecting one as 
preferred. Yet by hypothesis each of them satisfies the initial constraint on 
type of explanation. One option for how to proceed here would involve 
principled rules for selecting a preferred explanation based simply on 
whether the cause cited is proximate or remote. Explanatory pluralists, 
however, will not wish to buy into this strategy, as it goes against the very 
core of the explanatory pluralist position. Another way to go, which would 
avoid this outcome, would be to base the choice of preferential explanation 
on the inquirer’s interests in attaining the explanation. One question that 
can be asked, in this vain, is why we wish to explain the difference in the 
pattern of cholera outbreaks. Here, a very plausible answer would be ‘to help 
the people of Miasma City’ (hence the explanation would serve a therapeutic 
function).291  
 
If the foregoing analysis of the situation is correct, we can refer to our 
heuristic, interest-relative guidelines introduced in the preceding section 
when the case of Wernicke-Korsakoff complex was being discussed. The 
cholera example seems a case such that what is to be explained is a 
difference between two states of affairs – namely: the state of affairs 
obtaining in the year X-10 and that obtaining in the year X. Referring to our 
guidelines, what these suggest we should be focusing on is a cause remote 
enough such that it is less mysterious than the explanandum. Notice, 
though, that the emphasis on “enough” in the relevant guideline suggests 
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that it is in principle possible that the proximate cause in this instance is 
sufficiently remote for the purposes of satisfying this demystifying criterion. 
What must be done from here, then, is a comparison of the two explanations 
to work out which best suits the therapeutic interests of the inquiring agent. 
 
Considering first the proximate cause explanation, it seems that this leaves 
open the question of why there was a reduction in the production of cholera 
bacilli in Koch City but not in Miasma City. Conversely, the explanation citing 
the more remote cause of Koch City’s new sewerage system is such that it 
cites a human intervention present in one case and absent in the other and 
that is precisely what, in Bouwel and Weber’s view, allows this explanation of 
the two to serve the therapeutic function relevant to the interests of the 
inquirer.292 
 
In this case, it seems that what motivates explanatory pluralism is simply the 
thought that a means of selecting the preferred of a plurality of viable 
explanations was required, for there was more than one explanation 
satisfying the macro-level causal criterion, and there was nothing about the 
citation of more or less proximate causes in this plurality of explanations 
that intrinsically offered a decision-making procedure in this regard. Rather 
than this being the correct account of what motivates explanatory pluralism 
in this case, however, perhaps there is something about history and social 
sciences that are the real motivating force. Though it is my contention that 
this is not the case, this claim will be more plausible once we have some 
basis for comparison, and so in the following subsection I turn to examine 
motivations for embracing explanatory pluralism in areas distinct from 
history and social science: namely, medical science and cognitive science. 
Thereafter, the hope is that this will constitute a broad and varied enough 
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set of subject areas, such that claims about motivating explanatory pluralism 
in the philosophy of perception do not seem quite so ad hoc.293 
 
3.3.2: Explanatory pluralism in psychiatry 
One area of study in which explanatory pluralism is arguably motivated that 
connects centrally to the mind is that of psychiatry. I take this to be a useful 
area to examine since although related to the mind it is at some remove 
from the central focus of this thesis – our understanding of the perceptual 
aspects of our conscious experience – and is thereby less entangled with 
potential objections and controversies that arise in the latter, which shall be 
tackled later. Whilst my overall focus in this thesis is that of philosophical 
theories adopted to further our understanding of the nature of our 
perceptual experience, psychiatry instead focuses on the aetiology of mental 
disorders and diseases: it is directed and uncovering and studying the causal 
explanations of these disorders and diseases. In this respect, it fits quite 
neatly into the current dialectic of showing that explanatory pluralism can 
be motivated with respect to causal explanations in varying fields of study. 
In what follows of this section, I shall be discussing the work of Kendler, 
who claims that explanatory pluralism is indeed motivated in psychiatry. I 
shall first offer some general remarks and exposition on the contention that 
explanatory pluralism is motivated in the field of psychiatry, before 
discussing several examples highlighted in the literature to illustrate this 
point. 
Considering first, then, the broad notion that explanatory pluralism is 
appropriate for deploying in the field of psychiatry, it is worth considering 
that to which such a claim would amount. Recalling earlier discussion on the 
tenets of explanatory pluralism – particularly the two negative claims central 
to the view – it should be clear on the most general level that adopting an 
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explanatory pluralist methodology here would amount to the rejection of 
general rules for both (i) explanatory preference and (ii) explanatory 
rejection, in just the same way as we have seen with social sciences. In other 
words, the explanatory pluralist psychiatrist will reject the notion that any 
account offered of psychiatric disorders is such that there are any hard, fast 
rules for selecting the sort of explanation to be preferred on the basis of the 
sort of explanation under consideration. Likewise, on the same basis, there 
will on this view be no comparable hard, fast rule for rejection of these 
explanations. 
As before, this is a far cry from saying that we have no way to sort 
competing explanations into a hierarchy of preference, it is simply to say 
that there is no way for this to be accomplished by only looking at the sort 
of explanation that it is; other factors such as explanatory power, 
particularly explanatory power based on that which we would like to explain, 
will be required in order to achieve this successfully. Similarly, the criteria 
for rejecting an explanation relevant to the field of psychiatry will extend 
beyond mere examination of the kind of explanation under consideration. As 
I hope to show, the lie of the land here is no different to social science, or to 
the area of medical science to be examined below, and selection of our 
preferred explanation will require careful consideration of the es-questions 
being asked so that the most appropriate eg-answer can be selected in each 
case. 
If the general tenets of explanatory pluralism involve a rejection of rules of 
preference and exclusion of explanations, then what this will amount to for 
explanations of matters of psychiatry in general terms – in the same way we 
saw it did for social sciences above – is a collection of smaller explanations 
at various levels, which together combine to most heighten our 
understanding of the salient explananda. The relevance of one or other 
explanation will vary according to explanatory context which, as we saw 
earlier, is determined by the es-questions at hand, that is: they are 
determined by precisely that which we wish to explain. 
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In support of this broader picture of explanation in psychiatry, here is 
Kendler: 
Our current knowledge, although incomplete, strongly suggests that all major 
psychiatric disorders are complex and multifactoral. What we can best hope for is 
lots of small explanations, from a variety of explanatory perspectives, each 
addressing part of the complex etiological processes leading to disorders. It will be 
particularly challenging to understand how these many different small 
explanations all fit together.  
In grieving for our loss of big explanations, we similarly have to give up our hope 
for simple, linear explanatory models. It will not be “A→B→C→D.” Etiological 
pathways will be complex and interacting, more like networks than individual 
linear pathways.294 
The description in the ultimate sentence of this quotation, which describes 
aetiological pathways as being like networks is particularly telling. Networks, 
in the broadest terms, are composed of interrelating nodes which are 
responsive to matters extraneous to themselves. It is an interesting 
comparison to draw, as it suggests that on this picture of psychiatric 
explanation, the explanations that may be adopted to account for the causes 
of various mental problems may themselves vary due to factors extraneous 
to those very aetiological pathways. Cohering with earlier discussion on 
explanatory pluralism and its application to social sciences, one such factor 
may legitimately be the interests of the inquirer: precisely what it is that one 
wishes to understand about psychiatric conditions, in other words, may be 
precisely one of the factors that leads to different explanations being 
adopted. 
Whilst it is all well and good to discuss matters in broad terms, without 
examples of different levels of explanation being incorporated into the study 
of psychiatry, it will be difficult to persuade anyone of explanatory 
pluralism’s relevance to the field. Consequently, I now examine some 
examples that illustrate the preceding point that explanatory interests 
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dictate the most relevant explanation in psychiatry just as we saw they did 
with respect to inquiries in the social sciences. 
Example 1: Kathy, a young psychiatrist, is asked by a distressed parent to 
consult with her about her son, Brian, who has decided to leave a career in 
science to enter the priesthood. The upset parent insists that Kathy order a 
brain scan to find a way to change his decision. “There must be something the 
matter with his brain, doctor. How could he throw away such a promising 
scientific career?” Kathy sees the young man, who appears thoughtful and 
mature, and he describes the deep satisfaction and inspiration he feels in the 
Catholic religion. He understands the possible hardships ahead of him but feels 
he is making the right decision. Kathy tells the parent that she is not going to 
order a magnetic resonance imaging scan. There is no evidence, she states, that 
there is anything the matter with his brain, and no interventions that would act 
directly on his brain are indicated in this situation. She feels that he has reached 
his decision in a reasonable way, but the mother should feel free, if she wants, to 
try to argue her son out of his decision.295 
In this example, we see demand for one manner of explanation, namely: a 
magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) scan, being rejected by our psychiatrist 
Kathy, in favour of another: Brian’s own, doxastic-level reasoning processes. 
This is important because the two operate at different levels of explanation. 
Brian’s mother assumes that the correct level of explanation here is that of 
sub-doxastic processes operating in Brian’s brain unbeknownst to him, hence 
her insistence on the MRI. However, in Kathy’s expert psychiatric opinion, 
there is no evidence that the problem (if it is to be called that) can be 
explained by factors operating at such a level. Tangentially, this touches on 
the important point that just because we would like or, as inquirers, may 
suspect that the best explanation occurs on a certain level of explanation, 
does not mean that the best explanation on offer does operate on that level. 
Based on what Brian’s mother wishes to have an explanation for (i.e. based 
on her explanatory interests, or the es-question to which she seeks an eg-
answer) – namely her son’s sudden change of behaviour and interests – 
Kathy can have a discussion with Brian and effectively rule out the efficacy 




of an explanation of his behaviour that operates at the level that the findings 
of an MRI would provide.  
This is, of course, different to saying that an MRI would not be informative: a 
brain scan could reveal many things that would provide some explanation of 
Brian’s behaviours, however these crucially would fail to provide the best eg-
answer to his mother’s es-question. Since, however, the findings of MRI 
scans are unquestionably relevant to the explanations adopted by 
psychiatrists to account for various other psychiatric conditions that they 
might have to deal with in other patients, it is readily arguable that different 
sorts of explanation might be preferred. This satisfies the explanatory 
pluralist tenets that merely looking at the sort of explanations they are is 
insufficient grounds for either ruling out or preferring one explanation over 
another.  
In this case we see that what allows explanations based on MRI findings to 
be excluded as the best candidates for providing Brian’s mother with an eg-
answer simply is the nature of her es-question itself. Whilst she broadly 
seeks some explanation of his change in mentality, and an MRI would 
doubtless provide some explanation of this, it is concluded that actually a 
more informative account could be gained by Brian’s mother discussing the 
matter with him further, as this level of explanation is simply more salient 
than the lower-level mental functioning into which the MRI findings would 
provide insight (though which would be the most salient if her overall goal 
was to heighten her knowledge of her son’s mental processes at the sub-
doxastic level). Consequently, it seems, we have here an instance of the 
tenets of explanatory pluralism being satisfied in the study of psychiatry. 
To help illustrate the point further, I offer next an original example featuring 
two patients with identical physiological symptoms. The patients differ 
substantially in psychiatric assessment, in that where to look for the most 
useful explanations of their physiological symptoms varies: 
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Example 2: Kathy is called to psychiatrically assess two patients who have 
recently suffered panic attacks. One of the patients, Bill, suffered his panic 
attack whilst mountain climbing with friends; the other, Nikita, suffered theirs in 
the middle of a crowded supermarket. Following discussion with each patient, 
Kathy rules that Bill’s panic attack was brought about in response to a near-fatal 
accident that occurred during the climb, and that the attack was a response to 
an overload of stress in an otherwise healthy individual. Nikita’s panic attack, 
meanwhile, is deemed by Kathy to be the result of an underlying anxiety 
condition, which Nikita in turn reported to have flared up due to feeling that 
many other shoppers in the crowded supermarket were staring at them due to 
their appearance as an openly trans woman. 
Here we see that different sorts of explanation may be utilised in psychiatry 
even when explaining identical proximate symptoms. In the case of Bill, 
Kathy appeals merely to factors of his environment – that he was in an 
extremely high-stress situation immediately leading up to his panic attack. In 
the case of Nikita, Kathy’s assessment does also involve environmental 
factors – the busy nature of Nikita’s environment being deemed a significant 
part of the explanation of their panic attack – yet also to factors extraneous 
to merely their environment, in the form of extant mental health issues, 
themselves explained in terms of social stigma attached to Nikita’s gender 
identity. 
In the first instance, the environmental factors are sufficient to serve as 
where to look for the most salient explanation of his panic attack; yet in 
Nikita’s case, although environmental factors are part of the aetiological 
pathway that explain the occurrence of their panic attack, finding the most 
useful explanation of its occurrence requires looking elsewhere. Were Kathy 
to have adopted a generic preference rule according to which the occurrence 
of a panic attack (here the explanandum) entailed that explanations focused 
on the patient’s environment were the best explanations based on their focus 
on that patient’s environment, she would have missed the psychiatric 
relevance of other factors in determining the cause of Nikita’s panic attack. 
In order to motivate explanatory pluralism, recall that we need it to be the 
case that one is required to pick between several explanations, yet lacks a 
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principled rule that would facilitate this in virtue of the sort of explanations 
these explanations are. Instead, the preferred explanation is decided based 
on what which one wishes to explain: whichever explanation provides the 
most satisfactory eg-answer to one’s ultimate es-question is the preferred 
one. The above example exhibits this well, highlighting that whilst 
environmental and biological factors may be most useful in explaining Bill’s 
panic attack, far more relevant to ultimately explaining the underlying 
causes of Nikita’s are psychosocial factors. As Kendler puts it:  
While certain psychiatric symptoms may be pathological at a basic biological level 
(e.g., hallucinations), many symptoms are dysfunctional only in certain contexts [. 
. .] Since many psychiatric disorders include, by definition, some degree of 
psychosocial dysfunction, explanation at the level of biology alone is unlikely to be 
sufficient.296 
We see here, then, that a pluralist account of explanation in psychiatry can 
be well motivated. In each of the above examples, acceptance of the view 
that only one level of explanation is relevant to psychiatric inquiries is 
simply insufficient to successfully provide the most helpful eg-answers 
available to the legitimate es-questions that psychiatrists might pose. 
Focusing on merely biological factors, in the first example, is not going to 
provide Brian’s mother with the answers she seeks, despite her beliefs to the 
contrary. In the second example, explanations accounting for environment as 
well as biology are shown to also provide sub-optimal answers when 
attempting to ascertain the underlying cause of Nikita’s panic attack – an es-
question that ultimately requires an eg-answer that accommodates the 
psychosocial aspects of their underlying anxiety disorder. 
This concludes my analysis of explanatory pluralism’s motivation in 
psychiatry. In the following section, I shall consider one final area in which 
explanatory pluralism is arguably motivated – medical science – before 
                                                          
296 Ibid. (437) 
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progressing on to determine whether this pluralist methodology is similarly 
well motivated in the philosophy of perception. 
 
3.3.3: Explanatory pluralism and medical science 
I turn now to examine the motivation behind utilising explanatory pluralism 
within medical science. Before delving into their specific examples, though, it 
is worth noting what Vreese et al. say in more abstract terms about using 
explanatory pluralism in this context: 
Suppose we wonder why x has property P at time t. Different, more specific 
questions— motivated by different epistemic interests—can underlie this general 
explanation-seeking question, even if all questions are assumed to be requests for 
causal explanations. For instance, why does x have property P, rather than the 
more desirable property P’? Is the fact that x has property P the predictable 
consequence of some other events? Is the fact that x has property P caused by a 
familiar pattern or causal mechanism? According to explanatory pluralism, these 
questions have different answers. Which answer provides the most adequate, 
efficient, and accurate explanatory information depends on the specific question 
one wants to answer (or, in other words, on the specific information that is 
requested in view of the explanatory purposes). Hence, making the specific 
question as explicit as possible is important for explanatory success.297 
Here again, as in the cases of history and social science, and of cognitive 
science, it appears as though not only is an integral part of motivating 
explanatory pluralism is the variety of interests and goals one may have in 
asking an es-question, but additionally it is accepted that what may have 
appeared to be two inquirers asking the same question (due to uttering the 
same words in the course of doing so, for instance), upon further analysis, is 
actually a case of two very different es-questions being asked in accordance 
with two distinct sets of explanatory interests and aims, which may 
nevertheless be such that they can be asked in a coarser-grained way by the 
same utterance. Indeed, it is claimed that there may be several sorts of 
                                                          
297 Vreese et al. (2010: 374 – 375) 
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desired outcomes of es-question within the context of medical science: 
therapeutic/remedial motivations, prediction, general curiosity and 
accounting for the unexpected are all taken to be legitimate – yet distinct – 
aims of inquiry.298 
By way of a more concrete example, consider lung cancer. A natural question 
to ask regarding the condition might be ‘why did person P get lung cancer?’; 
this question, however, seems on reflection to be interpretable at least as 
one of the three following specific es-questions: 
(a) Why did person P, who smokes, develop lung cancer, while person P’, who 
also smokes, did not? 
(b) Why did person P with behaviour B develop lung cancer, while person P’ with 
behaviour B’ did not? 
(c) Why did person P living in country C develop lung cancer, while person P’ in 
country C’ did not?299 
Such elaborations of different es-questions that appear similar at first glance 
are reminiscent of the example discussed above of Saul going to the shop. 
There are differences in the examples, since these three are contrastive 
questions, whereas the same was not true in the earlier discussion. However, 
commonalities to the effect that there are different explanatory goals at 
work in each fully articulated es-question are certainly present.  
In those earlier examples, recall that we saw how these different es-
questions were such that the preferred eg-answer would vary, and would 
vary based on the difference between reference classes of the es-questions 
under consideration. Here, it is contended, the es-questions of the lung 
cancer example ((a) – (c) above) work in much the same manner: whilst 
attention paid to smoking habit may be taken colloquially to be the answer 
to the general ‘why did person P get lung cancer?’ question, it is in fact more 
properly the answer to (b).300 Similarly, knowledge of lung cancer variants 
might figure most appropriately into an answer to (a), whilst the reference 
                                                          
298 Ibid. (375) 
299 Ibid. (375 – 376) 
300 Ibid. (376) 
156 
 
class of (c) is perhaps the most fitting present reference class of the three es-
questions that may contain matters concerning public health policy.301 
Once again, then, it appears that what we are left with is an array of 
explanatory interests, the eg-answers to which are being selected for based 
upon how well they satisfy the interests of the inquiring agent behind the es- 
question. Indeed, Vreese et al. conclude their discussion of the example with 
the following telling passage: 
This lung cancer example demonstrates that researchers and practitioners cannot 
freely select one or the other of the more specific questions to answer the 
rudimentary question. Instead, something needs to guide them toward their 
choice. Good scientists think thoroughly about what kind of information they 
need, and which of the possible more specific explanation-seeking questions will 
deliver the most adequate, accurate, and efficient explanation in view of their 
needs. Different epistemic interests will guide medical researchers and 
practitioners to different kinds of explanation-seeking questions and thus to 
different kinds of explanations in different explanatory contexts. This means that, 
in theory, explanatory pluralism holds for the medical sciences.302 
Here again, the thought does appear to be that it is the different explanatory 
interests of the inquirer – leading to the advancing of different es-questions 
– that leads to different kinds of explanations being preferable in different 
explanatory contexts. Additionally, although the notion that inquirers cannot 
freely select their es-question may be just as likely to find support from 
monists (due to the exclusion or preference rules the latter are looking to 
guide their explanation selection), it seems a fairly reasonable interpretation 
of the earlier part of the preceding quotation to say that on this view, 
inquirers form their own es-questions by contemplating which ones will be 
the most explanatorily adequate, efficient, etc., in the case in question. If this 
is correct, then there can very plausibly not be any general principles 
regarding explanation, and the explanatory pluralist tenets are satisfied. 
Moreover, they are satisfied for reasons that do not apply to the subject 
matter of medical science itself, but rather due to the same variation in 





explanatory interests that led to pluralism being motivated in the cases of 
cognitive science, social science and history. In short, we see that in each of 
these areas, we can apply a consideration along the lines of the following: 
[No] one explanation has [universal] precedence over another; there is no such 
thing as the explanation [. . . and the presupposition that there is] does not stand 
up to critical scrutiny. We must take seriously the context-ladenness of scientific 
explanation.303 
In the next section, I shall attempt to provide support for the contention 
that, at least in the areas philosophy of perception which I am chiefly 
concerned with, explanatory pluralist methodology of the sort expounded 
above is capable of being utilised, and will show that the objection to the 
pluralist approach that contends it is unmotivated is itself unfounded. 
 
3.4: Explanatory pluralism in the philosophy of perception 
The overall purpose of this chapter has been to show that the utilisation of 
explanatory pluralism in the philosophy of perception is not doomed to fall 
prey to the objection that such utilisation is unmotivated. Presently, I am in 
the position to begin tackling this undertaking. The previous sections 
provided discussion of numerous different areas of research in which 
explanatory pluralism is said to be a motivated methodology. Recalling that 
in each of these areas, the explanatory pluralism in question was motivated 
by the difference in explanatory interests of the researcher (which led to 
multiple different sorts of es-questions with different kinds of eg-answers in 
different explanatory contexts), it seems that what is required to show that 
pluralism is a motivated view is simply to illustrate that the philosophy of 
perception also possesses the varying, legitimate sorts of interest that serve 
to make for the various es-questions and eg-answers. In other words, what 
must be done in this final section is to establish whether those engaged in 
philosophy of perception possess the same sort of diverse explanatory 
                                                          
303 Boylan and O’Gorman (1999: 144) 
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interests as those engaged in history, social science, cognitive science or 
medical science. If it turns out that there is a variety of legitimate 
explanatory interests in the philosophy of perception, then it seems that 
either the latter is such that explanatory pluralism can be a methodological 
approach to it which appears well motivated, or else the pluralist position 
arguably is unmotivated, both in the philosophy of perception and in the 
other disciplines discussed.  
It is important to stress that the purpose of this chapter is to establish the 
disjunctive claim in the preceding sentence. This is to say that the present 
chapter stops short of establishing that the explanatory pluralist 
methodology, when applied to the philosophy of perception, actually does 
circumvent the Screening Off Argument in the manner I am envisaging – 
establishing that conclusion is the task of the remaining chapters. The 
remainder of this one, meanwhile, is committed to illustrating merely that 
there is virtually no difference between how the explanatory pluralist 
methodology can be applied to the philosophy of perception and, as we have 
seen above, how it has been applied to the social, cognitive and medical 
sciences. On the basis of establishing this, it becomes possible to submit the 
overall conclusion that either explanatory pluralism is just as motivated an 
approach in all of these disciplines, unless there is something particular to 
its application to the philosophy of perception that defeats this, which I shall 
argue there is not.  
The key question for the purposes of this section, then, is whether in 
working with the relational and representational views of experience, there 
come times whereby the two theories fall into distinct reference classes of 
distinct es-questions. To answer this, one should recall how exactly it is that 
es-questions come to vary to the extent that they do – namely: difference in 
explanatory aims and goals of the inquirer, for it is these that guide the 
decision-making process as to what the most illuminating (or efficient, etc.) 
of the es-questions on offer is. It is, I submit, precisely the case that such 
varied explanatory interests obtain in this case, such that there are distinct 
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es-questions with distinct reference classes that involve representationalism 
and relationalism respectively.  
Before attempting to argue for this latter point, it will be useful to provide as 
a ‘stepping stone’ an example which illustrates how different aspects of 
perceptual experience may be more relevant in providing eg-answers to es-
questions, before trying to compare the respective merits of 
representationalism and relationalism in providing these eg-answers. If we 
grant that there are these distinct, legitimate aspects of perception, it can be 
illustrated that just because focusing on one aspect of perceptual experience 
is most prudent in providing an eg-answer to an es-question, this does not 
mean that another aspect of perceptual experience would not be better 
suited to providing an eg-answer to a different es-question. As we will see in 
the example that follows, this contention turns out to be true even in cases 
where it looks as though the different eg-answers are eg-answers to the same 
es-question: whilst there can be a hierarchy of appropriate eg-answers, this 
is actually established in the example that follows by teasing apart the more 
specific es-questions to which some respective inquirers actually desire 
some eg-answers (in other words: by focusing upon exactly what it is that 
they wish to understand), rather than by some general rule that sorts 
prospective eg-answers into a hierarchy based on the sorts of explanations 
they provide. This is to say, I wish to show the plausibility of the claim that 
that of which we are attempting to gain a heightened understanding is what 
determines where it is most appropriate to look for an eg-answer to the 
given es-question. Thus, the example will be very similar to that seen in the 
preceding sections viz. social sciences, psychiatry, and so on, yet applies the 
same approach seen there to the sorts of es-questions to which philosophers 
of perception would be likely to seek eg-answers. Note that what follows is 
an example whereby both relationalism and representationalism may 
plausibly be utilised: at this point I am merely showing how the explanatory 
pluralist methodology itself may be applied to the questions that 
representationalism and relationalism might be appealed to in answering. I 
leave discovery of stronger examples, where it looks more convincingly as 
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though only one of the two theories might be of use (often treated in the 
literature as cases that sway the so-called relationalism versus 
representationalism debate in favour of one theory or the other), to the 
following chapter.304 
Considering the rudimentary question that we might imagine an inquirer to 
ask – ‘what is it for S to see o as F?’ – this is further analysable, in what 
should hopefully at this point be a familiar way, into more specific es-
questions. Which aspect of the initial articulation of this es-question is 
relevant in each of the more specific versions can be stressed as follows: 
a) What is it for S to see o as F? 
b) What is it for S to see o as F? 
c) What is it for S to see o as F? 
d) What is it for S to see o as F? 
e) What is it for S to see o as F? 
Here, I take (a) to be unobjectionably the sort of es-question that gets asked 
in the philosophy of perception. It is, I think, the most natural reading of the 
rudimentary es-question provided, and is also the one closest to the types of 
questions with which this thesis is concerned. It is asking for an account of 
the whole process of a subject visually perceiving an object as instantiating a 
given property. The second, (b), is on one reading less obviously in 
philosophy of perception territory, but can be read as asking for an account 
of why a subject is seeing the scene they are, rather than hearing or smelling: 
it pertains to sensory modalities. Insofar as some work in the discipline 
focuses on sensory modalities, I do not think treating this as an es-question 
arising in the philosophy of perception is too great a leap. Versions (c) and 
(d) can be read as pertaining respectively to the particularity of objects 
perceived and to how we predicate properties to objects we perceive. I 
discuss both cases in the following chapter. Finally, (e) is a contrastive 
                                                          
304 These stronger cases, though more useful to my ultimate aim, require argument in support of the 
contention that they qualify as such. Though necessary to my overall conclusion, I deem such arguments 
extraneous to the point currently at issue – which is to illustrate the application of the methodology of 
explanatory pluralism itself – and so delay their discussion for now. 
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question seeking an account of which property is predicated to a perceived 
object.  
For clarity, here is the list of more specific es-questions that fall out of these 
readings: 
a) What is it for S to see o as F? 
b) What is it for S to see – rather than hear, smell, or taste – o as F? 
c) What is it for S to see o – rather than o* – as F? 
d) What is it for S to predicate the property F to object o in their visual experience? 
e) What is it for S to see o as F, rather than seeing it as G? 
When analysing the motivation of explanatory pluralism in previous 
sections, one notion that was appealed to was that of a reference class: the 
range of options salient to providing the eg-answer to the es-question. This 
was useful in relation to contrastive es-questions, or those whose eg-answers 
had causal explanations. The difference in reference class, it was held, 
served as a plausible indicator of difference in explanatory interests. Since 
the latter are what is required to motivate explanatory pluralism, I am 
arguing, it will be useful to consider this notion here. 
Examining es-questions (a) – (e), we see that three of them are contrastive, 
whilst two – (a) and (d) – are not. I return to these two below. Of the 
remaining three, identifying the reference class of each is straightforward: 
the range of sensory modalities serves as the reference class for (b); the 
range of mind-independent objects serves as that of (c); and the range of 
predicable properties that can possibly be instantiated by mind-independent 
objects serves as that of (e). These are all different reference classes, and 
serve to highlight the different explanatory interests realised by the 
respective inquirers of (b), (c) and (e). 
Finally, (a) and (d) are not contrastive, but instead seem interested in 
identifying the nature of something. In the case of (a), it seems that what is 
sought is an identification of the nature of the perceptual experience as a 
whole. Since the eg-answer to this is such that it could possibly contain the 
eg-answer to (b) – (d) as constituent parts, I take it to be plausible that the 
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explanatory interests realised by (a)’s inquirer differ from those realised by 
the inquirers behind the other es-questions. Lastly, (d) is also looking to get 
at the precise nature of something in a non-contrastive manner.305 In this 
regard it is similar to (a), but the predication of properties in visual 
experience seems a constituent part of what it is to have a visual experience, 
in the sense that one can intelligibly ask about it and view as explanatorily 
irrelevant many other aspects of what it is to have a visual experience. 
Conversely, one could ask (a), be given the perfect eg-answer to (d), and view 
this as an incomplete explanation. 
This overall point generalises: an explanation that perfectly answers (a) will 
have as its reference class the range of sensory modalities, but this will serve 
very poorly as a reference class for (e), which seeks an eg-answer relating to 
which property is predicated to a visually perceived object. For the latter 
question, the visual modality is held fixed, and so matters of other sensory 
modalities are not relevant to providing a satisfactory eg-answer. More 
generally: certain aspects of perceptual experience are simply less relevant 
than others in arriving at a satisfactory eg-answer to legitimate es-questions. 
Moreover, it is the es-question itself – and the explanatory interests which 
generate it in the first place – that determine what is relevant. As Bouwel 
puts it: 
By making the different possible explanatory requests explicit [. . .] the motivation 
and the explanatory information required will be taken into account. It can be 
shown that one [. . .] fact can be the subject of different questions, and hence of 
different forms of explanation. Consequently, taking into account the explanatory 
question is not something of secondary importance, as it decides on which form of 
explanation will be used. To be able to answer these different kinds of explanatory 
questions we will need different forms of explanation.306 
                                                          
305 At least not in a manner that contrasts with anything in particular, as is the case for the other es-questions 
that possess an obvious reference class. The case could be made that the inquirer is interested in how 
predication of properties to perceived objects contrasts with everything else, but this is not an important 
point. 
306 Bouwel (2004: 308) 
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If the above analysis is correct, then it appears that different aspects of 
perception can generate different es-questions due to divergent explanatory 
interests involved in investigating them, and these es-questions are such that 
the way to the most appropriate eg-answer will differ. It has also been shown 
that at a sufficiently coarse-grained level, these es-questions can all appear 
identical, despite actually being distinct. Importantly, these differences map 
onto the explanatory interests of the inquirer, which is why there are no 
generalised rules of explanatory exclusion or preference at the global level. 
Yet this is precisely what was required in order to satisfy the claim that 
explanatory pluralism was motivated in researching cognitive science, 
medical science, history, etc., hence it seems that in the absence of any 
subject-specific defeaters present in the philosophy of perception – which 
are not obviously present – we must conclude that explanatory pluralism is 
at least as motivated in this area as in the others examined earlier.307 Of 
course, this allows equally for the view that explanatory pluralism is 
motivated in none of those research areas mentioned, but this is a hugely 
strong monist claim, and without substantive argument offered by the 
monist, it is hard to see why we ought to abandon what is potentially a 
highly intellectually lucrative approach to such a diverse range of quests for 
understanding. 
Perhaps one relevant difference in terms of types of explanations is that in 
the previous sections where explanatory pluralism was held to be motivated 
in other disciplines, the examples used involved causal explanations. Since 
the particular question in the philosophy of perception that I am concerned 
with is about the nature of perception, it might be held that this difference 
precludes inference from the methodology’s motivation in those cases to its 
motivation in the philosophy of perception. 
                                                          
307 By subject-specific defeaters, I mean something particular about engaging in the philosophy of perception 
that undercuts my argument supporting the view that pluralism is motivated. Though I do merely say above 
that the presence of such a defeater is not obvious, perhaps the most obvious potential candidate would 
simply be that perception is fundamentally just not an area of research that admits of more than one kind of 
explanation, but this would be question-begging. 
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I think the above example es-questions illustrate that this is not a relevant 
difference that outright blocks the conclusion that explanatory pluralism 
could be motivated in the philosophy of perception. Certainly, it does not 
obviously block the conclusion that it is as motivated in the philosophy of 
perception as it is in the other disciplines considered. More than one of the 
es-questions considered did not involve a causal explanation, yet were in the 
philosophy of perception remit, and upheld the broader point that an array 
of explanatory interests could be shown to operate across the es-questions 
considered. This can be argued, just as in preceding sections, to show that 
different eg-answers are more suitable for addressing different es-questions.  
If there is any further reason why this causal/non-causal distinction renders 
application of explanatory pluralism unmotivated in the philosophy of 
perception, it is not clear to me what it is. I have shown that the 
methodology broadly holds up in dealing with the sorts of es-questions 
occurring in the philosophy of perception, which do not seek causal 
explanations. Consequently, I take the onus to be on the party voicing 
continued scepticism towards explanatory pluralism’s motivation in this 
discipline to argue the point. 
I have argued that what is required to motivate explanatory pluralism is 
simply the existence of different explanatory interests, such that these result 
in different es-questions being generated which themselves have different –
more or less fitting – eg-answers, to the effect that the preferred possible 
explanation depends upon the explanatory interests of the inquirer. I have 
supported this claim by examining how explanatory pluralism is supposed 
to be motivated in other disciplines – namely: history and social science, 
cognitive science, and medical science. In all of these, the claim I am arguing 
for appeared to hold, for different explanatory interests do appear to lead to 
distinct es-questions in each case. Thereafter, it was demonstrated that the 
same can be said for the philosophy of perception, and there are no obvious 
countervailing reasons for nevertheless rejecting the view that explanatory 
pluralism might be motivated in the latter discipline if it is motivated at all 
in any of the others. If the foregoing analysis is correct, then it appears the 
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utilisation of explanatory pluralism in the philosophy of perception cannot 
be blocked by way of objecting that such an approach is unmotivated. This is 
important because, as we shall see throughout the remaining chapters, 
utilisation of explanatory pluralism allows an account to be developed which 
successfully overcomes the Screening Off Argument, and which entails the 








I identified the Screening Off Argument in §0.3 as a frontrunning reason for 
maintaining that relationalism and representationalism are incompatible, 
and therefore as the argument I wish to overcome. The first part of the 
approach I have in mind for overcoming the Screening Off Argument can be 
realised based on the concepts introduced in the previous chapter. In 
particular, it will rely on the notion of explanations being reducible to 
pairings of es-questions and eg-answers. Broadly, the thought is that by 
focusing on certain es-questions addressed by relationalism and 
representationalism respectively, it is possible to identify explanatory 
interests that will only be served by one theory or the other. Specifically, this 
will be the case when there can be identified an es-question which is such 
that an eg-answer is provided to it by only one of relationalism or 
representationalism, but not both. It is identifying es-questions such as this, 
and arguing that they conform to this constraint, that will be the task of this 
chapter. The role that such es-questions play in my attempt to reconcile 
relationalism and representationalism will become clear in the following 
chapters. 
 
4.1: The interests of relationalism 
Starting with relationalism, I now commence in an effort to identify an es-
question which is such that an eg-answer is offered to it by relationalism but 
not by representationalism. There are two possible ways I see of 
accomplishing this. The first is to identify an es-question which is de facto in 
such a position, which is to say that there is currently no eg-answer offered 
to it on behalf of representationalism. The problem with such an approach is 
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that there is nothing to stop the representationalist from thereafter 
formulating and offering an eg-answer to this question, thereby undermining 
its support of my overall argument. Conversely, the second way to 
accomplish this task is to identify an es-question which is such that 
representationalism cannot, due to its commitments, provide an eg-answer 
to it. This es-question, if it really is that way, does not allow for a 
representationalist eg-answer being offered at any time, and thereby 
circumvents the worry of the first method outlined above. If possible, 
therefore, es-questions that satisfy the constraints imposed by the second 
method are the es-questions that I shall be attempting to identify in this 
section. 
I take it that a fruitful way of identifying such an es-question would be to 
consider just what it is that a relationalist theory does that a 
representationalist theory does not. One way of articulating this that is 
agreeable both to a reconciliatory as well as austere view is that 
relationalism fundamentally explains aspects of perception by appealing to 
the mind-independent objects of perception themselves, as well as the 
circumstances of the experience (point of view, lighting conditions, and so 
on). With reference to these, the relationalist can articulate a particular 
relation of direct acquaintance that the subject stands in with the objects 
that they perceive in their environment. This acquaintance relation is then 
used to explain aspects of perceptual experience in need of explanation. This 
articulation is acceptable to both reconciliatory and austere theorists 
because it is compatible both with the claim that representation occurs in 
perceptual experience (reconciliatory) and with the claim that all aspects of 
perceptual experience are to be explained by the subject’s acquaintance with 
the mind-independent objects they perceive. 
The two sorts of theorist will certainly disagree over the latter of those 
claims being true. It is in the nature of austere relationalism to claim that the 
acquaintance relation, and nothing more, explains all that is required of a 
philosophical theory of perception; a reconciliatory view, by its nature, does 
not accept this claim. This is compatible with both a relation of acquaintance 
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and representation occurring during our perceptual experience. Where the 
two sorts of view disagree is in which of these elements does the heavy 
lifting in explaining perceptual experiences. 
Relationalism’s explanatory focus on the relation of direct acquaintance, I 
submit, tells us about something that relates to the es-question for which we 
are presently looking. In particular, it tells us what its eg-answer will look 
like. The eg-answer will appeal to the direct acquaintance relation – itself 
cashed out in terms of mind-independent physical objects themselves, as 
well as the point of view, lighting conditions, and so on, from which they are 
perceived. These are what fall within the explanatory purview of 
relationalism exclusively, and so if the es-question of the sort to be 
identified does exist, the criterion that relationalism alone can provide an eg-
answer to it restricts its eg-answer to this domain. This gives us a concrete 
starting point. 
From here, the next move would be to identify the counterpart es-question 
to this form of eg-answer. This may strike some as a manner of formulating 
the es-question that is undertaken for the ad hoc reason of establishing a 
reconciliatory theory of perception. Against this charge, I counter that if 
such an es-question can (by any means) be found, along with a comparable 
es-question to which only representationalism can provide a satisfactory eg-
answer, then a reconciliatory view becomes overwhelmingly plausible. It is 
simply the case, I argue, that both austere versions of relationalism and 
representationalism turn out to be wrong in – and because of – instances 
such as these. I take the consequences for the relationalism versus 
representationalism debate, which I will argue these instances have, to 
overcome any allegations that the approach is ad hoc. 
A reconciliatory view being correct is one plausible outcome of this. Another 
available option is that an entirely distinct view may explain everything we 
wish to explain. Consequently, it is not strictly speaking inevitable that a 
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reconciliatory view falls out of the discovery of these es-questions.308 A 
wholly distinct view would not only need to be just that, but would also have 
to account for the appeal that both representationalism and relationalism 
have, whilst also accounting for why they were both ultimately mistaken. I 
take this to be a less plausible option than one that can account for all of 
this without also being required to differ substantially from relationalism 
and representationalism. 
Let us return to identifying our es-question. We now know that its eg-answer 
must appeal ultimately to the mind-independent objects themselves, and the 
salient circumstances (point of view, lighting conditions, and so on) within 
which they are perceived. To progress this further we might consider, then, 
what role these play. I suspect, though, that this would make for a quite a 
long and complex answer. It also seems ill suited as it stands to serve as our 
target es-question: it is sufficiently generic and has a wide enough scope that 
the representationalist would likely be able to provide an eg-answer to it. 
Nevertheless, the overall approach of analysing what work the appeal to 
mind-independent objects and the circumstances in which they are 
perceived does for the relationalist account seem a plausible approach to 
take. The task will be confounded by the need to narrow the scope and 
suggest a more specific es-question, but this will not render it 
insurmountable. 
The upshot of this thought, I suggest, is that a way of sharpening our focus 
towards what we are looking for is to specify the sort of role that mind-
independent objects and the circumstances within which they are perceived 
play for relationalism, and to request an explanation of that role. The 
thought is that perhaps they play a role within the relationalist explanation 
of some aspect of perceptual experience which is intelligible on relationalism 
alone. That is: the mind-independent objects and circumstances of 
                                                          
308 Though of course one could restrict the context of discussion to include only promising views widely 
discussed in contemporary philosophy of perception literature, which would have the effect of shifting far 
closer to inevitability. 
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perception could not play this role on a representationalist picture, whatever 
other roles they might feasibly play for that theory. 
Broad candidates for different sorts of roles can be found by considering 
certain aspects of perceptual experience – namely: phenomenal, behavioural, 
and epistemological.309 The candidate I have in mind is the latter, as I take 
relationalists to generally consider their view to provide a satisfactory 
account of the epistemological aspects of perceptual experience.310 Their 
account enjoys intuitive plausibility, because a naturally appealing 
explanation for how we can know about the objects in our environment via 
perception is that perception involves being directly related to those mind-
independent objects themselves.  
The means of approaching the target es-question, then, will be to consider 
what epistemological role is played by the apparatus that is central to the 
story told by relationalism. In order to do this, we should first consider the 
positive epistemological story told by relationalism. 
 
4.1.1: Conclusive reasons 
In Chapter 2, I set out the commitments of relationalism for visual 
perception. On Brewer’s articulation of relationalism, this involved 
accounting for seeing in terms of propositions of the form ‘o looks F to S’, 
where o is the mind-independent object perceived, ‘F’ is some property, and 
S is the perceiving subject. The idea was that o looks F to S iff (i) S stands in 
a relation of direct acquaintance R to o, from a standpoint c – which is such 
that o bears visually relevant similarities to paradigm exemplars of F when 
viewed from c – and (ii) S registers that o bears visually relevant similarities 
to paradigm exemplars of F when viewed from c. According to relationalism, 
if this captures something of the basic structure of perceptual experience, 
                                                          
309 See Logue (2014) 
310 Ch. 6 of Brewer (2011) is dedicated to highlighting precisely this, and Martin (2004, 2006) famously 
accounts for hallucination in a wholly epistemic way. 
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then any positive account of perceptual knowledge will need to adhere to 
it.311 
In the most straightforward cases of knowledge, there is reason to suppose 
that factual knowledge is dependent upon possession of concepts relevant 
to the propositional articulation of that knowledge.312 One cannot know what 
one lacks the appropriate concepts to express; this is not to claim that one 
must be capable of articulating the proposition in question – but one must 
possess the concepts required to do so. The relationalist can say that, 
provided the subject possesses the relevant concepts and is acquainted with 
the epistemic grounds that render their perceptually based judgement 
correct (in a manner to be discussed below), conscious acquaintance with an 
object “normally makes application of ‘F’ in judgement evidently correct”, as 
in such cases the subject possesses the relevant concepts and is viewing the 
object from an appropriate position and in correct conditions.313 Hence, 
seeing the object constitutes the subject’s reason (in the sense of providing 
epistemic grounding) for judging that o is F – i.e. “experience acquaints us 
with the grounds for empirical truth.”314 This can be expressed in the 
relationalist framework from earlier by stating that, on the supposition that 
o is F, “o makes an application of ‘F’ correct: o itself is what makes ‘o is F’ 
true and in this sense constitutes a reason to apply the predicate.”315 
The representationalist can rightly say the same, and would have an equally 
legitimate claim that the object o actually being F is what renders S’s 
judgement that o is F is correct. What I shall argue in what follows is that the 
representationalist cannot place the same emphasis on reasons as the 
relationalist can. To illustrate the point, a question to consider is: what are 
the respective epistemological contributions of (a) the mind-independent 
                                                          
311 I borrow some of Brewer’s terminology in what follows simply because it renders the point to be made 
clearly and precisely. Not all relationalists would spell things out in exactly this fashion, but differences in 
precise articulation do not affect the broader point being made. 
312 Ibid. (142) 
313 Ibid. (143) 
314 Ibid. 
315 Ibid. (142) 
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object perceived, and (b) the standpoint from which the object’s being a 
particular way is made apparent to the subject?316 
I shall state the relationalist’s response to each of these in turn, before 
analysing them. In response to (a), Brewer states: 
(A) It is a necessary condition upon a perceiver’s having an experientially based 
reason of the kind that I am elucidating here to apply the concept ‘F’ in 
judgement that she should be consciously acquainted with what is in fact a 
reason for such application, namely, a direct object of perception, o, that is in 
fact F. That object o itself is a reason in the relevant sense to make the 
concept application in question in judgement.317 
On this view, then, the object itself plays the role of providing a reason for 
the subject to predicate a property to that object. More precisely, it provides 
the subject with a reason to judge that their environment is a certain way 
(that property F is instantiated by object o, say) that is conclusive – that is: a 
reason that does not leave the possibility open that the judgement is 
mistaken.318 This is to be taken as in Chapter 2, where McDowell’s 
epistemological disjunctivism was discussed. That view holds that there is 
an epistemic asymmetry between successful (veridical) perceptions and 
corresponding (subjectively indistinguishable) hallucinations. In the so-called 
‘good case’ of successful perception, one’s experience provides one with 
warrant to make a judgement about their environment that is conclusive in 
the sense specified. Conversely, the so-called ‘bad case’ does provide the 
subject with warrant for making such a judgement, but in this case warrant 
that is compatible with the judgement being mistaken. The view takes a 
subject’s experience of things appearing a certain way to constitute a 
disjunctive fact: either an objective state of affairs becomes manifest to the 
subject, or else a situation in which it is, to the subject, as though an 
objective state of affairs becomes manifest to them (when that is not how 
things are). 
                                                          
316 This question is adapted from one in Brewer (2011: 147), credited to Anil Gupta. 
317 Ibid. (147 – 148) 
318 Soteriou (2016: 119) 
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Importantly for our present purposes, the McDowellian position has 
consequences for our perceptual knowledge – particularly: it impacts the 
epistemic status of the reasons a subject has for judging their environment 
to be a certain way. I alluded above to the ability both relationalists and 
representationalists have to appeal to mind-independent objects as 
constituting reasons why the subject is correct in judging their environment 
to be thus and so. Distinguishing reasons why such a judgement may be 
correct from the epistemic reasons (or grounds) upon which the subject 
might base that judgement, however, highlights an important point. In 
considering epistemic grounds for a subject’s perceptually based 
judgements, epistemological disjunctivism allows its proponent to 
simultaneously hold that these grounds stop short of the fact in the bad 
case, but not in the good case. We also saw that epistemological 
disjunctivism does not entail metaphysical disjunctivism, so the success of 
the former cannot be said to hang on the success of the latter. 
With all of this in mind, we can unpack (A) above. Brewer’s claim is that to 
have the sort of epistemic grounds that do not fall short of the fact, one 
must be directly acquainted with the mind-independent object and its 
properties. The thought is that the object itself (and its properties) are the 
only grounds for the subject’s judgement that their environment is a certain 
way that are incompatible with that judgement being mistaken. Mere 
appearance (that falls short of the fact, in the relevant sense) is compatible 
with the judgement being mistaken, and so does not constitute the sort of 
reason envisaged. 
Meanwhile, (b) seeks to establish the epistemological role of the subject’s 
standpoint in making conclusive reasons for perceptual judgement apparent 
to them. Specifically, it asks what epistemological bearing the circumstances 
of perception (C) have on the subject making their perceptual judgement. 
Since C itself details the way the subject becomes acquainted with o (and 
thus acquainted in the good case with conclusive reason for their perceptual 
judgement), the answer to (b) had best establish how such a reason can be 
realised by a subject. One way in which (b) has been responded to is in terms 
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of how mind-independent objects perceptually look to a subject who is 
directly acquainted with them. One account of this discussed in Chapter 2 
cashed it out in terms of o bearing visually relevant similarities to paradigm 
exemplars of F. Though not the only way of providing an answer to (b), 
Brewer offers the following: 
(B) It is a further necessary condition on that very reason coming to light in her 
experience that she be acquainted with o from a point of view and in 
circumstances that enable her registration of the appropriate visually relevant 
similarities that it has from that point of view and in those circumstances with 
the paradigms that are involved in her grasp of the concept ‘F’.319 
The point of view and circumstances, C – via which Brewer’s account claims 
that o’s visually relevant similarities to paradigm exemplars of F become 
apparent – play a central role in the subject appreciating the reason 
articulated in (a) above. More precisely: it is a necessary condition on S 
grasping this conclusive reason for applying F to o, that they are acquainted 
with o from some standpoint C*. 
Satisfaction of (A) without (B) renders possible cases where S is acquainted 
with what is in fact a reason to judge that o is F, yet this fails to be made 
evident to S.320 Satisfaction of (B) without (A), meanwhile, allows illusory 
experience of an object that is G but not F, and is viewed in conditions which 
cause it to have visually relevant similarities with paradigm exemplars of F, 
leading to cases of understandable errors in judgement based on the 
experience.321 Hence, establishing both (A) and (B) precludes respectively that 
a subject has equally strong justification for their perceptual judgement in 
both the good and bad cases, and that the subject has legitimate grounds for 
doubt in the good case. Looked at one way, these are both strengths of the 
position; though one’s modus ponens being another’s modus tollens, such 
preclusions can also be looked at as the bases for two objections to the view. 
                                                          





In the first case, the objector argues that it is counterintuitive to say that the 
strength of a subject’s justification across the good and bad cases varies – 
we should want to say that the hallucinating subject is just as justified in 
their judgement as the perceiving subject just because the respective 
experiences are subjectively indistinguishable.322 The idea is that, given the 
nature of the subject’s experience in each case, and the introspective 
indistinguishability across cases, the epistemically appropriate response to 
each experience is the subject making the same judgement, with identical 
credence in each case.323 However, one can uphold that there is a match of 
sorts in epistemically permissible responses to cases whilst denying that 
there is epistemic symmetry in terms of how conclusive the subject’s 
reasons for perceptual judgements are across good and bad cases.324 Hence 
what is going on in non-veridical experience is to be explained derivatively 
on the basis of what is going on in veridical experience: in the latter, one has 
access to conclusive warrant for one’s perceptual judgement; in the former, 
one only seems to have such access, and is not in a position to tell that one 
does not.325 
In the second case, the objector seeks to argue that it is plausible that 
subjects can have legitimate grounds for doubting their perceptual 
judgements in good cases: for instance, testimony of others may provide the 
veridical perceiver with grounds for doubt that are legitimate, even though 
they are mistaken.326 However, here the epistemological disjunctivist can 
appeal to the potential for the double dissociation between (A) and (B) – it is 
consistent with the subject having a conclusive reason to perceptually judge 
that o is F, for instance, that they fail to appreciate that they have this 
reason. Consequently, the subject in the good case can be sensitive to 
purported counterevidence to their perceptual judgement, even if that 
purported counterevidence is mistaken.327 As Soteriou puts it, these cases are 
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324 Ibid. (139)  
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327 Ibid. (141) 
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such that “you are deprived of the awareness that your experience puts you 
in a position to know things about your environment.”328 
Having established, in line with (A) and (B) that both foregoing 
considerations constitute necessary conditions for perceptual knowledge, it 
follows that it is not enough that S is acquainted with relevant reason for 
judging o to be F in order for S to know that o is F – they must also 
appreciate the reason in question. In other words, they must be aware of and 
accept the reason they have to apply the relevant concept(s) to the object(s) 
in their surroundings.  
Brewer cashes out this acceptance of the sort of reason in question in terms 
of conceptual registration. Conceptual registration constitutes the subject’s 
appreciation of the reason in question as being the conclusive epistemic 
reason for their judgement that it is. The subject acquainted with conclusive 
reasons for perceptual judgement undergoes conceptual registration, 
accepting – in a manner constitutive of knowledge – that their environment 
is a certain way. As Brewer puts it: “acquaintance has to be combined with 
conceptual registration and endorsement for the acquisition of 
knowledge.”329  
We now have a clear articulation of the respective roles played by o and C in 
the acquisition of perceptual knowledge – thereby answering questions (a) 
and (b) above of the epistemological roles played by each. It will now 
therefore be prudent to assess whether either of these allow us to formulate 
the target es-question. I do not think that the analysis in (B), pertaining to 
the circumstances of perception and point of view, are such that they will do 
the job. This is because one of the criteria of our target es-question is that 
representationalism is unable to provide an eg-answer to it. As we saw, the 
epistemic contribution of the circumstances of perception and point of view 
are closely bound up with conceptual registration – the notion that S must 
endorse, as well as be acquainted with, reasons for applying the property F 
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to the object o. Conceptual registration, as drawn up here, sounds a great 
deal like the representationalist’s conception of representation. For instance, 
conceptual registration as taken to be “an irreducibly primitive notion that 
[can be conveyed] by appeal to such familiar commonsense activities as 
noticing, recognising, and seeing as.”330 The emphasis in the preceding 
quotation echoes closely representation as I have defined it in Chapter 1. 
Thus, I think it arguable that the functional role played by each notion is 
similar enough that an es-question based on the deliverances of (B) would 
plausibly allow for a representationalist eg-answer. 
Giving credit where it’s due, Brewer anticipates this objection, contending 
that two considerations support a distinction between representation and 
conceptual registration: 
First, acquaintance itself does not presuppose conceptual registration. Hence 
registration is not in this sense part of the fundamental nature of our basic 
perceptual relation with the mind-independent physical world. Second, 
registration is something that subjects themselves do [. . .] Hence, again, this is not 
a feature of our most basic deliverances of our perceptual systems in our 
conscious experiences of the world around us.331 
For reasons that are worth pointing out for my later purposes, I think this 
statement stops short of showing that representation fails to play a central 
explanatory role in our perceptual epistemology.  
The first claim – that acquaintance does not presuppose conceptual 
registration – highlights a difference in importance placed upon conceptual 
registration and representation respectively for Brewer’s view and for 
representationalism. The thought is that since representation occupies a 
position of foundational importance for representationalism, whilst the 
same cannot be said for conceptual registration’s place in Brewer’s 
relationalism, the two are not identical. This is fine, as far as it goes. It does 
not preclude a representationalist answering an es-question about the 
                                                          
330 Ibid.; emphasis mine. 
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epistemological role circumstances of perception C play in perceptual 
knowledge, however. If one assumes that what I am calling austere theories 
of perception are the only viable option, then this difference would be 
sufficient. Reconciliatory views can allow for the same thing (say, a subject’s 
capacity for perceptual representation) to occupy explanatory roles of 
varying importance depending on what is to be explained, however. 
Consequently, one cannot claim that conceptual registration is obviously 
distinct from representation in the manner required on the basis that each 
respective theory assigns them varying levels of importance.  
To the second claim: that subjects themselves carry out conceptual 
registration clearly entails no difference between that process and 
representation as I am understanding the term. Promising theories of 
representation can happily argue that the subject carrying out the process 
autorepresentation is in fact a most basic feature of our perceptual 
experience, and so I do not accept this as a reason for drawing a distinction 
between the two. That said, if it turns out that I am wrong about either of 
these things, then all this means is that the deliverances of (B) might more 
plausibly lead to an articulation of the target es-question. Consequently, I 
shall say no more on the matter, as I think the deliverances of (A) are much 
more clearly suited to that purpose. 
Recall that (A) involved the object o being F itself constituting a reason for 
the subject judging o being F. More generally, one might say that mind-
independent objects themselves constitute reasons for the correctness of 
applying concepts (of the sort that (A) establishes as a necessary condition 
on perceptual knowledge) in judgements about those objects.332 In other 
words, one might say that o itself being F constitutes a conclusive reason for 
the correctness of S judging o to be F. 
It was stipulated above that the eg-answer to our target es-question is 
restricted by the criterion that only relationalism, and not 
representationalism, can provide it. In real terms, this precludes the subject 
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being in a representational state – i.e. S representing o as being F – from 
doing the explanatory heavy lifting. I take the notion of the object 
constituting reasons for the correctness of the subject’s application of 
properties to that object as satisfying this constraint, so now turn to 
articulating the es-question I have in mind, and then supporting this 
contention. 
Since o in fact being F is a conclusive reason for S to judge that o is F – and 
this in turn constitutes an appeal to mind-independent facts about the 
object itself, as opposed to S being in a representational state compatible 
with this judgement being mistaken – I take simple identification of these 
conclusive reasons to appeal to relationalist but not representationalist 
apparatus. Consequently, an articulation of the target es-question I have in 
mind may be the following: 
(REL-1): How does experience provide the perceiving subject with conclusive 
reasons for applying certain empirical concepts in judging their environment as 
being a particular way? 
The ‘certain’ empirical concepts here just are those concepts that the subject 
is required to possess and deploy to judge the environment in question as 
being a particular way – that ‘particular way’, in turn, just being the way the 
environment actually is. As we have seen, the relationalist provides an eg-
answer to (REL-1) by referring to the mind-independent objects themselves, 
together with their properties, and the relation of direct acquaintance that 
the subject stands in to these. The representationalist, in contrast, cannot 
appeal to the subject representing their environment as being a certain way – 
even the correct way – as this is compatible with the falsity of their 
judgements, on the widely accepted position that representation requires the 
possibility of misrepresentation. I take it that (REL-1) itself is an acceptable 
articulation of a fair question that one might expect a philosophical theory 
of perception to answer. It seems therefore that the representationalist 
cannot dispute the legitimacy of (REL-1) as an es-question. 
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Perhaps the representationalist will appeal to a representation that is caused 
by the mind-independent objects and properties that the relationalist 
appeals to, but such an appeal would strip any of the representational 
apparatus of any of its explanatory power. An eg-answer to (REL-1) must 
show how experience provides the subject with reasons for judgment that 
are conclusive, and according to this purported eg-answer what is 
accomplishing this is the relation of causation that the representation stands 
in to mind-independent objects. Once again, the mind-independent objects 
and relations to them are providing any success enjoyed by the eg-answer, 
and representation itself is not contributing anything of explanatory value to 
the situation. 
At this point, the only way out I can see for the representationalist is to bite 
the bullet, and deny that experience provides us with conclusive reasons for 
applying certain empirical concepts in judging our environment as being a 
particular way. This approach has several effects. One of these, happily for 
the representationalist, is that representationalism is no longer obliged to 
provide an eg-answer to (REL-1). Instead, what they arguably must now do is 
provide an error theory, explaining why it is a mistake to hold that 
experience plays this role of providing us with the relevant conclusive 
reasons, as well as why some have been prone to commit this misstep. 
Additionally, they must either provide an account of what does provide us 
with these conclusive reasons or adopt the sceptical position of denying that 
we have them altogether. Whatever else this approach might accomplish, it 
devalues (REL-1) for the representationalist. This is the important 
consequence for my purposes, as it renders (REL-1) an es-question which is 
such that only one of relationalism or representationalism – in this case the 
former – can provide an eg-answer to it.  
My overall argument to be made is the following: provided that it is possible 
to identify es-questions like this, with at least one pair such that only 
representationalism can provide an eg-answer to one es-question and only 
relationalism can provide an eg-answer to the other, then it is arguable that 
our philosophical theory of perception should involve both relationalism and 
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representationalism. I will introduce the other apparatus required for 
making this argument in Chapter 5, but it is prudent at this evidence-
gathering stage of the argument to note and dismiss one possible means of 
resisting it.  
We have seen that one approach to being confronted with es-questions of 
the sort I am looking for is to devalue them: to regard them as questions 
that our philosophical theory of perception ought not to answer. Whilst this 
would count against my appeal to any of the es-questions one would be 
willing to devalue in this way, it would come at a price. Once a plurality of 
such es-questions have been identified, devaluing all or even most of them 
would entail that our philosophical theory of perception ought to explain far 
less than would seem obvious. The price, then, would amount to “devaluing 
the very debate one is engaged in.”333 
Finally, it is worth noting that, on another way of viewing this situation, it 
can be held that if such conclusive reasons are necessary for knowledge, 
then the alternative es-question, ‘how does perception make immediate 
knowledge of one’s environment possible?’, looks like it would serve a 
comparable role to (REL-1). In either case, the representationalist needs to 
explain away rather than explain conclusive reasons of the sort envisaged, as 
their view does not provide any illuminating account of them. I have chosen 
for (REL-1) the approach involving fewer assumptions, however I do think 
that the alternative suggested here is even more obviously an es-question to 
which our theory of perception must provide an eg-answer. 
 
4.1.2: Demonstrative reference 
I have argued in Chapter 2 (especially in §2.3.1) that relationalism is 
equipped to accommodate our capacity for demonstrative reference in a 
manner that representationalism simply is not. I shall now identify another 
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es-question to which relationalism but not representationalism can provide 
an eg-answer, before providing the reader with some reminders of the 
considerations discussed earlier that have led to this conclusion. The es-
question I have in mind is, straightforwardly, the following: 
(REL-2): What makes demonstrative reference possible? 
A common thread running between the considerations from Chapter 2 that 
support only relationalism being able to provide an eg-answer to this 
involves two claims. The first is that demonstrative reference involves a 
particularly close connection to the mind-independent object referred to, 
and the second is that this close connection does not find a natural home in 
the story told by representationalism, yet can be readily accommodated by 
relationalism. I shall now address these claims. 
Support for the idea that demonstrative reference involves a close 
connection to the mind-independent object(s) referred to was seen when we 
examined Jackson’s case of Mary the colour scientist. Recall that this case 
involved the brilliant scientist, who knew everything that there was to know 
through testimony about colour and colour experience, yet had lived all her 
life in a monochrome laboratory without access to any phenomenal colour 
experience of her own. Upon leaving the room and seeing colour for herself 
for the first time, the question posed was whether or not this constituted 
Mary learning anything. 
This knowledge would constitute knowledge that could not be derived from 
testimony alone, but that could only come from experience. As we saw, the 
relationalist considers that Mary does learn something: when she sees the 
colour red for the first time, she is acquainted with the colour red for the 
first time, and what it is like to see that colour. Mary learns what it is like to 
see the colour red because she becomes newly acquainted with that colour 
and what it itself is like (i.e. becomes acquainted with its intrinsic properties). 
If this knowledge about red things is afforded her uniquely via her new 
experience, and not available to her via testimony, there is an argument to be 
made that we might expect the content of the knowledge Mary gains to 
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involve a close connection between red things, on the one hand, and the 
phenomenal character of her experience of redness, on the other.334 This 
close connection, it seems, can be captured (perhaps only) by means of a 
demonstrative: Mary now knows that instances of redness are like that 
(demonstrating the phenomenal character of her experience).335 
Some insight into what this contrast in knowledge gained by Mary when she 
sees colour for the first time is provided by Campbell, who writes: 
The contrast between the knowledge you have now, on the basis of a look at the 
objects, and the knowledge you had before of the existence of objects with 
particular functional roles, is that when you see the thing, you are confronted by 
the individual substance itself. On seeing it, you no longer have knowledge of the 
object merely as the postulated occupant of a particular functional role. Your 
experience of the object, when you see it, provides you with knowledge of the 
categorical grounds of the collections of dispositions you had earlier postulated.336 
Upon attending to the actual red objects, then, Mary came to know not only 
her exhaustive body of testimonial knowledge of redness – functional roles 
occupied by the property and things that instantiate it, say – but she came to 
be newly acquainted with the objects that occupy that functional role.  
This acquaintance, it can be argued, is the kind of connection that can be 
captured only by means of a demonstrative, for it is with reference to ‘that 
red thing’, rather than ‘the red thing occupying functional role x’ that Mary 
might newly express about red things. Nevertheless, it is also a result of 
Mary referring to her own experience, in particular to its phenomenal 
character. On the relationalist picture of phenomenal character, to refer to 
phenomenal character of an experience  is to refer to the mind-independent 
objects that it is an experience of, for the latter constitute the former.337  
If what Mary newly learns is accessible to her via the phenomenal character 
of her experience, and the content of the knowledge involves a close 
                                                          
334 See Logue (2012: 229) 
335 Ibid. 
336 Campbell (2002: 115 – 116) 
337 Ibid. (116) 
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connection between that phenomenal character and the object experienced 
capturable only by means of a demonstrative, then we can see how 
relationalism accommodates this so well: the view holds that the referent of 
the demonstrative reference is precisely what constitutes the phenomenal 
character of the experience that enables her to refer to the redness 
demonstratively. 
Having established that relationalism can accommodate the close connection 
to mind-independent objects and experience that demonstrative reference 
involves, let us consider once more the prospect of representationalism for 
accommodating this connection. If it cannot do this, I submit, then the view 
cannot provide an account of how demonstrative reference is possible, and 
so (REL-2) will go through as another es-question to which relationalism but 
not representationalism can provide an eg-answer. 
We saw in Chapter 2 the example of representationalism accounting for my 
experience of a white cup. The example comes from Campbell, who notes 
that if you and I are sitting in exactly similar prison cells looking at exactly 
similar scenes, and each thinking ‘that cup is empty’, then the content of our 
experience is identical; further, since we are by hypothesis looking at 
different cells, scenes and cups – i.e. at different particular objects – neither 
of our perceptions are representing the particular things we are looking at.338 
This squares poorly with the thought that when we each think ‘that cup is 
empty’ we both seem to know which particular cup we are talking about; for 
all that has been said so far, representationalism has not yet provided an 
explanation for our possession of this knowledge. We have seen that 
representationalist efforts to build the capacity for demonstrative reference 
into the story they tell about representational content have resulted in 
accounts where experience of objects pre-supposes our ability to think about 
them, and therefore cannot be appealed to in explaining that capacity.  
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Views that fall prey to this objection include those which attempt to give 
representational contents a ‘demonstrative element’, whereby the reference 
of a demonstrative element is fixed by the context of the perception in which 
it occurs.339 One prospective counterargument to this is that the 
demonstrative element in question should not be taken to be involved in 
thought about the object demonstratively referred to (i.e. the cup), but as 
being some category of perceptual representation that is more basic than 
such thought, i.e. it forms non-conceptual content.340 I shall not rehash the 
concerns with non-conceptual content discussed in Chapter 1, though they 
would apply here too. A further concern relevant to this particular case, 
though, is that shifting the demonstrative element to the domain of non-
conceptual content does not sufficiently heighten the explanatory role it can 
play. This argument has made the demonstrative element itself available to 
the subject by building it in to their subjective life at the level of non-
conceptual content. What fixes the reference of this demonstrative element 
are certain aspects of the context of the perception in which it occurs, and 
these are not made available to the subject on this account. Consequently, 
how the subject can come to have any understanding of what the 
demonstrative element refers to – or even that it refers at all – is arguably 
left wholly opaque on this picture.341 
It has been taken to be the case that representationalism cannot account for 
our capacity to refer demonstratively, largely on the basis that the latter 
involves a close connection to the mind-independent object referred to. For 
the sake of covering all bases, I shall close this line of argument by briefly 
assessing the prospects for the representationalist resisting this conclusion 
by denying that this close connection obtains. We saw in the preceding 
paragraphs problematic representationalist efforts to accommodate our 
capacity for demonstrative reference that jeopardised the connection 
between the subject’s experience and the object demonstratively referred to. 
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The problem with denying that demonstrative reference involves a close 
connection to a particular mind-independent object at all is that it leaves the 
demonstrative reference as a whole without anything onto which to anchor. 
In summary: this approach instead jeopardises the very connection that we 
take demonstrative reference to involve – it is wholly unclear, on this final 
approach, what (if anything) is being demonstrated to at all. There is nothing 
that serves as an anchor that grounds what ‘that object’ actually picks out. 
I have considered in this section the notion of demonstrative reference, 
particularly with respect to the es-question (REL-2): 
(REL-2): What makes demonstrative reference possible? 
I submitted above that if it could be shown that (i) demonstrative reference 
inherently involved a close connection between the subject doing the 
referring and a mind-independent object, and (ii) that relationalism could 
accommodate this connection whilst representationalism could not, that 
(REL-2) would constitute an es-question to which relationalism but not 
representationalism could provide an eg-answer. I take the foregoing to have 
satisfied (i) and (ii), as relationalism can provide an eg-answer via the 
perceptual relation of acquaintance, whilst representationalism seemingly 
cannot accommodate it at all, and denying (i) apparently comes at the price 
of losing the grounding for our capacity for demonstrative reference. I 
conclude, therefore, that (REL-2) is such an es-question. 
 
4.2: The interests of representationalism 
I turn now to identifying an es-question that is eg-answerable by 
representationalism but not by relationalism. In the following section, I shall 
accomplish this by considering non-veridical experience; however, since 
representationalism is primarily a theory of veridical experience, I shall 
attempt now to find such an es-question by considering veridical experience. 
Drawing on Dan Cavedon-Taylor’s (2015), which considers perception of 
187 
 
properties relating to what kind of object that object is classified as (i.e. kind 
properties), I submit that a good candidate es-question is: 
(REP-1): How do subjects of veridical experiences perceive the kind properties of 
mind-independent objects? 
In what remains of this section, I shall provide an outline of the ideas and 
arguments Cavedon-Taylor presents for thinking that addressing the 
question of how we perceive kind properties weighs in on the side of 
representationalism, which I take to constitute an argument against the view 
that relationalists can offer a satisfactory eg-answer to the es-question that 
is now under consideration. 
First, we start with the basic claim  
(KP): subjects can perceptually experience the kind properties of objects.342  
Though perhaps not itself uncontroversial, if we take (KP) for granted, and 
we take representationalism and relationalism to be the two front-running 
theories in the philosophy of perception, and deny their compatibility, then 
a natural question that emerges is to determine which of the two theories 
best accommodates (KP). From here, we have two different adaptations of 
(KP), that differ because of the distinct commitments of relationalism and 
representationalism: 
1) (RepKP): Subjects can visually represent kind properties to be instantiated by objects.343 
2) (RelKP): Subjects can visually detect the kind properties of objects.344 
For relationalism, then, it appears the properties of natural and artefact 
kinds (to unpack the umbrella term of ‘kind properties’, more on this below) 
will need to be such that they are candidates for visual detection, where to 
detect something visually is to become perceptually acquainted with it. 
However, such properties are arguably exceptionally poor candidates for 
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343 Ibid. (492) 
344 Ibid. (494) 
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visual detection. This is because bare visual detection is a direct detection, 
with limited contribution from the subject themselves. The information 
picked up through visual detection is information about the subject’s 
environment that does not rely heavily on subjective mental interpretation 
governed by convention or similar; it is, as it were, information that is wholly 
‘out there in the world’.  Natural kind properties (e.g. ‘being water’), 
meanwhile, are ‘hidden essences’, of the sort that render the object in 
question to be thought of or classified as the object it is; artefactual kind 
properties (e.g. ‘being a guitar’), conversely, are responsive to their creator’s 
intended function for them to serve.  
In each case, it seems, the subject’s interpretive capacities are utilised: one 
must learn to appreciate the various criteria for ‘being water’, though one 
could visually detect ‘that stuff over there’, for example.345 Though there may 
be some theory of natural or artefactual kinds according to which it is viable 
that these sorts of properties can be visually detected (in the sense above), it 
is argued that not only would committing to such theories of kinds 
constitute a high theoretical cost, but also that it remains unclear as to what 
such a theory would look like.346 By way of example, here is Cavedon-Taylor: 
In looking at a doorknob, the relevant properties that make it a doorknob are 
such things as: the property of having been made by a creator with such and such 
intentions, the property of having such-and-such a function, the property of 
having been made in such-and-such a social/cultural context, etc. These are not 
properties to which one can be perceptually related. After all, these properties are, 
themselves, relations to a particular person, a function, and a context.347 
                                                          
345 Natural kinds, and in particular the example of water (as H2O) has been hotly contested at least since 
Putnam (1975). The literature on the topic is massive, and I cannot hope to engage with this separate issue 
here, due to constraints on the scope of the present project. Bird & Tobin (2017) provide an excellent 
introduction to the debate and different views people have on it. With that caveat in place, I commit myself 
without defence in what follows to a certain position on kind properties with which not all parties to the 
debate would agree. Two thoughts: if one objects particularly strongly to this, one can disregard (REP-1), and I 
think my argument as a whole still works; as we shall see, however, the representationalist account of (KP) to 
be considered is compatible with a number of positions on kind properties – including anti-realism – so this 
position is not as weak as it may appear, and I insert the above caveat only for the purposes of transparency. 
346 Ibid. (497) 
347 Ibid. (498) 
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In this example then, the ‘relevant properties’ are just those properties that 
make a doorknob a doorknob – it is just these properties that constitute the 
kind properties of a doorknob, indeed of any doorknob: the properties 
enjoyed by all and only doorknobs. In the case in question, we have 
considerations such as specific function for which doorknobs are made, as 
well as intention with and context in which they are manufactured. As 
Cavedon-Taylor points out, these are not properties to which one can be 
perceptually related in the direct manner involved in visual detection, as 
they are themselves relations to particular functions, people and contexts 
that one does not detect simply by visually detecting the object itself.348 It 
seems, then, that kind properties are not good candidates for visual 
detection and – if relationalism holds that visual perceptual acquaintance is 
a matter visual detection – then (RelKP) seems unattractive.  
Of course, this falls short of assuring us that (RepKP), and with it 
representationalism, fares any better. On the face of it, representationalism 
seems better equipped. This is because the view separates seeing the objects 
in one’s environment on the one hand, and the attribution of properties to 
those objects on the other (i.e. autorepresenting) – the former is a process 
which operates from the outside of the subject inwards; the latter operates 
from within the subject outwards.349  
In this respect, seeing the objects is – as it were – a ‘bottom up’ process, 
where information about the physical environment culminates within the 
subject’s conscious experience of their environment. Conversely, the 
attribution of properties would be a ‘top down’ process, where various 
properties conceived of by the subject are projected outwards and assigned 
to objects in their physical environment. Call this position separatism about 
seeing and attributing properties. In endorsing separatism, then, the 
representationalist successfully severs questions regarding what properties 
                                                          
348 Ibid. (498) 
349 See earlier discussion (§1.3.4) on autorepresentation and allorepresentation for arguments in support of 
my view that representation works this way. 
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the perceiver experiences from questions about the nature and metaphysics 
of those properties.350 
This latter point is quite telling, as it implies that even if there could be some 
theory of kind properties such that they were candidates for visual 
detection, thereby vindicating (RelKP) in the manner described above, to 
embrace (RepKP) is still to tread the path of least resistance. This is due to 
representationalism’s embrace of separatism: no theory of kinds must be 
assumed in order to accommodate the thought that we can perceive kind 
properties – the representationalist interpretation of (KP) is not a matter of 
being related to kind properties (and therefore of having to provide a robust 
account of their metaphysics), but rather is a matter of perceptually 
representing those kind property instances or, in other words, of attributing 
them to mind-independent objects.351 This thought can be drawn out with 
reference to the familiar natural kinds example of water being H2O. Put 
simply, it is flatly a mistake to assume that possession of the concept H2O is 
required for the representationalist to see water as water. Rather, on a 
representationalist account, it is not required in order for that to happen 
that the subject represent water in a distinctly scientific way such as this: 
“[p]ossession, and subsequent activation of, the concept WATER can do the 
job instead.”352 The key point being made here is that whatever way the 
subject understands the kind properties of water, they can autorepresent 
some substance in their environment as instantiating that property, and do 
so without thereby being committed to providing a robust account of the 
metaphysics of these kind properties.  
As a final point, note too that adopting an anti-realist position about the 
kind properties in question still favours the representationalist account of 
(KP) over the relationalist one. This is because if anti-realism about kind 
properties is true – and objects really don’t have those ‘hidden essences’ that 
make them the objects they are – then properties such as ‘being water’ or 






‘being a tomato’ are incapable of instantiation; however, whilst it follows 
from this that they cannot be visually detected (and so (RelKP) comes out 
false) it is still possible for the subject to perceptually attribute kind 
properties to mind-independent objects even though there is de facto (on the 
anti-realist account) no way in which they could ever actually be instantiated 
by those objects.353 Whilst this admittedly would amount to an erroneous 
perceptual experience, this is arguably not of as much consequence as it may 
seem. Cavedon-Taylor again: 
[A]n error-ridden account of KP is no more incoherent than is, say, an error-
ridden view of colour perception, no matter its unattractiveness. By contrast, in 
understanding perceptual experience to be a relation, the naïve realist cannot 
recognise the possibility of an error-ridden theory of KP; for them, KP entails 
commitment to the existence of kind properties themselves, whereas for 
representationalism, KP does not.354 
It is on these bases that the thesis (KP) – that we can perceptually experience 
kind properties of objects – is taken to favour representationalism over and 
above relationalism. Indeed, representationalism looks set to give a better 
account of our experiences in this regard even if an anti-realist approach is 
taken towards kind properties in general. Consequently, I take it that the 
representationalist, though not the relationalist, has at their disposal a 
satisfactory eg-answer to (REP-1).  
Admittedly, the case I have made falls short of suggesting that the 
relationalist cannot possibly provide such an answer, or an objection to the 
foregoing analysis. An instance of the latter that I anticipate is that the 
relationalist may appeal to conceptual registration, as discussed earlier in 
this chapter, and in Chapter 2. The idea being that kind properties involve 
concepts and registration and deployment of these actually is a central part 
of the relationalist picture. Against this, I would reply that I have already 
argued (see §4.1.1) that conceptual registration and the role it plays for 
relationalism strikes me as very similar to representation. If this is so, then I 
                                                          




think the case is there to be made that representationalist apparatus 
apparently plays a fundamental, indispensable role in explaining our 
perceptual experiences. Whilst I am happy to concede this point, the austere 
relationalist should not be. I think this is the case more generally, but if 
relationalists wish to appeal to conceptual registration to accommodate our 
perceptual experiences of kind properties, then I submit that this merely 
strengthens the point. 
Additionally, if the above analysis of the situation is adequately correct and 
comprehensive, then it seems as though efforts to provide an alternative 
relationalist eg-answer to the one I have envisaged would still come at the 
cost of biting a substantial bullet in the form of a theory according to which 
kind properties are candidates for visual detection – a claim which would 
then require some undesirably strict constraints as to the metaphysics of the 
kind properties in question. 
 
4.3: Further examples: non-veridical experiences 
Finally, I wish to discuss both types of non-veridical experiences – illusion 
and hallucination – in order to identify further examples of es-questions 
answerable only by one or the other (but not both) of representationalism or 
relationalism. I shall revisit a point touched on in Chapter 2, pertaining to 
the thresholds for error according to which a given non-veridical experience 
is categorised as either an illusion and hallucination. The point highlighted 
that illusion definitionally involves a misperceived object, but an object 
nonetheless, and maintained that this placed constraints on how erroneous 
an illusory experience could be. By contrast, hallucinations do not do this, as 
there is no mind-independent object appropriately causing the non-veridical 
experience. I think this point plausibly demonstrates an instance of the 




I take it to be fairly uncontroversial on definitional grounds that unlike 
hallucinations, which might be of anything whatsoever, illusions must be 
restricted in some way in how erroneous they can be, due to their object-
involving nature. Furthermore, because relationalism takes seeing to be basic 
– in the sense that successful veridical perception is the foundation of the 
account of experience offered – the view allows a derived account of mere 
appearances to be constructed. If seeing that an object o looks F is a matter 
of standing in a relation to o from a given standpoint c, which are such that 
– to the subject – o appears F on account of standing in this three-place 
relation, then the illusory case can be constructed in a similar way, except 
that o* is such that it appears F despite being G, not F, and this too is due to 
the orientation of o relative to the subject, and to how c as a third relatum 
influences the acquaintance relation that holds between o and the subject.  
In other words, that o* appears F when it is in fact not F but G is accounted 
for because c is such that objects like o*, seen from the subject’s perspective 
within c, look G. One can imagine c involving lighting conditions that cause 
misleading appearances and erroneous colour judgements of cars at night 
under streetlights, for instance, just as one can imagine that spatial 
orientation of the subject and object are such that the subject’s view of 
something salient to the error is occluded. The point is that the error 
involved in illusory experience, whatever it is, is explicable by these facts of 
the situation; the subject’s point of view, or some other fact about objects 
like o* when viewed in c accounts for o* appearing F when it is in fact G. 
Since these facts about the three-place relation involved in an illusory 
experience are taken to wholly explain the illusion, the nature of the error 
committed by the subject of an illusion is wholly answerable to these facts. 
By contrast, a hallucination cannot be explained in this fashion: since the 
experience is not appropriately caused by a mind-independent object, there 
is no three-place relation to serve as the foundation for that sort of account 
of hallucinatory experience. Consequently, the nature of the error committed 
by the hallucinating subject is not wholly answerable to facts about how the 
world is, contrasting with the illusory case. Both of these observations agree 
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with our intuitions about the types of non-veridical experience, based on the 
rudimentary definitions provided of each. 
Another way of putting this insight is that illusion’s world-involving nature 
places a restriction on just how erroneous the experience can be, relative to 
the fact of the matter, before it is rightly classed as a hallucination.355 If the 
foregoing analysis is correct, then relationalism can account for this, and 
thus can provide an answer to the following: 
(REL-3): How do we determine whether an erroneous experience is illusory or 
hallucinatory? 
Conversely, because representationalism treats the way things appear or 
look to be as basic, the strategy of founding an eg-answer to this question by 
deriving an account of the mechanics of illusory experience from the 
mechanics of a more basic account of veridical perception is unavailable to 
its proponent. As a result, the thought goes, they cannot appeal to the 
workings of veridical experience to place the limitations on the error 
involved in a non-veridical experience that are necessary for determining 
whether it is illusory or hallucinatory.356 
To be clear, I am not denying that representationalism can offer an account 
of how things appear to a subject to be – I take it that autorepresentation 
allows the subject themselves to represent things to themselves as being a 
particular way, and it is this particular way that is how things will appear to 
the subject of that experience, irrespective of the veridicality of the 
experience. What I am denying, because this representationalist account of 
appearances is not derived from a separate, more basic account of seeing, is 
that the account in question can provide any limitations on the 
erroneousness of illusory experiences. 
Indeed, since representationalism cashes out both veridical perceptions and 
mere appearances in terms of content, it is not clear exactly to what 
                                                          




theoretical apparatus its proponent can appeal to appropriately restrict the 
degree of error involved in illusory experience of an object, except for 
experiential content357. Presumably, it will need to somehow involve 
representational content. One can imagine a response running along the 
lines of the experiential content of the illusory experience being caused by 
the mind-independent object(s) observed, contending that the content 
involved in this causal relation is the content of a misrepresentation.  
The problem with this approach is that it commits the representationalist to 
explaining how this causal relation alone generates certain errors in the 
experiential content that are compatible with observing the object: in other 
words, the bare relation of causation must account completely for the 
misrepresentation. More plausible, perhaps, is an appeal to whatever mind-
independent object has caused the erroneous experiential content, together 
with the relation this stands in to other worldly states of affairs. The issue 
with this approach is that it is essentially the relationalist story, with the 
added level of experiential content. This makes the inclusion of the latter 
arguably superfluous and unacceptably ad hoc. 
More precisely, adding in the experiential content contributes nothing to the 
explanation: the heavy lifting is still done by the mind-independent objects 
themselves, their surface reflectance properties, lighting conditions in the 
environment, spatial orientation with respect to other objects, and so on. It 
may be the case that the experiential content of any illusion is, as a matter of 
fact, appropriately restricted in order to match closely enough with the 
(mis)perceived mind-independent object for the experience to be classed as 
illusory rather than hallucinatory. If that is what is to be argued, then the 
representationalist must provide an account of this that does not yield to the 
relationalist picture, otherwise the resulting eg-answer cannot be said to be 
representationalist. 
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Representationalism takes content to be a feature of any kind of perceptual 
experience: veridical, illusory or hallucinatory. However, if the above is 
correct, then the view does not seem do the job of outlining how erroneous 
an illusion can be, or of determining where the threshold – in this respect – 
exists between illusion and hallucination. If so, then it can be concluded that 
relationalism, but not representationalism, can provide an eg-answer to (REL-
3). 
However, even if relationalism is plausibly the only theory that can explain 
how some threshold for error might be put in place for illusions, I submit 
that representationalism is the only theory offering an explanation of 
potential subjective indistinguishability between veridical perceptions and 
hallucinations. If this is right, then it also shows how the two views can work 
together by explaining different aspects of non-veridical experiences that we 
would like to be explained. Relationalism alone may be able to explain 
precisely how erroneous a non-veridical experience can be before it is 
classed as a hallucination and not an illusion, whilst representationalism 
alone can provide an illuminating account of why veridical perceptions and 
subjectively indistinguishable hallucinations seem to share a common 
phenomenal character. 
Switching from illusion to hallucination, we discover what I take to be the 
counterpart to the example of the previous paragraphs: representationalism 
provides an eg-answer to an es-question that relationalism does not. The es-
question I have in mind is the following: 
(REP-2): Why are certain hallucinations and veridical perceptions subjectively 
indistinguishable? 
Rather than focusing on the representationalist’s account of hallucination, 
though, it is easier to get this point across by sticking with the relationalist 
account for now. The standard relationalist approach to hallucination, as 
discussed in Chapter 2, is the so-called epistemic account of hallucination. 
According to this account, all there is to say in explaining hallucination at all 
is that one is in a state of perceptual experience such that one cannot know, 
197 
 
by reflection alone, that one is not undergoing the corresponding veridical 
experience. This wholly negative epistemic claim constitutes the most widely 
endorsed metaphysical disjunctivist analysis of hallucination, which is 
appealed to by relationalists because they require a way to resist the 
argument from hallucination, and can find this in a satisfactory account 
which holds that veridical perception and hallucination involve fundamental 
differences in mental state. 
If the negative epistemic claim exhaustively accounts for the phenomenal 
character of hallucination, then all relevant es-questions that we might 
legitimately ask about it (including (REP-2)) must be provided satisfactory eg-
answers by the claim itself, or that which underpins it. As we saw in Chapter 
2, Martin’s claim finds support in the form of the impersonal notion of 
indistinguishability to which the account appeals. Recall that for two 
experiences to be impersonally indistinguishable from one another was for 
them to be utterly incapable of being distinguished, rather than their 
indistinguishability being due to some failing or limitation on the subject. 
Considering (REP-2) and what it asks, an eg-answer shall provide an account 
of why it is that a hallucination and its corresponding veridical perception 
are subjectively indistinguishable. A natural response to this question is that 
it has something to do with the phenomenal character of the hallucination, 
and its relation to the phenomenal character of the corresponding veridical 
perception. A satisfactory eg-answer would also be able to say what it is 
about phenomenal character that renders the two experiences subjectively 
indistinguishable.  
The problem is that Martin’s view cannot appeal to any robust positive 
feature of phenomenal character: neither of the hallucination, as he thinks 
there is none, nor of the corresponding veridical experience, as this would 
not really explain why the two experiences are subjectively indistinguishable. 
Martin has appealed to impersonal indistinguishability in order to account 
for the phenomenal character of hallucinations (see §2.4.1), yet doing this 
here would beg the question, for (REP-2) stipulates that the subjective 
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indistinguishability of the two experiences is exactly what the eg-answer 
should be explaining!  
If this is correct, then Martin’s metaphysical disjunctivist account seemingly 
cannot provide an adequate eg-answer to (REP-2). Representationalism, by 
contrast, will simply appeal to the common factor approach it advocates 
when considering hallucinations and corresponding veridical perceptions, 
arguing that both experiences share phenomenal character because both 
experiences share content, which is the result of successful representation in 
the good case and of misrepresentation in the bad case. In this way, (REP-2) 
is a legitimate es-question to which the popular relationalist account of 
hallucination – Martin’s metaphysical disjunctivism – cannot provide a 
satisfactory eg-answer, whereas representationalism can. 
There are potentially ways for the relationalist to avoid this unfortunate 
outcome for their view regarding (REP-2). If they can provide an alternative 
account of hallucination, then they will not by necessity be committed to the 
problematic outcome that Martin’s disjunctivism is. Such alternatives would 
have to be shown to provide an eg-answer to (REP-2), however, and would 
need to be such that they weren’t inherently problematic. I will now examine 
two such alternatives, discussed earlier in Chapter 2. The first is the 
alternative metaphysical disjunctivism advanced by Fish; the second is 
McDowellian epistemological disjunctivism.358 
Recall that Fish’s view was such that philosophers’ hallucinations (those 
mundane hallucinations that are subjectively indistinguishable from 
counterpart veridical perceptions) lack phenomenal character, and explains 
their apparent possession of it in terms of false beliefs founded upon 
corresponding veridical perceptions, and the phenomenal character 
possessed by the latter experiences. It seems that this view, on the face of it, 
is in a position to provide an eg-answer to (REP-2). The eg-answer will 
essentially involve the cognitive effects of the hallucination in the manner 
outlined in the articulation of the view. Certain veridical perceptions and 
                                                          
358 See Fish (2009) and McDowell (1982), as discussed in Chapter 2 (§2.4.1 and §2.4.2 respectively). 
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hallucinations are subjectively indistinguishable because subjects of the 
hallucinations form the mistaken belief that they are having an experience 
with phenomenal character, and the phenomenal character they think their 
experience has is just the phenomenal character that the counterpart 
veridical perception would have. 
We also saw some problems with the view, however. In the first instance, 
Fish’s account is committed to upholding the seems/is distinction for 
phenomenal character. Generally, if what an experience is subjectively like 
for me is p, then p is the phenomenal character of that experience. Fish’s 
eliminativism about phenomenal character for hallucinations flies in the face 
of this. More pressingly, we saw that once the philosophical conception of 
hallucination is understood as including philosophers’ hallucinations, drug-
induced hallucinations and hallucinations of impossible figures, the view 
leads to an intolerable disunity in accounting for different types of 
hallucination.  
As a result of this, it is arguable that the view is not satisfactory due to 
inherent flaws. Consequently, even if it can provide an eg-answer to (REP-2), 
these flaws prevent it from serving as a satisfactory account of hallucination 
for independent reasons. Moreover, those independent reasons quickly 
signpost other potential es-questions to which the view could not provide a 
satisfactory eg-answer, such as ‘how can we hallucinate impossible figures?’. 
The final way for the relationalist to provide an eg-answer to (REP-2) is to 
drop metaphysical disjunctivism as the account of hallucination, and to 
accept epistemological disjunctivism instead. Recall that both of these 
accounts involve the claim that one is in a different epistemic state when one 
is hallucinating than one is in when veridically perceiving.359 Metaphysical 
disjunctivism develops the epistemic claim in various ways, and then 
concludes that that is all there is to say about the phenomenology of 
hallucination. Epistemological disjunctivism does not make this 
commitment. In this respect, the door is open for some view or other to 
                                                          
359 See §2.4.2. 
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provide an eg-answer to (REP-2) on the basis of epistemological 
disjunctivism. 
I am sympathetic to this approach, yet only because I think it allows a 
pleasing story to be told about hallucination that involves both relationalism 
and representationalism. Epistemological disjunctivism is an account of the 
epistemic aspect of hallucination. Whilst this leaves the phenomenology free 
to be explained by one’s preferred view, epistemological disjunctivism itself 
does not have such ambitious goals. I surveyed in §2.4.1 and in the 
preceding paragraphs other wholly relationalist efforts to account for the 
phenomenology of hallucination, and have found them to be inadequate. 
Representationalism, conversely, has always been able to answer (REP-2) by 
appealing to representational content. Since epistemological disjunctivism 
makes no claim about the phenomenology of hallucination, it seems that the 
two are not inherently incompatible, and a hybrid theory of sorts might 
allow the relationalist to provide an eg-answer to (REP-2). 
Of course, the view that falls out of this accepts that relationalism and 
representationalism are indeed compatible. An application of modus tollens 
informs us that austere relationalists are therefore unlikely to accept the 
view suggested. I have surveyed Fish’s account of hallucination, and have 
argued that it cannot be relied upon due to inherent flaws which, if one does 
utilise it to generate an eg-answer to (REP-2), merely serve to indicate 
alternative es-questions that the view cannot answer. I have also evaluated 
Martin’s metaphysical disjunctivism, which is also relied upon by other 
relationalists, such as Brewer.360 This view also was unable to provide an eg-
answer to (REP-2), because on the one hand his view cannot by its own lights 
appeal to any positive feature of hallucinatory phenomenology, and on the 
other hand a satisfactory eg-answer to (REP-2) cannot appeal baldly to 
subjective indistinguishability, as that is precisely what we are trying to 
explain. If all of the above is correct, it can be concluded that 
                                                          
360 Brewer (2011: 109) 
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representationalism is the only theory of perception in the vicinity that can 
provide a satisfactory eg-answer to (REP-2). 
If the rather large number of arguments and ideas considered in this chapter 
have fallen into place successfully, then I take it to have been shown that 
there exist at least several es-questions, such that with regard to 
representationalism and relationalism, each can be offered a satisfactory eg-
answer by only one of these theories, but not by both. On the side favouring 
relationalism, we have: 
(REL-1): How does experience provide the perceiving subject with conclusive reasons for 
applying certain empirical concepts in judging their environment as being a particular way?, 
(REL-2): What makes demonstrative reference possible?, and 
(REL-3): How do we determine whether an erroneous experience is illusory or 
hallucinatory? 
On the side favouring representationalism, meanwhile, we have: 
(REP-1): How do subjects of veridical experiences perceive the kind properties of 
mind-independent objects?, and 
(REP-2): Why are certain hallucinations and veridical perceptions subjectively 
indistinguishable? 
In the broader dialectic, this would mean that relationalism and 
representationalism, qua overall explanations of perceptual experience, are 
such that each explanation offers something that the other does not. As I 
shall show in Chapter 5, this will be extremely important in arguing that 
relationalism and representationalism are complementary explanations of 






5: On Complementary Explanations 
 
In Chapter 3, I argued that we should understand explanations as consisting 
in relations of explanation-seeking questions (es-questions) and explanation-
giving answers (eg-answers). I have supported the methodology of 
explanatory pluralism, according to which there are no rules of preference or 
exclusion for explanations that are based on the types of explanation they 
are. Rather, once we identify an explanation as an eg-answer to some es-
question, we find that the es-question (possibly with some refinement) 
indicates the explanatory interests of the inquirer. These, in turn, provide 
the necessary context within which to evaluate explanations for which is to 
be preferred and which is to be excluded. The eg-answer which proves most 
illuminating relative to the context determined by these explanatory 
interests simply is the one to be preferred, according to explanatory 
pluralism. I presented cases where such an approach is motivated in other 
disciplines, and then considered the prospective merits and motivations for 
applying it in the philosophy of perception. 
Then, in the immediately preceding chapter, I utilised this explanatory 
pluralist methodology and es-question/eg-answer framework for 
explanations in the relationalism versus representationalism debate to 
identify certain legitimate es-questions – ones to which we would plausibly 
want eg-answers to be given by our philosophical theory of perception. 
These es-questions were such that of the two theories of perception under 
discussion, only one of them could provide an eg-answer. I argued that 
multiple es-questions of this nature could be found that favoured each 
theory, claiming that these es-questions would be of paramount importance 
to my efforts to reconcile relationalism and representationalism. 
Now that I have identified these es-questions, I am in a position to construct 
my argument against the monist position that relationalism and 
representationalism are incompatible. This will be done by observing ways in 
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which allegedly competing explanations might interact. In particular, I will 
discuss the notion of explanations being complementary to one another in 
various ways. Following Marchionni, I will spend the first half of this chapter 
elucidating precisely what it means and what it takes for explanations to be 
either strongly complementary or weakly complementary. Thereafter, I will 
utilise the es-questions identified in Chapter 4 to support my argument that 
relationalism and representationalism are complementary explanations. In 
particular, it will be argued that these es-questions support a view which 
holds that they are strongly complementary explanations – in that their 
integration results in a better explanation overall – but in which the notion 
of weakly complementary explanations (to be defined in the following 
section) still plays a vital role. 
 
5.1: Strongly and weakly complementary explanations 
The notion of complementary explanations to be used in what follows would 
benefit from being elucidated precisely at the outset. Following Marchionni, I 
distinguish between two sorts of ways in which a pair of explanations can be 
complementary: 
Weakly complementary: Two explanations of the same phenomenon are (i) 
legitimate explanations of that phenomenon, (ii) autonomous, and (iii) are 
complementary in virtue of possessing different explanatory virtues. 
Strongly complementary: Two explanations of the same phenomenon are (a) 
legitimate explanations of that phenomenon, (b) each possess different 
explanatory virtues, and (c) when integrated, they provide a better explanation 
(in the sense of making more complete or enhancing the explanatory virtues of 
the individual explanations).361 
There are three claims being made in the definition of each sort of 
complementary explanation, which I shall now briefly elaborate upon. The 
first condition on being either sort of complementary explanation is that 
                                                          
361 Marchionni (2008: 315); I have adapted the definitions offered in the original for the sake of clarity on what 
is to follow.  
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each of the explanations of the same phenomenon be a legitimate 
explanation of that phenomenon. By this, I simply mean that each offers a 
satisfactory eg-answer to an es-question that falls within the explanatory 
interests of those wishing to understand that phenomenon.  
I now address the remaining conditions in turn. For weakly complementary 
explanations, the second condition is that the pair of explanations are 
autonomous. What is meant by this is simply that the explanations are not 
integrated, and proceed as standalone explanations. This could be because 
there is nothing to be gained from integrating them into one single 
explanation. A pair of explanations could remain autonomous because they 
each offer a different eg-answer to the same es-question. In this respect, the 
two explanations would offer competing answers. According to the 
explanatory pluralist methodology I am employing, which eg-answer is to be 
preferred will depend upon the inquirer’s explanatory interests. Importantly, 
as I shall argue later, a pair of explanations offering competing eg-answers 
like this does not entail that the explanations as a whole are in competition, 
and so does not preclude their being complementary, or even compatible. 
The third condition requires more unpacking. Before doing so, it is worth 
clarifying some terminology. What I will be considering here are explanations 
of the same phenomenon which are complementary. The single phenomenon 
is perception. The explanations in question are relationalism and 
representationalism. Each of these explanations consists of a set of eg-
answers to a multitude of fine-grained es-questions about perception. Taking 
this set of eg-answers together results in an eg-answer to a more coarse-
grained es-question about perception, such as ‘what is the nature of 
perception?’ or ‘what philosophical account of perception should we give?’ 
I return to the third condition on weakly complementary explanations. In the 
first instance, it states that weakly complementary explanations possess 
different explanatory virtues. I take an explanatory virtue to be a property of 
an explanation or theory: if the explanation or theory is admirable in view of 
(a) its explaining something that another view cannot, or in view of (b) 
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explaining something in a particular way, then it possesses an explanatory 
virtue in this respect. The precise nature of explanatory virtues involved in 
satisfying (a) will depend on the particular explanations involved. Examples 
of the explanatory virtues involved in (b) are traits of explanations as a 
whole, such as breadth or depth. Breadth is concerned with unifying and 
accounting for several explananda via their commonalities; for instance, if 
representationalism offers an eg-answer that encompasses several es-
questions (in the way that it offers representation as accounting for 
phenomenological aspects of both veridical and non-veridical experiences, 
say), it may be said to possess greater breadth, relative to this explanatory 
interest, than relationalism. Depth, conversely, is concerned with 
understanding a single explanandum by appeal to what sets it apart or 
distinguishes it from others; in this respect, an explanation may involve 
greater depth if the eg-answer it offers to a single es-question is more 
comprehensive and really gets to the heart of the matter.362 An instance of 
this could arguably be relationalism offering an account of perceptual 
epistemology of veridical perception that gets to the heart of the matter by 
centrally involving mind-independent objects, in a way that representation 
does not. These are just examples; what is important to note presently is 
that the first of these involves comparison, whilst the second involves 
contrast.363 
Moreover, the thought is that these explanatory virtues (in line with the 
autonomy condition) are – if not mutually exclusive – such that they trade 
off against one another. As I understand this, what is meant is that if we had 
a pair of explanations e1 and e2, and suppose that they possess different 
explanatory virtues (say breadth and depth), then they are such that either 
(1) each one of them possesses all and only one of these explanatory virtues 
(i.e. the explanatory virtues are mutually exclusive with respect to these 
explanations), or (2) they each possess a mixture of breadth and depth, but 
are such that opting for e1 will, say, involve a greater amount of explanatory 
                                                          
362 Ibid. (319 – 320) 
363 Ibid. (317) 
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breadth than depth, whilst opting for e2 will yield a greater amount of 
explanatory depth and a lesser amount of explanatory breadth than is 
yielded by opting for e1 (or vice versa), relative to explanatory interests. 
It is worth noting that breadth and depth, as I define them above, are merely 
examples of explanatory virtues. What would now be helpful is to set the 
notion of explanatory virtues into the context in which I will be discussing 
them in what follows. In terms of our preceding es-question/eg-answer 
framework, establishing that two explanations possess different explanatory 
virtues is, I argue, achieved by demonstrating that each offers a satisfactory 
eg-answer to distinct es-questions. 
The reason for placing importance on the es-questions being distinct, rather 
than simply the eg-answers, is that we are considering explanations of the 
same phenomenon – perception – which are complementary. The 
explanations in question are relationalism and representationalism, and each 
of these consists of eg-answers to a multitude of es-questions. If 
explanations simply produced different eg-answers to the same es-questions 
across the board, then the argument could be made that they are simply 
competing explanations. Note that this is not the same as maintaining that 
relationalism and representationalism are autonomous. Autonomy merely 
requires that they are not integrated, possibly because they offer competing 
eg-answers to some es-question(s). Maintaining that they are wholly 
competing explanations, on my account, requires that at least one of them 
must offer competing eg-answers to all es-questions that the other attempts 
to answer. I shall discuss this in greater detail below. 
The remaining definitions pertain to strongly complementary explanations. 
The first of these states that the pair of explanations once more must 
possess different explanatory virtues, just as weakly complementary 
explanations do. The final condition is what separates strongly from weakly 
complementary explanations, and stipulates firstly that the explanations can 
be integrated (contra weakly complementary explanations), and that this 
integration leads to an enhancement in explanatory virtue (again, contra 
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weakly complementary explanations, whereby the explanatory virtues trade 
off against each other). One important example that is identified in 
Marchionni’s work is that the integrated explanation could be more complete 
as a result, but in general the thought is simply that the explanatory virtues 
possessed by one of the explanations do not come at the expense of those 
possessed by the other, and in some respect the overall integrated 
explanation is possessing of some explanatory virtue that the unintegrated 
explanations do not.  
Marchionni applies this strongly/weakly complementary distinction to 
explanations in the social sciences, yet there is nothing within the distinction 
as defined above that prevents it from being adapted and applied to 
explanations in other fields, such as the philosophy of perception. It is 
precisely this that constitutes my goal for the remainder of this chapter. 
First, however, there are a couple of other distinctions and pieces of 
terminology that Marchionni draws upon in her analysis of complementary 
explanations, and these must now be introduced. 
The first of these is the distinction between micro- and macro-explanations. 
Though this distinction is, strictly speaking, one which will only obtain 
properly in explanatory enterprises similar to the social sciences, there 
nevertheless remains good cause for explicating the distinction here, as 
more than one element of its machinery will prove useful in what follows. To 
be precise: the term ‘micro-explanations’ is reserved solely as a way of 
characterising explanations which operate “exclusively in terms of 
individuals and their intentions”; conversely, the term ‘macro-explanations’ 
refers to explanations which operate “exclusively in terms of macro-
aggregates or social structures.”364 Explanations that are neither micro- nor 
macro-explanations, states Marchionni, are called “mixed” explanations.365 
                                                          




With this distinction in place, it is possible to introduce a ‘visualisation of 
possibilities’ for allegedly competing explanations: 
1) Macro-explanations are better explanations [than micro-explanations; or vice versa]. 
2) The macro- and micro-explanation are strongly complementary: they are legitimate 
explanations that possess different explanatory virtues and are such that, when 
integrated, they produce a better explanation. 
3) The macro- and micro-explanations are weakly complementary: they are legitimate 
explanations that possess different explanatory virtues, but are autonomous to the 
extent that each is a standalone explanation, the explanatory virtues of which are 
either mutually exclusive or trade off against one another. 
With this range of possibilities in mind, it is then concluded – much in the 
spirit of explanatory pluralism – that “which [complementary] explanation is 
preferred in a given context depends on what first motivates the explanatory 
enquiry.”366  
In order to illustrate how this works, Marchionni utilises an example – due to 
Jackson and Pettit – on explanations of rising crime rate statistics: 
The phenomenon to be explained is an increase in the crime rate. The macro-
explanation explains it by citing an increase in the level of unemployment. The 
micro-explanation describes the precise changes of opportunities and motivations 
of specific individuals that led to a rise in the crime rate. The macro-explanation 
focuses on the similarities between the actual world and other possible worlds in 
which the crime rate increased, and tells us that under a wide range of individual-
level circumstances and psychological profiles, the rise in unemployment ensures 
that the crime rate increases. The micro-explanation instead describes the actual 
causal process, and thereby focuses on the differences between the way in which 
the crime rate actually increased and the other possible ways in which it could 
have increased. Switching from information to questions, the macro-explanation 
is an adequate explanation for a coarse-grained explanandum such as ‘why did 
the crime rate increase rather than decrease or remain the same?,’ whereas the 
micro-explanation is an adequate explanation for a much more specific object of 
explanation, ‘why did the crime rate increase exactly as it did rather than in 
another slightly different way?’ Because the macro-explanation abstracts away 




from the specific details of the particular increase in the crime rate, it is broader 
or more unified than the corresponding micro-explanation. To see this, consider 
the case in which we have two regions both experiencing a rise in the crime rate 
as a result of an increase in the level of unemployment (and further suppose that 
the unemployment-crime relation is a stable regularity). The unemployment 
explanation provides a unified explanation of the two occurrences, whereas the 
micro-accounts in terms of particular changes of opportunities and motivations 
are extremely different in the two cases.367 
In the manner outlined in the preceding chapter, then, we see here that 
different explanations can be offered for what at a sufficiently coarse 
level of grain looks to be – and can be described as – the same es-
question, yet on closer inspection and at a finer level of grain are in fact 
distinct es-questions. Both the macro- and micro-explanations from the 
above example might be treated as answers to the coarse-grained es-
question ‘why did the crime rate increase?’. As the example goes on to 
illustrate, however, the eg-answers offered by the macro- and micro-
explanations more specifically correspond respectively to the es-
questions ‘why did the crime rate increase rather than decrease or stay 
the same?’ and ‘why did the crime rate increase as it did rather than in 
another slightly different way?’. A reason for this disparity can be 
uncovered by being attentive to how exactly one arrives at micro- and 
macro-explanations respectively: 
Macro-explanations [. . .] provide ‘modally comparative information’: they focus 
‘on similarities between the actual world and other possible worlds; it takes us to a 
distance at which we can discern constancies across the actual way things are 
and the way things might have been.’ Micro-explanations [. . .] provide ‘modally 
contrastive information’: they focus ‘on the differences between the actual world 
and other possible worlds’ it homes in [on] the particularities of the actual case.’368 
In other words, providing a modally comparative explanation of an 
event or phenomenon involves examining other possible worlds that 
feature the same event or phenomenon and seeking commonalities 
                                                          
367 Ibid. (318 – 319) 
368 Ibid. (317); the notions of modally comparative information and modally contrastive information, which are 
applied to macro- and micro-explanations respectively, are discussed more fully in Jackson & Pettit (1992). 
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(which, in theory, may likely account for the occurrence) between these 
other possible worlds and the actual world. Modally contrastive 
explanations of an event of phenomenon, on the other hand, are 
formulated by examining other possible worlds where the event or 
phenomenon could have happened but didn’t, and analysing the 
specific differences between these worlds and the actual world. With all 
of this laid out, we can see why it might be suggested that “modally 
contrastive information is given when the object of the explanation is 
described at a very fine grain, and modally comparative information 
when the object of explanation is coarser grained.”369 After all, modally 
contrastive information is mapped on to micro-explanations, as these 
provide eg-answers in terms of individuals and their intentions, which 
are themselves modally contrastive; conversely, modally comparative 
information is mapped onto macro-explanations, which abstract to a 
sufficient distance for allowing the discerning of constancies holding 
across individual differences that may obtain at a finer-grained level. 
A point of key importance here, though, is that neither the micro- nor the 
macro-explanation is intrinsically better than the other, and each has its own 
selling points. The macro-explanation, for instance, is broad or unified, as in 
theory it demonstrates connections and common patterns in a manner 
supporting – in the spirit of Kitcher (1981) – the claim that “abstracting from 
the details of causal mechanisms can increase explanatory power.”370 The 
micro-explanation, meanwhile, offers a deep explanation that looks to 
expose “the inner workings of the relevant causal mechanism”, a feature 
which would render the micro-explanation the favourable choice if an 
explanation were to be valued – in line with the view of explanation offered 
by Salmon (1998) – solely upon how well it opens up ‘black boxes’ and shows 
their inner workings.371 To clarify these explanatory virtues slightly: the 
broad explanation is providing modally comparative information, in the 
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sense that it focuses on making comparisons between the actual world and 
other possible worlds in which the same phenomenon occurs; in contrast, 
the deep explanation is providing modally contrastive information, in the 
sense that it focuses on differences obtaining between how the phenomenon 
to be explained might have occurred, and how it actually occurred.  
In a manner familiar from the preceding chapter on the workings of 
explanatory pluralism, however, neither of these types of explanation are 
such that there is a principled decision procedure for either favouring or 
excluding either one of them; instead, the pluralist stance is adopted and – 
with respect to the distinction between broad and deep explanations just 
outlined, it is contested that “which [explanation] we prefer in a given 
context depends on whether we are interested in breadth or depth.”372 
Having outlined Marchionni’s conception of complementary explanations,   
the ways in which competing explanations might interact with one another, 
and how this fits together with how explanations can be evaluated and 
selected as preferred explanations, all that remains to be done in this section 
is to draw the reader’s attention to the fact that, in what follows, the account 
I offer is designed to remain for the most part as ecumenical as possible viz. 
how some individual explanations are evaluated as better than others in 
terms of how well they address es-questions rendered salient by the 
inquirer’s explanatory interests. Different explanatory interests will render 
different es-questions salient, and therefore would render as better 
explanations those that may not be considered as so relative to different 
explanatory interests. What I argue this means is that there will be various 
ways of answering es-questions about perception, that broadly adhere to the 
tenets of explanatory pluralism, and are features of the complementary 
explanations relationalism and representationalism.  
The exact respect in which the latter wind up being complementary – i.e. 
strongly or weakly, and why – will depend on whether the explanations are 
to be integrated or not. I contend that they should be, and that doing so will 
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result in an overall account of perception that is more complete than the 
unintegrated explanations. In this respect, I will be concluding that 
relationalism and representationalism are strongly complementary, and shall 
defend this position below. Overall, the finding that relationalism and 
representationalism are strongly complementary entails that the two are 
compatible after all, as it overcomes the screening off objection used to 
uphold the opposite conclusion. 
In the following section, I will utilise the apparatus identified in this section 
in order to clarify how an explanatory pluralist methodology can be applied 
to the relationalism versus representationalism debate. This will provide a 
solution to the apparent tension between the allegedly competing 
explanations which maintains that, rather than being competing 
explanations, the two are in fact complementary explanations. 
 
5.2: The Argument from Complementary Explanations 
Recall that the screening-off objections, according to which a theory can be 
screened off as explanatorily redundant by another have, as part of their 
integral workings, the following premise: 
Explanatory Redundancy: If x explains everything that needs to be explained, then y is 
explanatorily redundant. 
where the variables are assigned either relationalism or representationalism, 
as the structure of the argument is itself neutral on which theory is 
preferred. It is this premise that is needed to get proponents of either 
austere view who wish to utilise the Screening Off Argument from the 
premise that their theory explains everything that we want a philosophical 
theory of perception to explain, to the premise that the allegedly opposing 
view is screened off as explanatorily redundant. The thought is that a 
screening off objection could be used by either austere relationalists or 
austere representationalists. It is this premise that I wish to resist, and I 
shall do so by illustrating that there are two readings of it, only one of which 
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would get the austere theorist to the conclusion they seek (i.e. that the 
competing view is explanatorily redundant), and then arguing – via what I am 
calling the argument from complementary explanations – that this one 
reading is such that it renders the above premise, Explanatory Redundancy, 
false (or a true but unsatisfied conditional) irrespective of which way round 
relationalism and representationalism are assigned to its variables. 
My first task, then, is to elucidate the two readings of Explanatory 
Redundancy in question, and to show why one of these readings is not 
sufficient for establishing the conclusion of the Screening Off Argument. The 
distinction between readings that I have in mind pertains to the 
interpretation of ‘explains everything that needs to be explained’; in 
particular, it hinges on what exactly ‘everything’ is taken to be quantifying 
over. If we accept the reasonably uncontroversial claim that there are 
multiple aspects of perception that a philosopher of perception has interests 
in explaining, then the following two readings, I suggest, are plausible: 
Interest-dependent: ‘Everything’ is restricted to certain explanatory interests / 
aspect of perception (e.g. the phenomenal aspects of perception – the subjective 
phenomenology of experience). 
Interest-independent: ‘Everything’ is unrestricted as far as any legitimate 
explanandum in the philosophy of perception is concerned (so on this reading 
for theory x to explain everything is for theory x to offer an explanans that 
covers all legitimate explananda in the philosophy of perception). 
With this distinction between readings carved out, the problem for 
proponents of the austere relational and representational views, I suggest, is 
that the interest-dependent reading makes Explanatory Redundancy at best a 
false conditional. On the assumption that relationalism/representationalism 
merely explains everything that needs to be explained relative to certain (i.e. 
not all) explanatory interests of the philosophy of perception, e.g. explaining 
the epistemological aspect of perceptual experience, then it is simply false 
that the consequent of Explanatory Redundancy follows.373 This is because 
                                                          
373 It might be contended that the assumption in this sentence can be rejected, but no austere theorist would 
reject this assumption regarding their own view, for this would entail that the theory under consideration 
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whatever theory the austere theorist wishes to establish as being 
explanatorily redundant may provide the most suitable eg-answer to a 
distinct yet equally legitimate es-question – or even to most or all of the 
remaining es-questions – and at this point it is false that the theory is 
explanatorily redundant. Consequently, it looks as though the proponents of 
austere views, if they wish to utilise a screening off objection, need to 
substantiate the interest-independent reading of Explanatory Redundancy.  
The problem with establishing the interest-independent reading, I will argue, 
is that the antecedent then becomes much more difficult to satisfy and, 
consequently, even though the conditional claim of the premise comes out 
true and the argument as a whole is valid on this reading (which I take it to 
be), it fails to be sound as the further required premise – to the effect that 
the antecedent of Explanatory Redundancy is satisfied – turns out to be 
false. In this section, I will argue that relationalism and representationalism 
are explanations which – although traditionally taken to be competing with 
one another – are in fact strongly complementary, and therefore Explanatory 
Redundancy is only a true conditional on the interest-independent reading in 
virtue of having a false antecedent, thus allowing the overall argument 
supporting the Screening Off Argument to be overcome due to lack of 
soundness. 
In order to establish that relationalism and representationalism offer 
complementary explanations, I adapt the ‘visualisation of possibilities’ 
offered by Marchionni regarding ways in which allegedly competing 
explanations might interact: 
1) Relationalism/representationalism is the better explanation. 
                                                          
offered an explanation that addressed none of the es-questions pertinent to a philosophical account of 
perception successfully, which would be tantamount to arguing that their own view was itself explanatorily 
redundant. Of course, they may reject this assumption regarding the other austere view, however this is not 
only exceptionally uncharitable but, as we will see, will commit them to the unpalatable position that what 
appear to be perfectly legitimate concerns in the philosophy of perception are not in need of explanation. 
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2) Relationalism and representationalism are strongly complementary 
explanations: both are legitimate explanations, which possess different 
explanatory virtues and, when integrated, they produce a better explanation. 
3) Relationalism and representationalism are weakly complementary 
explanations: both are legitimate explanations, are autonomous, and are 
such that they possess different explanatory virtues which trade off against 
one another. 
4) Neither relationalism nor representationalism offers a satisfactory 
explanation. 
Here, (1) obtaining involves declaring one theory or the other as outright 
explanatorily superior, to the detriment of the other, in the manner argued 
for by proponents of the austere theories, be they relationalists or 
representationalists. Most efforts to substantiate this claim involve an appeal 
to Explanatory Redundancy, as articulated above, however it should be noted 
that (1) may also be established if either relationalism or representationalism 
turns out to be untenable due to internal problems with the theory. (2) and 
(3) respectively claim that relationalism and representationalism offer 
explanations that are strongly or weakly complementary; I shall argue that 
(2) is most applicable to relationalism and representationalism, though (3) 
will also play a role in my overall account. In particular, I will maintain that 
the explanations offered by relationalism and representationalism as 
complete theories turn out to be strongly complementary, and submit that 
this suggests a reconciliatory view in the philosophy of perception is to be 
preferred to its austere counterparts. There will, on my account, be parts of 
the overall explanations offered by relationalism and representationalism 
that turn out to be weakly complementary. As we saw above when discussing 
what it was for two explanations to be weakly complementary, one of the 
conditions of this is that they must be autonomous (i.e. not integrated). I 
have argued that, though equally true for the case of representationalism 
and relationalism, this is not as damning for the enterprise of finding a 
reconciliatory view of perception as one might think, as it is importantly 
different to the claim that they are wholly competing explanations. Though 
(4) has no analogue in the visualisation of possibilities for competing micro- 
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and macro-explanations considered by Marchionni, I add it in here for the 
sake of exhaustively considering potential interactions between allegedly 
competing explanations. I shall now turn to considering what conditions 
must be met in order for each of (1) – (4) to be true. 
Starting with (1), we have two ways of establishing this: 
1a) Relationalism or representationalism is subject to Explanatory Redundancy. 
1b) Relationalism or representationalism is inherently untenable. 
We saw above that satisfaction of (1a) only achieves its goal if Explanatory 
Redundancy is read in its interest-independent form. In order to satisfy the 
antecedent of this reading of Explanatory Redundancy, recall, relationalism 
or representationalism must offer an explanans that covers all legitimate 
explananda in the philosophy of perception. With the outcome of the 
previous chapter in mind, I argue that this does not seem plausible for either 
view. The reason for this is that the five es-questions I identified over the 
course of that chapter ((REL-1), (REL-2), (REL-3), (REP-1) and (REP-2)) were 
instances where one theory could provide a satisfactory eg-answer to them, 
whilst the other could not. In these cases, the opposing theory seems to not 
provide an explanans to a legitimate explanandum in the philosophy of 
perception at all. If this applies to each of these es-questions, then I do not 
think the austere forms of relationalism or representationalism can satisfy 
(1a). 
It may be objected at this point that, for instance, the austere relationalist 
may hold that (REP-1) or (REP-2) does not latch on to legitimate explananda, 
because the explananda in question simply are not legitimate, and so my 
argument does not go through. I think this is misguided. We saw in Chapter 
4 that the es-questions under consideration were perfectly intelligible, and 
involve phenomena that do seem to occur, and which we would like our 




More promisingly, the austere theorist can concede the legitimacy of the 
explananda, whilst holding that their view does provide the correct 
explanans, and that the latter is deflationary or error-theoretic in nature. 
Though a more promising strategy, part of my analysis in Chapter 4 of each 
of these es-questions involved examining and assessing putative eg-answers 
offered by the opposing theory. In each case where this occurred, we saw 
that the latter were not satisfactory eg-answers to the es-question being 
considered. For example, my analysis of (REL-1) (which was about experience 
providing conclusive reasons) considered potential representationalist 
responses, none of which were satisfactory; my analysis of (REP-2) (on 
subjective indistinguishability of hallucinations and corresponding veridical 
perceptions) considered several relationalist accounts of hallucination, all of 
which were found wanting. Whilst it may be true, therefore, that the 
opposing theories do provide an eg-answers to some of these es-questions, 
such eg-answers were found to be unsatisfactory across the board. Being 
satisfactory, I take it, is a plausible desideratum without which this form of 
response loses efficacy, and so I take this type of response to my above 
argument to be ineffective, and (1a) is not satisfied by either austere view. 
I turn now to (1b), which holds in the event that relationalism or 
representationalism is viewed as inherently untenable. This may be 
concluded if either view is internally inconsistent, or if it can be argued that 
one view or the other entails commitment to intolerably problematic 
consequences. Note that (1b) – were it to apply to both relationalism and 
representationalism – results in (4), according to which neither view offers a 
satisfactory explanation. For this reason, I will take the following argument 
to apply to (1b) and to most ways in which (4) might be satisfied. I also take 
this to be a suitable point of departure from the austere theories: perhaps 
these possibilities do spell real trouble for austere relationalism and austere 
representationalism, but as neither of those is the view I am seeking to 
defend, I do not assume their respective positions in what follows. 
Instead, the view I defend can – and does – appeal to those parts of the 
austere theories that are rightly considered to be their real strengths: the eg-
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answers offered to the es-questions listed at the end of Chapter 4. A 
corollary to this, as we saw in identifying those es-questions, is that the view 
is not committed to appealing to weaker aspects of either theory. In short: a 
reconciliatory view can pick and choose which parts of relationalism or 
representationalism it wants to accept and – more importantly at this point – 
can choose which weaker parts it wants to avoid. Consequently, for my 
purposes, the satisfaction of (1b) or even (4) by the explanations offered by 
austere relationalism or austere representationalism doesn’t matter. This 
outcome does not entail any problem whatsoever for a reconciliatory 
account. Indeed, areas where the austere theories look to be intolerably weak 
may prove just as effective in outlining the correct articulation of a 
reconciliatory view as areas in which the austere theories look particularly 
strong. If one can pick and choose parts from either theory, the challenge 
becomes to identify areas where one must appeal to one or the other. Here, 
intolerable weakness seems just as viable an indicator as overwhelming 
strength. 
I take the above to have addressed the possibilities of (1a), (1b), and most 
ways of satisfying (4). There is one way in which (4) may be satisfied that has 
not been addressed, and that is if a theory that is wholly different from 
representationalism and relationalism (i.e. not identical to, or made up of 
parts of them) was proposed, and this theory highlighted some hitherto 
unrecognised explanandum in the philosophy of perception that was 
sufficiently important that any theory that failed to offer an explanans 
would be viewed as not providing a satisfactory explanation. Presumably 
such an outcome would be equally problematic to the sort of reconciliatory 
view I am attempting to argue for, however in the absence of this new view’s 
articulation – and therefore of further specifics – I am unable to address the 
possibility further, save for concluding that I do not take this to be an 





5.3: Relationalism & representationalism as complementary explanations 
If the above is correct, then of the range of possibilities (1) – (4) for allegedly 
competing explanations, I have provided reasons for accepting that 
representationalism and relationalism do not satisfy (1) or (4), subject to 
being able to successfully show that they satisfy (2) or (3). If it can be shown 
that they do satisfy (2) or (3), then it is true that they cannot satisfy (1) or (4), 
but I take the reasons provided in the preceding section to strengthen my 
overall case.  
(2) claims that relationalism and representationalism are strongly 
complementary explanations, whereas (3) claims that they are weakly 
complementary explanations. I will be arguing that relationalism and 
representationalism satisfy (2), and are strongly complementary (though 
weakly complementary explanations will also have a role to play in the 
account to be proposed in what follows). The difference between the two lies 
in whether the complementary explanations can be integrated in a way that 
provides us with a better explanation overall. In the case at hand, the sense 
in which the explanation integrating relationalism and representationalism 
will be taken to be better will end up being – based on Marchionni’s reading 
with regard to strongly complementary explanations – a more complete 
explanation: one which bolsters the explanatory virtues of both breadth and 
depth, as defined earlier, across the board once the component explanations 
are integrated.374 What strongly and weakly complementary explanations 
have in common is that each constitutes a legitimate explanation of the 
target phenomenon, that each is a distinct explanation, and that each 
possesses different explanatory virtues. In what follows, I will first show that 
these common conditions can be met – such that it can be concluded that 
representationalism and relationalism are complementary explanations. 
                                                          
374 It is worth pointing out that Marchionni herself actively resists the claim that more complete explanations 
are synonymous with better explanations in an exclusive definitional sense. That is to say, the possibility is left 
open that an explanation may be in some sense better than another despite not being more complete; they 
may simply be deeper explanations, for example (2008: 330). The point here is that, so far as strongly 
complementary explanations have integration as an essential facet, that they produce explanations which are 
more complete is potentially a more probable outcome than other ways in which the resulting explanation 
might be better (by being more stable, for example; see Marchionni (2008: 318) for discussion). 
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Then, I will look to establish what sort of complementary explanations they 
are. 
The question immediately in front of us is the following: in order for it to be 
the case that relationalism and representationalism are complementary 
explanations, what set of circumstances must obtain? A plausible three-point 
list that answers this question, I suggest, states with respect to the two 
theories that: 
a) Each explanation is a legitimate explanation. 
b) Each explanation is distinct. 
c) Each explanation possesses different explanatory virtues. 
This list is achieved simply by deconstructing the definitions of strongly and 
weakly complementary explanations into the three individual criteria that 
they have in common. Further elucidation may be achieved, then, by 
clarifying the conditions under which (a) – (c) would be satisfied. 
In order to be a legitimate explanation, I take it that the explanation under 
consideration must provide a satisfactory eg-answer to a salient es-question. 
This is a fairly minimal definition, and can be distinguished from a more 
demanding one according to which an explanation is only legitimate if it 
offers eg-answers to many, most, or even all of the es-questions that one 
might reasonably ask of the target phenomenon. I think the more minimal 
definition functions as a better determination of an explanation’s legitimacy. 
If all theory x offers is a single (correct) eg-answer to a single es-question 
that one may raise about a given phenomenon, then it is still plausibly a 
legitimate explanation of that phenomenon, on a reasonable reading of 
legitimate. That theory y provides correct eg-answers to every es-question 
relevant to that phenomenon may be a reason to far prefer theory y to 
theory x, but it does not count against x’s legitimacy as an explanation. 
Perhaps one is only interested in the es-question to which x provides an eg-
answer. In such a case, x may rightly be preferred to y, as the latter may 
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offer vast amounts of superfluous information that obfuscates the 
explanation initially sought. 
Whilst each of these claims seems true, it also seems entirely arbitrary to 
declare the explanation not legitimate on the basis that it is only legitimate 
at a certain finer level of grain. If such a move were permissible, it is hard to 
see why all of the explanations offered by both representationalism and 
relationalism cannot similarly be deemed not legitimate explanations on the 
grounds that they do not, in virtue of the fact that the theories offering them 
are only attempting to offer accounts regarding our perceptual experience, 
provide eg-answers to all of the es-questions pertaining to, say, the nature of 
the mind as a whole.  
The reading I intend for legitimacy to have here, regarding theories of 
perception, is that relationalism and representationalism are legitimate 
explanations of perception, and are so with respect to the es-questions to 
which they provide eg-answers. Since they both provide satisfactory eg-
answers to es-questions that can reasonably be asked about the 
phenomenon of perception, they are legitimate explanations on my intended 
interpretation of ‘legitimate explanation’. Having outlined what it is for (a) to 
be satisfied, in such a manner that I take it to have also been made clear that 
(a) in fact is satisfied, I turn now to (b) and (c).  
In order for it to be the case that one explanation is distinct from another, I 
take it that the set of eg-answers offered by each explanation must not be 
identical. I place the importance on the side of eg-answers rather than es-
questions here because this appears to be a more fruitful way of 
individuating explanations. Whilst it is true that two explanations that 
address distinct es-questions will be independent explanations, it is also true 
that two explanations that address exactly the same es-questions may be 
independent explanations, and this will happen precisely in the case 
whereby the same es-questions are addressed yet different eg-answers are 
provided. Cases of disagreement among competing explanations require that 
they are attempting to explain the same thing, yet offering different 
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explanations. In this respect, such disagreement is predicated upon them 
being distinct explanations. What cannot happen, since any eg-answer is an 
eg-answer to an es-question, is that two explanations are distinct despite 
offering all and only the same eg-answers as one another. No-one involved in 
the relationalism versus representationalism debate holds that they are not 
distinct explanations. Any number of differences between the views that I 
have discussed serves to satisfy this condition. 
Finally, (c) holds that the two explanations must possess different 
explanatory virtues. Recall that explanatory virtues were defined as 
properties of an explanation or theory. This allowed for two sorts of 
explanatory virtues: those possessed by a theory because it is admirable in 
view of explaining something that another cannot, and those possessed by a 
theory in view of it explaining something in a particular way. Of these, the 
former will be essential to my argument in showing that relationalism and 
representationalism are complementary; once this has been established, 
both sorts of explanatory virtue will come into play when assessing whether 
they are strongly or weakly complementary explanations. 
I take it that one way of demonstrating that explanations possess the first 
sort of explanatory virtue is to show that each explanation offers an eg-
answer to at least one es-question not addressed by the other. For present 
purposes, this would amount to there being at least one pair of es-questions 
within the purview of the philosophy of perception, which are such that one 
of them is offered an eg-answer by relationalism but not by 
representationalism, whilst the other is offered an eg-answer by 
representationalism but not by relationalism. If this set of circumstances 
obtains, representationalism and relationalism possess different explanatory 
virtues (of the first sort described above). 
Additionally, it seems as though if an explanation provides an explanans to 
an explanandum, then this plausibly is an explanatory virtue relative to what 
we want to understand. If there is some aspect of perception that we wish to 
understand and only relationalism (say) adequately explains it, then 
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relationalism possesses an explanatory virtue relative in view of offering this 
explanans. This is an explanatory virtue in virtue of explaining what it was 
that we wanted to have explained, and if two explanations can be said to 
possess explanatory virtues in this fashion, then they will possess different 
explanatory virtues (again, of the first sort). 
This set of circumstances does obtain, and demonstrating that it does was 
the task with which the previous chapter was concerned. If one es-question 
in favour of either theory is all that is required to show that relationalism 
and representationalism possess different explanatory virtues, then the 
findings of Chapter 4 should more than adequately support the claim that 
they do. There, I identified three es-questions that favour relationalism in 
the manner required, and two that favour representationalism. For 
convenience, I re-state them here: 
(REL-1): How does experience provide the perceiving subject with conclusive 
reasons for applying certain empirical concepts in judging their environment as 
being a particular way? 
(REL-2): What makes demonstrative reference possible? 
(REL-3): How do we determine whether an erroneous experience is illusory or 
hallucinatory? 
(REP-1): How do subjects of veridical experiences perceive the kind properties of 
mind-independent objects? 
(REP-2): Why are certain hallucinations and veridical perceptions subjectively 
indistinguishable? 
In Chapter 4, I provided arguments for why each of these es-questions was 
such that it satisfied the condition of being eg-answerable by either 
relationalism or representationalism but not by both.  
Appealing to the first sort of explanatory virtue defined above, I contend 
that relationalism therefore has explanatory virtue in view of explaining: (i) 
how experience provides subjects with conclusive reasons for applying 
certain empirical concepts in judging their environment as being a particular 
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way; (ii) how demonstrative reference is possible; and (iii) how we determine 
whether an erroneous experience is veridical or hallucinatory. We have seen 
that representationalism cannot provide satisfactory eg-answers to (REL-1) – 
(REL-3), and so relationalism – uniquely of the two views – possesses 
explanatory virtues in view of explaining these matters. 
Applying the same rationale to the es-questions that favour 
representationalism, I contend that representationalism can be shown to 
have explanatory virtue in view of explaining (i) how we perceive the kind 
properties of mind-independent objects, and (ii) why certain hallucinations 
and veridical perceptions are subjectively indistinguishable. Again, Chapter 4 
demonstrated that relationalism could not provide satisfactory eg-answers 
to (REP-1) and (REP-2), and so representationalism – uniquely of the two 
views – possesses explanatory virtue in view of explaining these matters. 
If the above analysis is correct – if conditions on complementary 
explanations are accurate, the definition of explanatory virtue is acceptable, 
and my arguments to the effect that representationalism and relationalism 
possess different explanatory virtues whilst satisfying the other conditions 
are correct – then relationalism and representationalism are complementary 
explanations. The pertinent question then becomes whether they are strongly 
or weakly complementary. The answer hangs on whether they can be 
integrated in such a way as to provide a better explanation overall (in the 
sense of enhancing net explanatory virtue, i.e. being a more complete 
explanation), or are to be treated as autonomous explanations, with 
explanatory virtues that trade off against each other. 
For representationalism and relationalism, that the first sort of explanatory 
virtues – the provision of eg-answers to the es-questions discussed above – 
will trade off against one another if the explanations are kept autonomous is 
trivial: they are explanatory virtues in view of the eg-answers being unique to 
one of the two theories. If one appeals to representationalism alone, one 
does not have access to the eg-answers to (REL-1) – (REL-3), for instance. 
Things get more interesting when considering the integration of the two 
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explanations. As things stand, integrating the two explanations (by appealing 
to relationalism when considering the issues involved in (REL-1) – (REL – 3), 
and appealing to representationalism when considering those involved in 
(REP-1) and (REP-2), and constructing the remainder of the account in 
whichever manner yields internal consistency) seems to yield a greater net 
total of explanatory virtues for the resulting view. Neither austere theory had 
access to all of these explanatory virtues for the reasons discussed in 
Chapter 4, yet their integration would. 
I stated earlier that in determining whether relationalism and 
representationalism were strongly or weakly complementary explanations, 
the second notion of explanatory virtue – the kind possessed by an 
explanation in view of it explaining something in a particular way – would 
become relevant. Before illustrating how, it will be prudent to say more 
about these types of explanatory virtues and how they work. I gave the 
examples above of breadth and depth. The former is the result of a 
comparative approach: it unites many different phenomena, accounting for 
them via their commonalities; the latter is the result of a contrastive 
approach, and gets to the heart of how a single explanandum works by 
contrasting its mechanisms with those of other explananda. More simply: an 
explanation with greater breadth may explain more different aspects of a 
given phenomenon; whereas one with depth will tend to explain fewer, but 
will explain those that it does explain more comprehensively. I took breadth 
to operate by necessity over multiple eg-answered es-questions, whereas 
depth may operate over as few as one eg-answered es-question. 
Let us return to the prospect of integrating representationalism and 
relationalism in the manner discussed previously: by appealing to whichever 
view provides satisfactory eg-answers to the es-questions that favour one 
theory or the other, and constructing an internally consistent view on this 
basis. Focusing on these es-questions, we see that integration of 
relationalism and representationalism makes the resulting explanation more 
complete, in the sense that a greater number of explanatory virtues are 
possessed by way of providing eg-answers to all of these es-questions.  
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As I have defined them, such integration also allows the integrated 
explanations to interact in a manner yielding greater breadth and depth in 
the resulting explanation. I have in mind here instances where the two 
individual accounts can genuinely interact, such as we saw when discussing 
(REP-2) in Chapter 4. Here, we discovered the potential for a hybrid account 
of why certain hallucinations and veridical perceptions were subjectively 
indistinguishable. The proposed view appealed simultaneously to 
representational content to explain the seemingly shared phenomenology, 
whilst utilising epistemological disjunctivism to account for the 
epistemological difference between the two states. Here, arguably, a greater 
number of experiential states are explained via the commonality of shared 
representational content, whilst the epistemological difference upheld by 
McDowellian disjunctivism allows a simultaneous deeper account to be given 
of their differences. In addition to these, it is trivial that by integrating the 
two explanations, the overall explanation offered is deeper, as by its design 
it explains things that each of the individual component explanations 
cannot. Either reading works for arguing that it is a better explanation – the 
net amount of explanatory virtues of both sorts increase upon integration. It 
is for this reason that I conclude that relationalism and representationalism 
are strongly complementary explanations. 
To be clear, this conclusion involves an integration of two explanations: 
relationalism and representationalism. These are explanations of a single 
phenomenon – perception – but can still be read as constituting eg-answers 
to a single es-question: something like ‘what is the fundamental 
philosophical account of perception?’. In the following chapter, I shall make 
a case that the ‘fundamental’ aspect of this question makes it, in certain 
respects, a bad question. What is important to the present point is that this 
question operates at a coarser-grained level than the more particular es-
questions that each theory offers eg-answers to, such as those identified in 
Chapter 4, which explain individual aspects of perception. It is important to 
interpret the conclusion given previously, therefore, as holding that 
relationalism and representationalism are strongly complementary 
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explanations relative to this coarser-grained es-question, and this is so in 
view of the heightened explanatory virtues across the board gained by 
integrating the explanations in a way that maps on to the eg-answers given 
to es-questions (REL-1) – (REL-3), (REP-1) and (REP-2). 
There is one point left to address before bringing all of this together to 
overcome the Screening Off Argument. For all that has been said so far, 
relationalism and representationalism are taken to be strongly 
complementary in virtue of cases where one of the two theories can provide 
an eg-answer to an es-question that the other cannot. Yet it seems plausible 
that there are cases where both theories appear to offer distinct accounts of 
the same precise aspect of perception. It seems that integrating the 
explanations will hit a stumbling block in such cases, and so my view must 
provide an account of what to do in such cases. I argue that when addressing 
these cases, we should treat the particular explanations offered of the single 
aspect of perception as weakly complementary.  
This will be possible by appealing to the distinct explanatory interests being 
addressed by the distinct accounts being offered. In offering distinct 
accounts in such cases, relationalism and representationalism offer different 
eg-answers to the same es-question. I argue that at a finer level of grain, they 
will end up being different eg-answers to more specific, different es-
questions. If this is so, then whilst they will account for the same aspect of 
perception, they will do so in different ways which reflect different 
explanatory interests, as exhibited by these finer-grained es-questions. As a 
result of this, each will possess different explanatory virtues relative to 
explaining uniquely the finer-grained explanandum, or by explaining it in a 
deeper way relative to the inquirer’s explanatory interest.  
In this way, I conclude the following: (i) the two accounts are legitimate 
explanations (within relationalism and representationalism respectively); (ii) 
they are autonomous in virtue of being distinct eg-answers to what is, at the 
initial coarse-grained level, the same es-question; and (iii) they possess, at 
the finer-grained level of es-question, different explanatory virtues that will 
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trade off against one another relative to the explanatory interests 
highlighted by those distinct es-questions. Claims (i) – (iii) satisfy the 
conditions for explanations being weakly complementary, and so these 
remaining cases where relationalism and representationalism appear to offer 
competing explanations can be accounted for by appeal to the particular 
explanations in question being weakly complementary. There is no reason to 
privilege one such eg-answer over another, save for how well it addresses 
particular explanatory interests indicated by the finer-grained es-question. 
This too will have ramifications for the Screening Off Argument that I will 
discuss in the chapter that follows. 
Having introduced the notions of weakly and strongly complementary 
explanations, and outlining what it would be for explanations to be 
complementary in either sense, I have argued in this chapter first that 
relationalism and representationalism, qua explanations of perception, 
satisfied conditions on being complementary explanations of one sort or the 
other, with the determining factor being whether their different explanatory 
virtues are magnified when the explanations are integrated. On the whole, by 
appeal to the es-questions (REL-1), (REL-2), (REL-3), (REP-1) and (REP-2), I have 
argued that this is the case and that, qua explanations of perception, 
relationalism and representationalism are strongly complementary. Finally, I 
addressed what to make of cases where the two views appear to offer 
competing eg-answers to the same es-question. Here I argued that the two 
theories, qua explanations of perception, are autonomous. However, it can 
also be held that these seemingly competing eg-answers, qua explanation of 
a particular aspect of perception, are actually eg-answers to distinct, finer-
grained es-questions. In this respect, their explanatory virtues will trade off 
against one another, and so in these cases the explanations can be treated as 
weakly complementary, with preference being rightly allocated to the eg-
answer to the es-question that more accurately reflects the explanatory 
interests of the inquirer. In the following chapter, I will bring the account I 
have proposed in this one to bear on the Screening Off Argument, and thus 






6: Conclusion: A pluralist reconciliation of relationalism and 
representationalism  
 
The account articulated at the end of Chapter 5, drawing on all preceding 
chapters, holds that relationalism and representationalism are strongly 
complementary with respect to the coarse-grained es-question(s) that they 
are generally taken to address as theories of perception. I have in mind here 
an es-question such as ‘what is the correct philosophical account of 
perception?’ or something similar. I argue that instances where the two 
theories appear to offer different accounts were crucial to my argument that 
they are complementary explanations, and this is so for two reasons.  
The first relates to instances highlighted by the es-questions identified in 
Chapter 4: (REL-1), (REL-2), (REL-3), (REP-1) and (REP-2). These instances are 
central to the claim that relationalism and representationalism are strongly 
complementary explanations because one of the conditions of being 
complementary in this respect is that, when integrated, the resulting 
explanation is a better explanation than the component explanations in 
some respect. I hold that the nature of these es-questions is that integrating 
relationalism and representationalism into a view that involves the eg-
answers to each of them, as identified in Chapter 4, would satisfy this 
criterion. Moreover, in virtue of being the best eg-answers to the es-
questions that were available, they also help to map out how relationalism 
and representationalism are to be integrated. 
The second reason that instances where relationalism and 
representationalism appear to offer different accounts are important to my 
view involves the role that weakly complementary explanations play in the 
account. These instances are not like the es-questions from Chapter 4, but 
rather are es-questions to which both representationalism and relationalism 
can provide an eg-answer. The thought here is that these es-questions are 
finer-grained than those with respect to which the theories are strongly 
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complementary. Thus, they serve as explanations of more specific aspects of 
perception. Since they do not obviously integrate, despite being legitimate 
and autonomous, I argue that explanatory pluralism suggests that our means 
of evaluating which is to be preferred should be determined by one’s 
explanatory interests. Drawing on material from Chapters 3 and 5, I submit 
that, relative to one’s specific explanatory interests, the two explanations 
will possess different explanatory virtues that trade off against one another. 
Consequently, these finer-grained relationalist and representationalist 
explanations of more specific aspects of perception are, I conclude, weakly 
complementary. 
As it stands, the proposed account falls short of establishing the conclusion 
that the Screening Off Argument can be overcome, much less the conclusion 
that relationalism and representationalism are compatible. Establishing 
these conclusions will be the central tasks of this final chapter. The structure 
will be as follows: I shall provide an argument that, in view of the es-
questions identified in Chapter 4, the Screening Off Argument can be 
overcome; once the Screening Off Argument has been dealt with, I shall 
appeal both to the strong and weak ways in which I take relationalism and 
representationalism to be complementary in order to establish that 
relationalism and representationalism are, on this account, compatible. 
Thereafter, I shall address three potential objections to the view as a whole 
(rather than to its individual relationalist or representationalist components), 
highlight two features that speak in its favour, and close with some remarks 
on prospective avenues for future study. 
 
6.1: Overcoming the Screening Off Argument 
My overcoming of the Screening Off Argument involves demonstrating that 
Explanatory Redundancy is necessary to the success of that argument, and 
showing that it is not satisfied by either relationalism or 
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representationalism. For convenience, I state here one version of the 
Screening Off Argument: 
The Screening Off Argument: 
1) Suppose (for the sake of reductio) that perceptual experiences are 
representational (in the sense that representationalism says they are). 
2) Relationalism is not explanatorily redundant with respect to what we want 
our philosophical theory of perception to explain (a commitment of 
relationalism). 
3) The fact that perceptual experiences are representational is sufficient to 
explain what we want our philosophical theory of perception to explain (a 
commitment of austere representationalism). 
4) If perceptual experiences are representational, relationalism is screened off 
as explanatorily redundant with respect to what we want our philosophical 
theory of perception to explain (from 3). 
5) Relationalism is screened off as explanatorily redundant with respect to 
what we want our philosophical theory of perception to explain (from 1 and 
4). 
6) Contradiction (2 and 5); perceptual experiences are not representational.375 
Recall that there are two versions of the argument, and this is just one. The 
idea is that the tenets of representationalism (as above) or of relationalism 
can be assumed to generate the reductio argument against the view. I argue 
in Chapter 5 that the inference from premise (3) to premise (4) requires 
appeal to the following claim: 
Explanatory Redundancy: If x explains everything that needs to be explained, then y is 
explanatorily redundant. 
Without this, there is no reason to hold the fourth premise true on the basis 
of the third, as the argument does. Consequently, either version of the 
Screening Off Argument as a whole can be rejected, provided that 
Explanatory Redundancy is not satisfied by either relationalism or 
representationalism.  
                                                          
375 Parenthetical information added to premise (3) for clarity only. 
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I argue that there are two readings of Explanatory Redundancy – an interest-
dependent reading and an interest-independent reading. The former restricts 
the scope of ‘everything’ to certain explanatory interests or aspects of 
perception, whereas the latter has no restriction among explanatory interests 
salient to the phenomenon. The interest-dependent reading renders 
Explanatory Redundancy (at best) a false conditional, since it is by no means 
true that relationalism (say) explaining everything that certain explanatory 
interests would like to have explained entails that representationalism is 
explanatorily redundant. There are other perfectly legitimate aspects of 
perception that it may explain which relationalism cannot. Consequently, the 
austere theorist must establish that their theory satisfies the antecedent of 
the interest-independent reading of Explanatory Redundancy. 
This reading is a true conditional, however I submit it has a false antecedent: 
neither relationalism nor representationalism can satisfy it. Let us address 
the prospects of representationalism first. That representationalism cannot 
explain everything we would like a philosophical theory of perception to 
explain, I argue, is demonstrated by three of the es-questions I identified in 
Chapter 4: 
(REL-1): How does experience provide the perceiving subject with conclusive 
reasons for applying certain empirical concepts in judging their environment as 
being a particular way?, 
(REL-2): What makes demonstrative reference possible? 
(REL-3): How do we determine whether an erroneous experience is illusory or 
hallucinatory? 
Of the es-questions to which relationalism can provide satisfactory eg-
answers, these are selected because – as I argue in Chapter 4 – 
representationalism cannot do so. As a result (REL-1) – (REL-3) highlight 
aspects of perception that we would want a philosophical theory of 
perception to explain, yet that representationalism cannot. 
Representationalism therefore fails to satisfy the antecedent of 
Explanatory Redundancy’s interest-independent reading. 
234 
 
Relationalism fares no better, as Chapter 4 also identifies the following 
es-questions: 
(REP-1): How do subjects of veridical experiences perceive the kind properties of 
mind-independent objects? 
(REP-2): Why are certain hallucinations and veridical perceptions subjectively 
indistinguishable? 
These constitute the counterpart to the preceding three es-questions, 
and although selected because representationalism can provide them 
with satisfactory eg-answers, they are also selected because 
relationalism cannot. Since they highlight aspects of perception that we 
would want a philosophical theory of perception to explain, and 
relationalism cannot provide satisfactory eg-answers, relationalism 
cannot satisfy the antecedent of Explanatory Redundancy’s interest-
independent reading either. 
Taken together, these results entail that neither relationalism nor 
representationalism can satisfy the antecedent of Explanatory 
Redundancy’s interest-independent reading. Hence the conditional 
claim comes out true, but with a false antecedent. What this means for 
the Screening Off Argument is that the premise (4) above cannot be 
successfully derived from premise (3), and so despite being valid, the 
argument as a whole fails due to lack of soundness. It is perhaps 
possible that some version of it could go through on the basis of the 
interest-dependent reading of explanatory redundancy, but this would 
be restricted in its ambition to simply the explanatory interests that one 
theory or the other explained everything about. Any attempt to 
establish that representationalism and relationalism were incompatible 
on such a basis would be guilty of screening off as explanatorily 





6.2: The pluralist solution 
I argue that the Screening Off Argument can be overcome by appealing to 
the es-questions I identified in Chapter 4. If this is right, then austere 
relationalists and austere representationalists cannot utilise the Screening 
Off Argument to support the austerity of their positions. What it does not 
establish is that relationalism and representationalism are compatible; it 
merely establishes that they cannot be argued to be incompatible in a certain 
way. Granted, I take the Screening Off Argument to be the most popular way 
of establishing their incompatibility, but what has been established so far 
falls short of demonstrating compatibility of the views. This is where the 
arguments from Chapter 5 that relationalism and representationalism are 
complementary explanations of perception come into play. 
Following Marchionni, I discuss two ways that explanations could be 
complementary: strongly and weakly. Conditions common to each sort were 
that the explanations in question had to be legitimate explanations – i.e. they 
must constitute at least one eg-answer to a reasonable es-question about 
their target phenomenon. They must also possess different explanatory 
virtues. I take there to be two sorts of explanatory virtues: those an 
explanation possesses in view of being admirable because it explains a 
particular thing, and those an explanation possesses in view of being 
admirable because it explains something in a particular way. The former sort 
can be predicated as the result of a single eg-answer to an es-question, whilst 
the latter tend in most cases to be predicated based on several of these. I 
hold that relationalism and representationalism satisfy both of these 
conditions: each is a legitimate explanation in the sense defined, and in 
virtue of their ability to provide eg-answers to (REL-1) – (REL-3) and (REP-1) – 
(REP-2) respectively, I argue that they have different explanatory virtues too, 
and therefore satisfy the common conditions for being complementary 
explanations. 
The two types of complementarity also differ. Explanations are strongly 
complementary if, when integrated into a single explanation, they form a 
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better explanation in the sense that the explanatory virtues involved are 
enhanced as a result of the integration. Weakly complementary explanations 
are autonomous: they remain unintegrated, and their explanatory virtues 
trade off against one another. Since representationalism and relationalism 
meet the conditions for complementary explanations, and I am to argue that 
their complementarity has bearing on whether or not they are compatible, 
my positive account must address what sort of complementary explanations 
they are. 
In the latter part of Chapter 5, I argue that relationalism and 
representationalism are strongly complementary explanations. This commits 
them to being integrated into an explanation that is better than its individual 
constituent explanations in view of having enhanced explanatory virtues. I 
support my claim that this condition was satisfied by appealing to (REL-1) – 
(REL-3), (REP-1) and (REP-2). I argue that the integration of 
representationalism and relationalism should be drawn up in such a way 
that the integrated account could provide eg-answers to all of these es-
questions.  
This is possible because, as I have stated, austere relationalism is not 
committed to there being no perceptual representation any more than 
austere representationalism is committed to there being no perceptual 
acquaintance relation. What each is committed to is that the apparatus 
proposed by the other does any indispensable explanatory work in 
accounting for perceptual experience, and so the notion that both things 
obtain is not in itself precluded. By appealing to both, in the manner 
outlined, the proposed view integrates relationalism and representationalism 
in such a way as to possess more explanatory virtues, insofar as providing 
eg-answers to these es-questions – and therefore offering good explanations 
of the relevant aspects of perception – constitutes possession of explanatory 
virtues. The integrated explanation, by answering all of the es-questions 
under discussion, possesses more explanatory virtues than either of its 
constituent unintegrated explanations. I do not argue for the conclusion that 
the integrated account possesses enhanced explanatory virtues of the 
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second sort – such as breadth and depth – on this basis, though I do not 
think it implausible. Either way, the above ensures all conditions on strongly 
complementary explanations are met, and it is concluded that relationalism 
and representationalism are strongly complementary explanations. 
Insofar as the proposed view involves the integration of accounts discussed, 
I take the question of compatibility, relative to these es-questions, to have 
been resolved. My positive account also features weakly complementary 
explanations, however. This is due to the relativity just emphasised. In virtue 
of being integrated in the way required of strongly complementary 
explanations, relationalism and representationalism are more specifically 
strongly complementary relative to the coarse-grained question that each 
was designed to answer. This coarse-grained question is something like 
‘what is the correct philosophical account of perception?’, and the two are 
strongly complementary because the integrated account provides 
satisfactory eg-answers to es-questions that constitute an overall eg-answer 
to this coarse-grained es-question. 
There are plausibly going to be instances, however, of es-questions to which 
both relationalism and representationalism can provide differing satisfactory 
eg-answers. Here, it looks as though the two theories will not 
straightforwardly integrate in the manner described above, and so 
compatibility of the two theories cannot be defended in the same way. In 
these instances, I argue, one should focus on the fact that these instances 
constitute specific es-questions which are of a finer grain than the coarser-
grained ‘what is the correct philosophical account of perception?’ es-
question. That relationalism and representationalism do not integrate neatly 
with respect to these es-questions is no problem for my account, however, 
because with respect to these finer-grained es-questions, I hold that 
relationalism and representationalism are weakly complementary. 
This is possible in virtue of the explanatory pluralist methodology I have 
been applying throughout, according to which one explanation is not to be 
preferred to one another in all circumstances by necessity, but rather in view 
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of how well it addresses one’s explanatory interests. Of course, one might 
discount a proposed explanation because of internal incoherence, 
contradiction or inconsistency, and prefer alternatives simply on the basis 
that they do not have these problems. The point is that when there are not 
inherent flaws such as these, there are no robust preference or exclusion 
rules on evaluating explanations. On this view an explanation is simply a 
statement (or set thereof), and only becomes an explanation in virtue of how 
well the statement constitutes an eg-answer to an es-question – a matter 
itself contextually determined by what the inquirer wishes to understand. On 
this account, we can identify which of two seemingly competing eg-answers 
is better suited to an inquirer’s explanatory interests by refining the es-
question until it really latches on to what they wish to understand, and then 
assessing which of the two (or more) eg-answers most effectively addresses 
this more specific es-question. 
When relationalism and representationalism offer seemingly competing eg-
answers to single es-questions, of the sort that make the sort of integration 
of the theories we saw earlier seem impossible, these instances are best 
addressed by utilising the method outlined in the previous paragraph. By 
taking these instances as cases where a specific, finer-grained es-question 
has been asked by some inquirer, we can take it that this inquirer possesses 
explanatory interests: there is something that they wish to understand which 
has prompted the asking of this es-question. By identifying what it is that 
they really want to understand, I argue, we can then evaluate the respective 
explanations offered by relationalism and representationalism of this 
particular aspect of perception. The one to be preferred will be the one 
whose explanatory virtues most closely align to the inquirer’s explanatory 
interests. In virtue of possessing distinct explanatory virtues and not being 
integrated, these explanatory virtues will trade off against one another, 
rendering relationalism and representationalism as autonomous relative to 
these finer-grained es-questions, and therefore weakly complementary with 
respect to them. 
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If I am correct, then the view I am proposing incorporates both sorts of 
complementarity, applying them to what I take to be all of the sorts of es-
questions that a philosophical theory of perception should be providing eg-
answers to. That strongly complementary explanations are compatible is 
trivial in view of the required integration. That weakly complementary 
explanations are compatible I take to be true because of the purpose and 
nature of explanations: they exist to aid understanding and, on the view I 
endorse, they are statements that become explanations only because they 
address an inquirer’s explanatory interests. Weakly complementary 
explanations are compatible in a context-sensitive way, in that both are 
appealed to, and which one is used to provide an eg-answer to a particular 
es-question depends upon one’s explanatory interests. This context-sensitive 
compatibility of explanations is not problematic, I argue, precisely because 
explanations are themselves context sensitive. 
In virtue of these arguments, I conclude that relationalism and 
representationalism are shown to be complementary explanations across the 
board (i.e. with respect to all es-questions a philosophical theory of 
perception might reasonably cover) and, therefore, are compatible across the 
board, albeit in different ways for different relevant es-questions. The 
relationalism versus representationalism debate itself pertained to the views 
as complete theories that set out to answer the question ‘what is the correct 
philosophical account of perception?’. Regarding that debate, then, I take the 
two theories to be compatible in view of being strongly complementary 
explanations. I view them as weakly complementary only with respect to 
certain, more specific aspects of perception that they each appear to explain. 
 
6.3: Concerns 
I now address three potential concerns that I can anticipate one having about 
the view proposed. The first can be posed as the question: is the view being 
advanced a theory of perception or a meta-theory? It would seem that in 
240 
 
order to be a reconciliation of relationalism and representationalism, the 
proposed view must operate at the same level as them: i.e. it must be a 
theory, rather than a meta-theory. On the other hand, any independent effort 
to demonstrate their compatibility by refuting grounds for the opposite 
conclusion – such as the Screening Off Argument – would seem to require a 
meta-theory. 
In response, I contend that the view I propose is an integration of various 
constituent parts of relationalism and representationalism. What my view 
subsumes are individual eg-answers to es-questions pertinent in the 
philosophy of perception, rather than the entire theories wholesale. This 
guarantees that the view operates at the same level as relationalism and 
representationalism, and therefore is reconciliatory in nature. The way in 
which this reconciliation was possible, however, is highly reliant on 
methodological considerations: the context sensitivity of explanations for its 
efficacy is crucial in establishing the claim that relationalism and 
representationalism are compatible in the manner outlined. In this respect, 
though not a meta-theory, the view allows a determinate stance to be taken 
to the question of compatibility of the two theories in view of the meta-
theoretic underpinnings it has. 
The second concern is summarised by the following question: to what extent 
is my view a reconciliation of representationalism and relationalism? By this 
it is meant: to what extent is the view a reconciliation of these, as opposed to 
simply being some alternative view? Such a concern would be motivated by 
the fact that the view does not appeal to either austere relationalism or 
austere representationalism in their entirety. Broadly, the view is not a 
reconciliation of either austere theory, insofar as it advocates the severance 
of the elements of austerity from both. It is this austerity – that the theory in 
question is the correct one and the other is not – that my view holds to be in 
fatal error. My view does neither reconciles, nor aspires to reconcile, these 
erroneous elements.  
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What it does reconcile is the respective explanatory apparatus of those 
theories: the notions of representation and the perceptual acquaintance 
relation. These, I argue, both play vital explanatory roles in the philosophy of 
perception. They are composed, on my view, of various eg-answers to es-
questions which, in turn, are simply statements that are rightly viewed as 
explanations in view of a context determined by explanatory interests of the 
inquirer. Taking one of these statements as an example, call it S1, it seems 
fair to say that if S1 is part of the reconciliation, there will be a statement in 
my account, S2, that corresponds to it. This will serve as an explanation in 
precisely the same way as it did in the austere theory it is taken from, and 
has the status of explanation in view of the same explanatory interests, and 
has the same content. For these reasons, it can be concluded that S1 = S2, and 
the subsuming of statements like this entail a reconciliation in the manner 
outlined. 
Consequently, my broad answer to the concern is: it depends. More 
specifically, it depends on which question is being asked in the articulation 
of the concern. If the question is about whether the aspects of austere 
relationalism and austere representationalism that have explanatory utility 
are being reconciled: yes, the view is such a reconciliation. If the scope of the 
question covers reconciliation of those theories, including their elements of 
austerity: no, it is not. 
Finally, I address a more specific concern regarding the methodological 
underpinning of my account. Considering the solution to the previous worry, 
what I am reconciling here are parts of different explanations (relationalism 
and representationalism) of a single phenomenon (perception). These parts 
are eg-answers: statements that answer es-questions. As we saw, statement 
S1 from one of the austere theories has an analogue S2 in my account. The 
account is a reconciliation, we saw, and so S1 = S2. Both are the same 
statement, with identical content, playing the same roles, and this is based 
on explanatory context, which is determined in turn by explanatory 
interests. Thus we have context sensitivity and determination explaining why 
S1 = S2, and explanatory interests playing the role of determining the context. 
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The concern runs as follows: on pain of regress, what are the identity or 
individuation conditions of explanatory interests? Suppose explanatory 
interests are context sensitive. Call whatever determines that context x. What 
are the identity or individuation conditions for x? If something robust cannot 
be identified to answer this line of questions, then we have a regress.376  
Fortunately, I think that we can halt the regress at the level of 
identity/individuation conditions for explanatory interests. Assuming the es-
question/eg-answer framework, presumably the explanatory interests are 
what leads the inquirer to formulate the es-question. Presumably, then, these 
are to be determined by the inquirer’s epistemic states: beliefs, expectations 
of what a good eg-answer should be, background knowledge and 
presuppositions.377 The determination also plausibly involves other 
intentional states of the inquirer; namely: desires, at least their desires to 
understand or have certain things explained. If the desire is for something 
robust to identify or individuate explanatory interests, it can be argued that 
we should look to the es-question: this is what encodes these notions, and 
does so to a reference class that suitably disambiguates what the inquirer is 
actually looking for from what they are not. 
A coarser-grained response to the worry is that we (as inquirers) determine 
our explanatory interests, and therefore it is the inquirer’s subjective 
individuation of their own explanatory interests that matters. This may seem 
arbitrary, though I do not believe it is worryingly so. We are individuating 
explanatory interests, not worldly things like mind-independent objects. 
Even perceptual experiences seem prone to individuation in a less arbitrary 
fashion than explanatory interests – the latter are not worldly in any robust 
sense and so, the thought goes, we should not expect our means of 
individuating them to be worldly in any robust sense either. Arguably, to the 
extent that they simply constitute states of mind, one can plug in one’s 
preferred theory of individuating those – at that point it is not a problem for 
                                                          
376 I am grateful to Melissa Ebbers for raising this point. 
377 See Schweder (1999: 116 – 117) 
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my view in particular, and the debate regarding which of those theories is 
correct is beyond the scope of the present discussion. 
 
6.4: Features 
Having dealt with some concerns, I now point out some positive features of 
my view (aside from resolving the relationalism versus representationalism 
debate). Firstly, if the view is correct, then proponents of several prominent 
theories of perception are, to some extent, mistaken. They commit the error 
of taking cases in which their preferred theory appears particularly strong – 
in virtue of it apparently explaining some aspect of perception that the 
allegedly competing theory seems unable to explain – as evidence that the 
alternative theory can be screened off as explanatorily redundant. In virtue 
of highlighting the methodological error being committed here, my view 
explains this mistake – providing a perfectly intelligible story as to how and 
why it occurs, whilst still making sense of the critical importance of such 
cases. 
The austere theorists are not wrong that the cases described above – cases, I 
have argued, such as those highlighted by (REL-1), (REL-2), (REL-3), (REP-1) 
and (REP-2) – demonstrate the strength and explanatory utility of their 
theory. They are not even wrong that such cases demonstrate these features 
of their view whilst highlighting the shortcomings of the other theory. They 
are wrong about the significance of this. By presuming a methodology of 
explanatory monism, they can uphold the view that there is indeed a 
fundamental account to be given – a One True Theory – of perception. Then, 
since they successfully identify an aspect of perception that the view they 
take as their competition looks unable to explain, they incorporate this into 
the argument for their own account, generally focusing on its strengths 
whilst remaining silent on its weaknesses. They then conclude that the 
supposedly competing theory is screened off as explanatorily redundant. 
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My view accommodates the arguments on either side for the strengths (and, 
indeed, comparative weaknesses) of both theories in various areas. By 
applying the methodology of explanatory pluralism, it highlights not only 
the errors made by austere theorists on the basis of such arguments, but 
also provides an argument that demonstrates the erroneous nature of their 
austerity mentality, whilst incorporating their philosophically meritorious 
arguments fully. 
The other feature of the view I wish to discuss relates to the fact that the 
integration is predicated upon reconceptualising the significance of cases 
where either relationalism or representationalism look particularly 
(uniquely) strong, and plays upon the observation that attempts to identify 
such cases constitutes much of the work in the debate at hand. What this 
allows for, I submit, is that the view I am proposing not only incorporates, 
but positively welcomes further examples. If it could be argued that only one 
of relationalism or representationalism could provide a satisfactory 
explanation of how we seem to perceive mind-independent objects as mind-
independent, for example, then my view has no trouble assimilating this 
result into the integration of the two theories, and such cases provide 
further specification on the precise nature of the integration to be preferred. 
In this respect, the view has the potential to accommodate instances that I 
have not identified, yet which may be appealed to in attempts to settle the 
relationalism versus representationalism debate in favour of either theory. 
 
6.5: Future work 
The latter feature identified in the preceding section is such that it also 
allows for future work in the philosophy of perception to be accommodated. 
That is not all there is to say about directions for further study in light of 
the proposed view, however. I close with some brief remarks about my 




The account I have proposed is very much focused upon, and derived from, 
theories of perception. These are taken to be explanations of a target 
phenomenon (namely perception) and are therefore distinct from that 
phenomenon. The question governing this thesis was about how these 
explanations interact with one another: commonly, they have been taken to 
be incompatible. I have argued against this claim and proposed an 
alternative account which integrates the two.  
This is all very explanation-centric, whereas the target phenomenon of 
perception, I suggest, is something empirical, that takes place in the world. If 
this is correct, and the account offered here seems plausible, then one 
avenue for future research is to assess whether there is any feature of 
perception (i.e. as it occurs in the world) that could underwrite the view as a 
whole, or that could at the least utilise the insights gained from the 
methodology applied, even if the specifics of the resulting view are 
substantiated slightly differently.  
Contemporary work on the unity of perception may constitute something 
along these lines.378 A view called capacitism, according to which 
relationalism and representationalism are compatible, and which holds that 
the austerity elements commonly applied to each are applied in error, has 
been proposed on the basis of perceptual capacities: capacities that function 
to single out mind-independent objects in the subject’s environment, and 
which are individuated by the mind-independent objects that they function 
to single out.379 The  view appears relational in nature, yet also features 
representational content playing an indispensable explanatory role. 
Consequently, the view appears reconciliatory in that “with relationalists, [it] 
argues that perception is constitutively relational, but with 
representationalists it argues that it is constitutively representational.”380 
                                                          
378 See Schellenberg (forthcoming). 
379 Schellenberg (2018b) 
380 Schellenberg (2018a) 
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I cannot delve into the specifics of the view here for reasons of space, but it 
seems that perceptual capacities – which are features of the target 
phenomenon, rather than explanations of it – are utilised in order to draw up 
the view and underwrite the reconciliatory view of perception on offer. As 
my view proceeds in the first instance from the explanatory methodology 
end of the spectrum, whereas capacitism proceeds from the end of the 
target phenomenon, it would be interesting to see whether the two views fit 
well together. If they did, one could imagine an argument in favour of a more 
comprehensive philosophical account of perception that addresses both 
perceptual and methodological concerns. If they did not, one could imagine 
that the reasons why they failed to do so would be illuminating in 
themselves and would help us along the road to establishing such a view. 
In addition to more philosophical features of perception, further work could 
also be done in addressing how well the proposed methodology squares with 
the findings of the empirical sciences on the topic of perception. It is worth 
noting that I take my view to operate at a different level of explanation to 
these, and so I do not take it to be in competition with them. Again, 
assessing how well the two sorts of take on perception may prove fruitful in 
our efforts to provide a unified, all-encompassing account of it. 
Consequently, there are several paths for future investigation into this issue 
to take, at least some of which involve asking questions about perception at 
a broadly different level of explanation to the one I have addressed here. The 
area of study in question is a promising one: perception is already a topic 
that has seen a great deal of interdisciplinary work, so answers based on 
careful comparison and evaluation of the work done across multiple levels 
of explanation – potentially in a variety of disciplines – are not obviously out 
of reach, though they are beyond the scope of the present project. 
Ultimately, solely in terms of being philosophical explanations of the 
phenomenon of perception, I submit that relationalism and 
representationalism are complementary and – however one prefers to draw 
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